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The word «moment" - from .the Latin movere (to move) -
c~n be understood in various senses. It is a point of time, 
an instant; it connotes importance, or weight; in 1666, 
according to the OED, it could be used to suggest a «definite 
stage or turning point in a course of events"; in 1691 it came 
to mean a "cause or motive of action, a determining influence 
or consid~ration" ... 
This dissertation stems from the conviction that the 
importance and weight of Sigmund Freud's "discovery" and 
elaboration of psychoanalysis - its impact as a turning point 
for western modes of intellectual activity, and as a 
determiµing consideration for western culture as a whole - has 
been so profound that it would be impossible to seek from 
within it the precise measure of its influence. Across modern 
philosophy, the human sciences, and the arts - from surrealism 
to pop art, from advertising to social welfare policies -
Freud's psychoanalysis permeates the ways in which we live, 
and is one of the key elements of that experience of modernity 
we can loosely call "modernism". 
The dissertation locates a number of moments ·of modernism 
in and around Freud's work - with attention to Freud's 
relation to the reading and interpretive practices of the 
twentieth century: Chapter One examines some of the ways in 
which psychoanalysis and literary studies have met, 
intersected and, at times, bypassed one another over the past 
few decades, in a flurry of encounters which have yet to 
settle into any definitive shape. Chapter Two responds to 
Stanley Fish's recent attack on Freud's scientific integrity 
in the "Wolf-man". The chapter focuses, in other words, on 
one particular strand of the critical tradition defined in the 
second section of Chapter One. 
Chapter Three - which conce~ns the famous case of "Dora" 
- attempts, first, to restore some sense of the theoretical 
moment in Freud's work represented by the case, and second, to 
re-introduce the question of history into what has become the 
critics' story of Freud's failure to get to the bottom of 
Dora's hysteria. The aim of this chapter is to suggest a way 
beyond the contradiction in which Freud is persistently 
invoked, in feminist criticism, as both liberator and 
oppressor, hero and villain. 
Chapter Four turns back to the interface between 
psychoanalysis and literature. Its focal point is a different 
permutation from that manifested in the "Dora" case history of 
Freud's life~long quest to solve the "riddle" of femininity. 
The chapter examines some of the problems Defoe's novel Moll 
Flanders has posed to a tradition of patriarchal literary 
criticism. These problems, it argues, are inseparable from 
questions of representation, female identity and the notion of 
''femininity" itself - the same questions which proved so 
intrusive in Freud's narrative of the case of Dora. 
This dissertation is concerned not only with the apparent 
"logic" of the arguments it confronts, but also with the· 
deeper constitution of that logic in and through the complex 
textures of writing. It aims to demonstrate that ·one of the 
most powerful moments of modernism in Freud's work lies in the 
stimulus it provides to an art of interpretation constantly 
attentive to the complexity of these textures. 
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PREFACE 
The word "moment" - from the Latin movere (to move) -· 
can be understood in various senses. It is a point of time, 
an instant; it connotes importance, or weight; in 1666, 
according to the OED, it could be used to suggest a 
"definite stage or turning point in a course of events"; in 
1691 it came to mean a "cause or motive of action, a 
.determining influence or consideration" ... 
This dissertation stems from the conviction that the 
importance and weight of Sigmu_~d_ Fr_e,ud_' s :d.:iscoyg_1~y_: __ a11_d 
~laboration of psychoanalysis - its impact as a turning 
point for western modes of intellectual activity, and as ~ 
determining consideration for western culture as a whole -
has been so profound that it would be impossible to seek 
from within it the precise measure of its influence. To 
some extent, like it or not, we in the West are all 
Freudians now, and psychoanalysis is one of the key elements 
of that experience of modernity which we can loosely call 
"modernism". 
"This is the age of Freud and Jung," notes Sanford 
Schwartz in his recent study of early twentieth century 
thought (The Matrix of Modernism, 1985) - an age of massive 
intellectual change~ deriving not least from the tendency 
(which is directly attributable to the influence of Freud's 
discoveries) to pose a sharp opposition between conscious 
"surfaces" and unconscious "depths"; between ordinary 
experience and a hidden realm of mental life; between the 
world of ordinary awareness and the invisible structures 
that condition it. Across modern philosophy, the human 
sciences, and the arts - from surrealism to pop art, from 
advertising to social welfare policies - Freud's 
psychoanalysis permeates the ways in which we live. 
.. 
II 
In the essays which follow, I have tried to locate a 
number of moments of modernism in and ~round Freud's work -
with particular attention to Freud's relation to the reading 
and interpretive practices of' the twentieth century. 
In Chapter One, I examine some of the ways in which 
psychoanalysis and literary studies have met, intersected 
and, at times, bypassed one another over the past few 
decades, in a flurry of encounters which have yet to settle 
into any definitive shape. My focal point in this chapter 
resides in what I see as an effort in Freud's writing 
whether conscious or unconscious - to transcend the 
traditional boundaries between the discourses of science and 
literature; an effort seldom acclaimed by his critics, who 
have tended either to eli-de the distinctive place of 
language in his work, or to use it against him as evidence 
of his implausibility as a scientist. 
The chapter traverses a number of diverse responses, in 
recent exchanges between psychoanalytic theory, literary 
theory and the practices of textual analysis, to the 
ambiguous textual status of Freud's writing - its uneasy 
position on the borders between literature and science. In 
Section I, a distinction is drawn between Patrick Mahony's 
reading of Freud in Freud as a Writer, and those readings of 
Freud's texts associated with what has popularly come to be 
known as "French Freud", in particular Derrida's reading of 
the second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. While 
the underlyirig objective of both these readings might be 
said to be the constitution of Freud's scientific project as 
itself an example of figurative writing, the outcome of each 
is crucially different. Section II is directed at the 
critical tradition for whom Freud's genius was "poetic" 
rather than scientific; his ideas more valuable as 
"metaphors" than as literal truths. In Section III, an 
alternative approach is put forward, exemplifie8 in Arnold 
Davidson's reading of Freud's Three Essays on Sexuality, 
which presents a version of Freud's "genius'' as neither an 
imaginative nor a rhetorical one so much as a conceptual 
one. In Section IV, it is suggested that Freud's 
transcendence of the usual boundaries of science was the 
enabling dynamic of his thought. 
Chapter Two is a response to Stanley Fish's recent 
attack on Freud's scientific integrity in his reading of 
Freud's "Wolf-man" case history. The chapter is focused, in 
other words, on one particular strand of the critical 
tradition defined in the second section of Chapter One. 
My response to Stanley Fish was prompted by two striking 
features of his paper: First, by the confrontation it 
represen~s between one specialist trained in the art of 
literary interpretation, and another who was discovering a 
methodology for the interpretation of dreams. To what 
extent do the two interpretative operations really coincide? 
Second, by ~ sense of deja-vu as I read his paper, as if 
everything he was saying had been said before, perhaps only 
in a different way. What is the fundamental objection 
underlying most attacks on Freud's work, how is it 
manifested in Fish's critique and, most significant of all, 
is it a valid one? 
The chapter as a whole was intended not so much to 
defend Freud against the charge laid against him by Fish -
for this would be a different project - as to suggest that 
even if Fish's charge were a valid one, he failed to make a 
case for it in his essay; and that this failure was 
crucially connected with ( 1 ) the limitations in his 
conception of what constitutes interpretive activity, both 
within the psychoanalytic situation and outside of it, and 
(2) his failure to engage in any substantial way with the 




In Chapter Three - which concer.ns another of Freud's 
most famous case histories, the case of "Dora" - I have 
tried to do two things: First, to restore some sense of the 
theoretical moment in Freud's work represented by the Dora 
case, particularly in its anticipation of later formulations 
of the crucially significant theory of repression, and in 
its movement - however halting - towards a new theory of a 
problematic, differential and component sexuality. Second, 
I have tried to re-introduce the question of history into 
what has become the critics' story of Freud's failure to get 
to the bottom of Dora's hysteria. In doing so, I hope to 
have suggested a way beyond the contradiction in which Freud 
is persistently invoked, in feminist criticism particularly, 
as both liberator and oppressor, hero and villain. As 
I 
Juli~t Mitchell points out (in Psychoanalysis and Feminism, 
1974), psychoanalysis, like any other system of thought, was 
formed and developed within a particular time and place: 
"but that does not invalidate its claim to universal laws, 
it only means that these laws have to be extracted from 
their specific problematic - the particular material 
conditions of their formation. In this connection we need 
to know of the historical circumstances of their development 
mainly in order not to limit them thereto." (xx) Chapter 
Three, then, re-examines a further moment of the critical 
reception of Freud's work - the recent outburst of feminist 
criticism around the "Dora" case history. 
In Chapter Four, the final chapter, I turn back to the 
questions I began with - the interface between 
psychoanalysis and literature. The focal point of this 
chapter is a different permutation from that manifested in 
the "Dora" case history of Freud's life-long quest to solve 
the "riddle" of femininity. The relation that concerns me 
here is not that between analyst and analysand, but between 
the institution of English literary criticism and one of 
( 
v 
fiction's most controversial female protagonists: 
Defoe's Moll Flanders. The chapter examines some 
Daniel 
of the 
problems Defoe's novel has posed to a tradition of 
patriarchal literary criticism. These problems, I argue, 
are insepar~ble from questions of representation, female 
identity and the notion of "femininity" itself - the same 
questions in fact which proved so intrusive in Freud's 
narrative of the case of Dora. 
In the final section of the chapter, ·I propose a new 
perspective through the work of British-feminist Denise 
Riley. In her recent book, Am I that Name?, Riley suggests 
that the discursive category "women" is neither 
straightforward nor natural, but is characterized by an 
"inherent shakiness": 
To put it schematically: women is historically, 
discursively constructed, and always relatively to 
other categories which themselves change; women is a 
volatile collectivity in which female persons can be 
very differently positioned, so that the apparent 
continuity of the sµbject of 'women isn't to be relied 
on; 'women' is both synchronically and diachronically 1 
erratic as a collectivity, while for the individual, 
~being a woman'is also inconstant, and can't provide an 
ontological foundation. (Riley, 1988: 1-2) 
It is this "shakiness", I argue, exe~plified in Defoe's 
novel in the character of Moll Flanders, which has so 
successfully resisted the classifications of traditional 
literary criticism. Although I make few direct references 
to Freud in the course of this ch~pter, his work as a whole 
lies behind it, and has been especially significant in 
making possible the new perspective I propose to bring, 
. 
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through Ril~y, to existing critical debates on Moll 
Flanders. 
This dissertation is concerned not simply with the 
apparent "logic" of the arguments it confronts, but also 
with the deeper constitution of that logic in and through 
the complex textures of writing. It aims to demonstrate 
that one of the most powerful moments of modernism in 
Freud's work lies in the stimulus it provides to an art of 
interpretation constantly attentive to the complexity of 
these textures. 
Despite the links between them, the following analyses 
were written to stand alone, as separate moments in the 
movement of Freud's thought and its ongoing history. 
CHAPTER ONE 
BORDERLINES 
Mediocra spirits demand of science a kind of certainty 
which it cannot give, a sort of religious satisfaction. 
Only the real, rare, true scientific minds, can endure 
doubt, which is attached to all knowledge. I always 
envy the physicists and mathematicians who can stand on 
firm ground. I hover, so to speak, in the air. Mental 
events seem to be immeasurable and probably always will 
be so. 
Sigmund Freud 
It is the peculiar focus of literary criticism on 
questions of language and interpretation which enables its 
practitioners to direct their attention not only to literary 
texts but to scientific ones as well. Since both science and 
literature are constituted in language - both are discursive 
- both may become objects for the practice of literary 
criticism. Yet if their common constitution in language is 
one of the features which unites science and literature, it 
is also the one (as Roland Barthes long ago recognized) 
which divides them more surely than any of their 
differences. The reason for this, as Barthes points out, is 
that science and literature do not assume or, if one 
prefers, profess the language which constitutes them in the 
same way: As far as science is concerned, 
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language is simply an instrument, which it profits it 
to make as transparent and neutral as possible; it is 
subordinate to the matter of science (workings, 
hypotheses, results) which, so it is said, exists 
outside language and precedes it. On the one hand and 
first there is the content of the scientific message, 
which is everything, on the other hand and next, the 
verbal form responsible for expressing that content, 
which is nothing. 
In the case of ~iterature, however - or at any rate,. 
that literature which has "freed itself" from classicism and 
humanism -
lang.uage can no longer be the convenient instrument or 
the superfluous backcloth of a social, emofional or 
poetic "reality" which pre-exists it, and which it is 
language's subsidiary responsibility to express, by 
means of submitting itself to a number of.stylistic 
rules. Language is literature's Being, its very world: 
the whole of literature is contained in the act of 
writing, and no longer in those of "thinking", 
"portraying", "telling" or "feeling". (Barthes, 1967: 
897) 
By professing the language which constitutes them in 
these two conflicting ways, science and literature stand 
essentially in opposition one to the other. Of the two, it 
is science which assumes a privileged position in relation 
to literature. In assigning itself a purely instrumental 
status, in which language is simply the transparent medium 
through which the "truth" of its content is c6nveyed, 
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scientific discourse believes itself to be a superior code, 
suggests Barthes - a mere "instrument of thought", a form of 
"neutral" language from which a certain number of 
specialized languages (the literary or poetic languages for 
example) have derived, as so many "devia-nts" or 
"embellishments". This neutral language is then held to be 
the referential code for all the "ex-centric" languages, 
which themselves are merely its sub-codes. By identifying 
itself with this referential code, as the basis of all 
normality, Barthes goes on to say, scientific discourse 
arrogates to itself a right grounded essentially in a 
misconception of the nature of language, which it is the 
role of literature - or "writing" - precisely to contest. 
One writer whose texts have consistently refused to 
uphold the boundaries between science and literature is 
Sigmund Freud. Symptomatic of the ambiguous textual status 
of his writing is the fact that though Freud was essentially 
a scientist, founder and father of the new science of 
psychoanalysis, and though, in his writings, he regularly 
and conscientiously defended the scientific status of his 
discoveries, the only public recognition he received from 
Germany in his lifetime was the Goethe Prize for literature. 
Some years after this award, Albert Einstein is reported to 
have told Freud that he particularly admired his work not 
from a scientific but from a litera~y point of view: "I do 
not know any contemporary who has presented his subject in 
the German language in such a masterly fashion," Einstein 
wrote in a letter to Freud in 1939. Later, in Stuttgart in 
1968, a book-l~ngth study focused exclusively on Freud's 
achievement not as a scientist but as a literary artist 
appeared, 1 and since then, Freud's name has become 
commonplace in literary studies throughout the West. 
Yet Freud's transcendence of the traditional boundaries 
between the discourses of science and literature has seldom 
4 
been'positively acclaimed by his critics, who have tended 
either to elide the distinctive place of language in his 
work, or to use it against him as evidence of his 
implausibility as a scientist. In this essay, I wish to 
examine a number of diverse responses, in recent exchanges 
between psychoanalytic theory, literary theory and the 
' practices of textual analysis, to the ambiguous textual 
status of Freud's writing - its uneasy position on the 
borders between literature and science. To what extent do 
these exchanges either endorse or undermine the privileged 
position appropriated for itself by the scientific 
establishment; its consistent - and in Barthes' view, 
scandalous - denial of the fact "that language is a vast 
system, none of whose codes is privileged or, if one 
prefers, central, and whose various d~partments are related 
in a fluctuating hierarchy"? If, as Barthes suggests, what 
is called for today is a "mutation" in the consciousness, 
the structure a~d the objectives of scientific discourse, 
what part can the debate between literature, psychoanalysis 
and literary criticism play in bringing this about? 
In Section I, a distinction is drawn between Patrick 
Mahony's reading of Freud in Freud as a Writer, and those. 
readings 0£ Freud's texts associated with what has popularly 
come to be known as "French Freud", in particular Derrida's 
reading of the second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. While the underlying objective of both these 
readings might· be said to be the constitution of Freud's 
scientific project as itself an example of figurative 
writing, the outcome of each is crucially different. Section 
II is directed at the critical tradition for whom Freud's 
genius was "poetic" rather than scientific; his ideas more 
valuable as "metaphors" than as literal truths. In Section 
III, an alternative approach is put forward, exemplified in 
Arnold Davidson's reading of Freud's Three Essays on 
Sexuality, which presents a ~ersion of Freud's. "genius" as 
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neither an imaginative nor a rhetorical one so much as a 
conceptual one. In Section IV, it is suggested that Freud's 
transcendence of the usual boundaries of science was the 
enabling·dynamic of his thought. 
I 
Patrick Mahony's Freud as a Writer (recently reissued 
in an expanded edition by Yale University Press) takes 
Freud's literary achievement as a starting point for an 
analysis of his "identity as a writer". In his bapacity 
both as practicing psychoanalyst and as professor of English 
literature at the University of Montreal, Mahony sets out to 
delimit this "identity" through a proposed "stylistic" 
exploration of some of his major texts. 
Mahony's project, in other words, stands at the 
intersection between the two fields of psychoanalysis and 
literature - an intersection to which the editors of 
Critical Inquiry devoted their winter 1987 issue. In her 
introduction to this issue, Francoise Meltzer suggests that 
traditionally, when psychoanalysis and literature are 
brought 'ogether, psychoanalysis is assigned an active 
interpreting position, while literature plays the role of 
"slave to psychoanalysis' master", the object to be 
interpreted: traditionally, "it is psychoanalysis which 
"knows" and will tell lite~ature what it is "really" about. 
From psychoanalysis literature is supposed to learn what it 
itself "means"". (1987: 219) In the usual exchange, suggests 
Meltzer, literature exists for the purpose of manifesting, 
almost in spite of itself, a psychoanalytic truth: 
6 
Since fiction is made possible by the constitution of 
the subject, and since it is the role of psychoanalysis 
to demonstrate how that constitution occurs, then it 
follows, psychoanalysis would have it, that fiction 
becomes truth and thus useful oniy when decoded by 
psychoanalysis. Otherwise, it remains merely fable. 
Literature is then 'recognized' by psychoanalysis only 
as the producer of Stoff for interpretation and 
consumption - precisely the position of the slave in 
the Hegelian model. In this position, literature cannot 
afford to recognize itself. Even if literature is 
mystified, as it often is in Freud or Lacan, it is so 
because it appears to have an arbitrary conception, 
which psychoanalysis will unravel as the ineluctable 
and incessant unfolding of the unconscious - nothing 
accidental, finally, at all. Except that literature 
dcies not know this. Its coherence, further, will be 
destroyed by the psychoanalytic reading; but it is only 
a surface coherence - the deeper ?ne, the one of which 
literature itself is ignorant, will be revealed by 
psychoanalysis. (1987: 218) 
Furthermore, not only literature is "partitive" in this 
way in the perspective of psychoanalysis, maintains Meltzer. 
The same would apply to all other disciplines: "Linguistics, 
philosophy, anthropology, history, feminism, 'humanism' 
could all be said to remain incomplete and ultimately less 
than meaningful without the overarching vision offered by 
psychoanalysis". (1987: 219) It is precisely in their 
implicit opposition to this notion of psychoanalysis' 
"overarching vision" that the e*says in the collection 
introduced by Meltzer find their co~mon ground - by turning 
psychoanalysis, in other words, from the interpreter into 
that which is to be interpreted; by making of it not the 
"all-consuming master subject" of inquiry, but, for once, 
its object. 
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Potentially at least, Mahony's promised "stylistic" 
project belongs in the same group as the above, for here too 
it is apparently not the established notions of 
psychoanalysis that Mahony proposes to bring to the practice 
of reading, but the texts of psychoanalysis themselves which 
ar~ to be "put on ttialu, as it were. But in the end, the 
project barely fulfills its potential: first, because of the 
author's failure to ground his exploration of Freud's style 
in any linguistic tradition which might conceivably lend his 
version of "stylistics" a less than purely arbitrary 
status; 2 and second, becau~e of the project's consequent 
inevitable degeneration, as the work proceeds, from the 
promised investigation of Freud's writing itself into a 
series of crude and speculative remarks more concerned with 
th• assignment of psychical motivations to the author than 
what he had to say. 
Evidently, Mahony is of the school which subscribes to 
the notion that creativity is some sort of disease which (as 
Meltzer puts it) "once the author is cured, disappears" -
the same school which, at a recent seminar for analysts at a 
psychoanalytic institute in a major American city, came up 
with a reading of Baudelaire's Fleurs du mal which argued 
that he wrote it because he struggled with a "negative 
maternal introject". When it was suggested to the analyst 
concerned that to see a great work of art purely as a 
psychoanalytic symptom might be to adopt an impoverished 
view of the creative act, he responded to his critic (who 
happen~d to be a woman) tha~ she too was in need of the 
cure: "From your reaction to my paper," he is reported to 
have said, "I am afraid that I must inform you that you too 
seem to have an unresolved conflict with your mother. Since 
you are a woman, this conflict has blocked your normal 
Oedipal development, and thus makes your relation to your 
father problematic. As I am the paternal figure here - male, 
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older - I must conclude that you are resisting my 
interpretation of Baudelaire because you are personally 
defensive with me and what I represent." 9 
My own resistance in reading Mahony is to the multitude 
of such symptoms which he manages to uncover, in the course 
of his study, in Freud's creative output: Can there be any 
scholarly significance, for instance, in the revelation (a 
product of Mahony~s scratchings through Freud's personal 
correspondence) that Freud's habit of addressing his 
lectures to a single member of the audience - very often to 
his great friend Lou Andreas-Salome, as he tells her in one 
of his letters - was,.iri Mahony's view, a manifestation of 
his "anxiety" about "exteriorizing his ultimately 
undefinable unconscious", a symptom of Freud's "personal 
inseq_uri ty" which "sought containment in a projected psychic 
space bounded and defined by good object relations"? (1987: 
58). How does.it help us to know that Freud's "creativity 
was at its highest when he was in a bad mood", or that he 
found a "symbolic paternal value in writing"? Or how are we 
to respond to the fatuous remark that writing was for Freud 
above all else a sort of masturbatory impulse ~ in Mahony's 
words, "a sublimating satisfaction for his drives", an 
attempt to "master them", or to give them "external 
realization". 
In his preface to Psychoanalysis and the Question of 
the Text, Geoffrey Hartman remarks that ideally, 
ps_ychoanalysis should provide a closer mode of close 
reading. Instead, it often blinds the "scientific" 
interpreter to the use of language, his own as well as 
that of the text at hand. The reductionist types of 
reading that result add nothing to theme, symbol, and 
archetype hunting. What does it matter that the drift 
\I 
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of an interpretation is descendental rather than 
ascendental, that sex rather than a lofty ideal proves 
to be the key? Such concepts as sublimation or 
regression in the service of the ego or defensive 
mastery do not compensate for the crudeness and 
tactlessness of these ventures. That the patient - in 
this riase the text - survives is something of a 
miracle. (1978: xv) 
Mahony's study is an almost parodic embodiment of the 
kind of "reductionist moves" identified both by Meltzer and 
Hartman, and which Hartman associates particularly with 
certain "older" kinds of psychoanalytic interpretations 
(Freud's excepted) which we read "only to know the worst .. 
to get them over with ... " or, as he puts it, "to admire the 
artist for the odds· he overcame, or ourselves for staying 
relatively sane though born inter faeces et urinas". (1~78: 
xv) 
It is crucial, however, that this particular form of 
psycho-biographical investigation (representative as it is 
of what Jacques Derrida might have called a form of 
"empirico-biographical explanation" whose function, 
ultimately, is to reduce the text to an excuse for the 
performance of an episode in the life of the autlior) be 
distinguished from that form of criticism concerned 
primarily with· the relation between objectivity and 
subjectivity in discourse, one of whose functions is to 
foreground the place of the subject in his or her own work; 
to foreground, in other words, the fact that "every 
utterance implies its own subject". (Barthes, 1967: 898) 
Only the latter form of psycho-biographical enterprise, in 
its capacity to demonstrate the necessity of the subject's 
constitution within discourse, is in a position to 
participate in the Barthesian project to "de-throne" 
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scientific discourse from the privileged position in which 
it is held by society as a meta-language ... Only the latter 
form is .appropriately positioned to demonstrate that, as 
Barthes •rites, 
... the relationship between subjectivity and 
objectivity or, if one prefers, the place of the 
subject in his own work, can no long~r be thought of as 
in the halcyon days of positivist science. Objectivity 
and rigour, those attributes of the scientist which are 
still used as a stick to beat us with, are essentially 
preparatory qualities, necessary at the time of 
starting out on the work, and as such there is no cause 
to suspect or abandon them. But they are not qualities 
that can be transferred to the discourse itself, except 
b~ a sort of sleight-of-hand, a purely metonymical 
procedure which confuses precaution with its end 
product in discourse. Every utterance implies its own 
subject, whether this subject be expressed in an 
apparently direct fashion, by the use of "I", or 
indirectly, by being referred to as "he", or avoided 
.altogether by means of impersonal constructions. (1967: 
898) 
What is excluded in the utterance is always only the 
"person", psychological, emotional, or biographical, 
certainly not the subject - a point amply demonstrated by 
many of those readings of Freud's texts associated with what 
has popularly come to be known as "French Freud". 4 One of 
the objectives of this recent French initiative is to 
constitute Freud's scientific project as itself an example 
of figurative writing, by focusing most insistently on the 
textuality of his work - an objective exemplified in, for 
instance, Derrida's reading of the second chapter of Beyond 
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the Pleasure Principle, in which he analyses Freud's account 
of the episode of the grandchild's game with the wooden 
reel, the fort/da episode. 
The game is played by Freud's grandchild who, at 
the age of one and a half, is observed by his grandfather 
playing with a wooden reel with a piece of string tied 
around it. "It never occurred to [t-he child] to pull it 
along the floor behind him, for instance, and play at its 
being a carriage," writes Freud. "What he did was to hold 
the reel by the string and very skilfully throw it over the 
edge of the his little curtained bed; so that it· disappeared 
into it, at the same time uttering his meaningful '0-0-0-0. • 
[signifying "gone"] He then pulled the reel out o~ the bed 
again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a 
joyful 'da' [signifying "there"]. This, then, was the 
complete game - disappearance and return. As a rule one 
witnessed only its first act, which was repeated untiringly 
as a game in itself, though there is no doubt that the 
greater pleasure was attached to the second act." (Freud, 
1920g: 15) 
Derrida's reading is based on the hypothesis that the 
process of repetition identified in the fort/da game is "re-
enacted" in the account itself in a way which can be shown 
to "re-inscribe" the writer (Freud) in his own text: 
If we consider the argumentative framework of the 
chapter, we notice that something repeats itself, and 
this process of repetition must be identified not only 
in the content (the examples, the materials described 
and analyzed) but also in Freud's very writing, in the 
"steps" taken by his text, in what it does as well as 
in what it says, in its "acts" as much as in its 
"objects." What obviously repeats itself in this 
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chapter is the movement of the speculator to reject, 
set aside, make disappear (:fort), defer everything that 
seems to call the PP 6 into question. He notes that it 
is not enough, that he must postpone the question. Then 
he summons back the hypothesis of something beyond the 
pleasure principle only to dismiss it again. The 
hypothesis returns only like something that has not 
really returned but has merely passed into the ghost of 
its presence. (1978: 114/115) 
According to Derrida, the description of Ernst's game -
of the "earnest game of Ernst, the elder grandson of the 
grandfather of psychoanalysis" - should no longer be read 
only as a theoretical argument, "a strictly theoretical 
speculation that tends to conclude that what we have here is 
the repetition compulsion QI.. the death drive QI.. simply an 
inner limit to the PP", but rather that the description of 
Ernst's game·can also be read as an "autobiography" of Freud 
- "not merely an autobiography entrusting his life to his 
own more or less testamentary writing but a more or less 
living descriptiori of his own writing, of his way of writing 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle". (1978: 119) 
[J]ust as Ernst, in recalling the object (mother, 
plaything, or whatever), come~ also to recall himself 
in an immedi~tely supplementary operation, in the same 
way the speculating grandfather, describing or 
recalling this or that, recalls himself, and produces 
what is called his text, making a contract with himself 
so as to be left holding all the strings of his line, 
descendants and ascendants, in an incontestable 
ascendancy (1978: 134) 
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By proffering both a multiple subject for the text 
(Freud as writer, father, grandfather, "father" of a 
discipline) and a multiple object (the fort/da game; the 
relation of the pleasure principle to a "beyond''; filiation; 
dissemination, or the projection of psychoanalysis into the 
future while at the same time attempting to master that 
future by repetition) D~rrida's reading demonstrates how 
Freud's text both accounts for and at the same time "acts 
out" the psychoanalytic processes - such as those of the 
dream-work~ that Freud examined. 8 At the same time, he 
demonstrates how the subject is constituted within his own 
discourse. But what survives in the Derridean reading, even 
as it sets out to "re-inscribe" the writer (Freud) in his 
text, is a comment not on the man, nor on his life, but on 
the nature and texture of writing itself, on the fact that 
the :institutional character of the science of 
psychoanalysis stands in relation to the institutional 
character of writing itself" (Hartman 1978: xii), and on the 
fact of the impossibility, at significant moments, of the 
writer's achieving any discursive distance from or 
perspective on what is written: 
This text is auto-biographical, but in a completely 
different way from what was believed before ... Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle is ... not an example of what we 
believe we already know under the name of auto-
biography. It writes the autobiographical, and, from 
the fact that an "author" recounts something of his 
life in it, we can no longer conclude that the document 
is without truth value, without value as science or 
philosophy. A "domain" opens up in which the 
"inscription" of a subject in his text is also the 
necessary condition for the pertinence and performance 
of a text, for its "worth" beyond what is called 
empirical subjectivity (if, indeed, there is such a 
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thing, since subjectivity speaks, writes, and 
substitutes one object for another). (1978: 135) 
Ironically, Mahony's psychobiographical project can 
only be described as "pre-Freudian" by comparison. In its 
commitment precisely to delimiting Freud's "identity as a 
writer", to identifying a single unitary self which would be 
the source and locus of Freud's entire oeuvre, Mahony 
implicitly rejects the very Freudian scenario which would 
have revealed to him the impossibility of his project - a 
scenario in which the notion of a unitary identity which 
waits to be revealed to all who take the trouble to uncover 
it is replaced by that of a subject inevitably partial and 
divided, consisting not in a single self but instead in a 
number of "quasi selves" (see Rorty, 1986: 7) which lurk 
beneath the threshold of consciousness, irrecoverable in 
toto even to the mind they inhabit. 
II 
Supplementing Mahony's fond but ultimately unhelpful 
psycho-biographical investigation of Freud's writing is a 
gushing tribute to his "literary genius". This places 
Mahony's reading amongst many recent essays in which Freud 
has been acclaimed as proto-novelist - in which his texts 
(in particular the case histories) have been compared to 
great works of fiction. Representative of this initiative is 
Steven Marcus' influential reading of one of the most famous 
of the case histories, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of 
Hysteria", better known as the case of Dora. 
In his analysis, Marcus compares the narrative course 
of Freud's history of Dora's illness and treatment to the 
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general form of the modern experimental novel. Like a 
modernist writer, he suggests, Freud begins the case history 
with an elaborate introduction concerning the problematical 
status of· his undertaking and the dubious character of his 
final achievement. In addition, like the familiar 
"unreliable narrator" of modernist fiction, Freud pauses at 
regular intervals to remind the reader that his insight into 
the complex of events composing the case history has 
remained "fragmentary", that his understanding of it remains 
in some essential sense permanently occluded. (1985: 66) 
The set of Prefatory Remarks to the history are regarded by 
Marcus as a kind of "novelistic framing action", in which 
Freud "rehearses his motives, reasons, and intentions and· 
begins at the same time to work his insidious devices upon 
the reader": 
First, exactly like a novelist, he remarks that what he 
is about to let us in on is positively scandalous, for 
"the complete elucid~tion of a case of hysteria is 
bound to involve the revelation of intimacies and the 
betrayal of ... secrets." Second, again like a writer 
.of fiction, he has deliberately chosen persons, places 
and circumstances that will remain obscure; the scene 
is laid not in metropolitan Vienna but "in a remote 
prov~ncial town". He has from the beginning kept the 
circumstances that Dora was his patient such a close 
secret that only one other physician - "in whose 
discretion I have complete confidence" - knows about 
it. He has "postponed publication" of this essay for 
"four whole .years", also in the cause of discretion .. 
Finally he has buried the case ev~n deeper by 
publishing it "in a purely scientific and technical 
periodical" in order to secure yet another "guarantee 
against unauthorized readers". He has, in short, made 
his own mystery within a mystery, and one of the 
. j 
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effects of such obscure preliminary goings-on is to 
create a kind of Nabokovian frame - what we have here 
is a history framed by an explanation which is itself 
slightly out of focus. (1985: 68) 
During the course of his essay, Marcus will compare the 
content of Freud's text to a play by Ibsen (64); its 
"forbidding" and "disconcerting" quality, in which the 
writer "succumbs to no impulse to make it easy for the 
reade~" will be said to be reminiscent of both Borges· and 
Nabokov (69/70); and the elaborate "interweaving" of the 
various strands of time in the account, or, as Marcus puts 
it, Freud's "geological fusing of various time strata -
strata that are themselves at the same time fluid and 
shifting" will be described as virtually "Proustian" in 
their complexity (73). Finally, as Marcus reminds us, the 
actual events of the case (quite apart from Freud's 
narration of them) are themselves "full of such literary and 
novelistic devices or conventions as thematic analogies, 
double plots, reversals, inversions, variations, and 
betrayals - full of what the 'sharp-sighted' Dora as well as 
the sharp-sighted Freud thought of as 'hidden 
connections' ... " (79/80) 
There is no doubt a certain intellectual satisfaction 
to be had in seeking out the traces of modernist fiction in 
Freud's prose. But is this all that there is at stake in 
the exercise? One of the effects of Marcus' reading is to 
contribute to the popular perception - so close to the heart 
of Mahony's project - of Freud as a "literary genius". Yet 
despite Freud's own well-documented enthusiasm for the 
novelists' art, it is not certain he would have cared much 
for Marcus' efforts, nor even the embedded tribute to his 
literary skill. Indeed, historically, the public's 
recognition of his success as an artist had, more ofteri than 
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not, been synonymous with a refusal to acknowledge his 
validity as a scientist - a bitter reminder to Freud of its 
scepticism with regard to the existence of any theoretical 
value in his writing. 
Such was the case on' the occasion of the publication of 
the Studies on Hysteria (1895) for which the most 
substantial recognition came not from the scientific 
community but from the poet, literary historian, and 
dramatic critic, Alfred von Bergner, then Professor of the 
History of Literature in the University and Director of the 
Imperial Theatre in Vienna: "We dimly conceive the idea that 
it may one day become possible to approach the innermost 
secret of human personality ... " wrote von Bergner. "The 
theory itself is in faqt nothing but the kind of psychology 
used by poets." (Jones, 1961: 224) In medical circles 
however, and in the scientific community as a whole, the 
book was not well received. (Jones, 1961: 223 ff) 
Four years later, The Interpretation of Dreams was 
given a similar reception. Some eighteen months after 
publication, no scientific periodical, and only a few 
others, had so much as mentioned the book. According to 
Jones, it was simply ignored. Although the book was not 
entirely neglected by the psychological periodicals, its 
reviews here were almost as destructive as complete silence 
would have been: one proclaiming the danger that "uncritical 
minds would be delighted to join in this play with ideas and 
would end up in complete mysticism and chaotic 
arbitrariness"; another settling for the conclusion that 
"the imaginative thoughts of an artist had triumphed over 
the scientific investigator". (Jones, 1961: 307) 
In the case of Marcus' 'reading of the Dora narrative, 
his response pivots on the allegation that the "central 
moment" of the "central scene" of Dora's life (and Freud's 
18 
text) 7 - a scene which Freud orchestrates with "inimitable 
richness", according to Marcus, and with the "tact" and 
"sense of form" that one associates ~ith a classical 
composer of music, or with Proust, Mann, or Joyce ... - this 
central moment, which becomes thereafter the central 
"reality" of the case, is a "reconstruction" that Freud has 
"formed in his own mind": 
"This pivotal construction becomes henceforth the 
principal 'reality' of the Gase, and we must also 
observe that this reality remains Freud's more than 
Dora's, since he was never quite able to convince her 
of the plausibility of the construction, or, to regard 
it from the other pole of the dyad, she was never quite 
~ble to accept this version of reality, of what 
'really' happened." (1985: 79) 
Marcus is quick to proclaim the "unquestionable genius" 
of this "pivotal construction", but it is clearly a 
"literary" rather than "scientific" genius he has in mind. 
By suggesting that the "central character" in the action in 
this history is not Dora but Freud himself, that it is "his 
story that is being written and not hers that is being 
retold", Marcus simultaneously repeats the claim, which is 
also his central thesis, that the history of Dora's case, as 
constructed in Freud's text, is essentially a fictional one. 
It must be emphasized, Marcus writes, that the "reality" 
Freud insists upon is very different from the "reality" that 
Dora_i~ claiming and clinging to. And he goes on to suggest 
that not only does Freud overlook for the most part this 
critical difference, he also adopts no measures for dealing 
with it: "The demon of interpretation has taken hold of him, 
and it is this power that presides over the case of Dora." 
(1985: 85) 
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In this way, what begins as a tribute to Freud's power 
as an artist ends as an attack on his integrity as a 
scientist - an attack in which the "demon of 
interpretation" is the principal target. What begins, in 
other words, as a potentially liberating gesture, promising 
in its inter-disciplinary nature to go beyond the opposition 
between science and art, ends by surreptitiously reinforcing 
it. Like other masterpieces of literature or the arts, 
Marcus claims, Freud's case histories seem to possess 
certain "transhistorical qualities" - which, if they are by 
no means easy to specify, are nevertheless clearly 
discernable. T~e implacable "march of science", he writes, 
has not - or has not yet - consigned them to "mere history": 
"Their singular and mysterious complexity, density and 
richness have thus far prevented such a transformation and 
demotion". (1985: 56) In effect, this is to place art and 
science on either side of an unbridgeable divide - one in 
which science is ephemeral, subject to the relentless 
passage of history, while art is "timeless" and lives 
forever; it is simultaneously to suggest, in effect, that if 
Freud's case histories are still in circulation, it is to 
their "transhistorical qualities", tha{ is, to their 
"complexity, density and richness" as works of art not 
science that they owe their life. 
In a more recent confrontation between literary 
criticism and another of Freud's best known case histories, 
Stanley Fish has made a parallel while singularly more 
direct attack on Freud's scientific integrity. (Fish: 1987)· 
The target this time is the so-called "Wolf-Man" case 
-
history (1918[1914]), and the force of Fish's attack is 
invested primarily in the by now familiar allegation that 
the greater part of the final interpr&tation of the dream 
which is the centre-piece of the Wolf-Man's analysis, is the 
product of "persuasion and force" on the part of Freud, the 
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analyst, rather than the result of independent work on the 
part of the patient. Even where the patient does apparently 
speak for himself in the interpretation of the dream, claims 
Fish, the independence of his words is compromised by the 
method by which they have been "induced" by Freud. 
In Fish's analysis, Freud's account of the Wolf-Man's 
case history proceeds not according to principles of 
rationality and objectivity, but is characterized by a 
rhetorical pattern in which repeated claims of 
"independence" - for the analysis itself, for the 
"materials" upon which it is built, and for the patient's 
share in its work - can be shown to be powerfully subverted 
by the narrative in which they are submerged: "The real 
story of the case," writes Fish, "is the story of 
persuasion, and we will be able to read it only when we tear 
our eyes away from the supposedly deeper story of the boy 
who had a dream". (1987: 163) 
Fish's argument against the "independence" of the Wolf-
Man's analysis, which he constructs in this way in the first 
secti~n of his paper, and elaborates in those which follow, 
along with Marcus' claim that in the Dora case history, "it 
is [Freud's] story that is being written and not [Dora's] 
that is being retold", are situated at the edge of a much 
broader ( ~.nd continuing) tradition of critic ism which 
attacks Freudian psychoanalysis on the grounds that it "acts 
by suggestion" - or, in Fish's terms, "that what the analyst 
claims to uncover (in the archaeological sense of which 
Freud was so fond) he actually creates by verbal and 
rhetorical means~ (1987: 158). Within this tradition, the 
principle objection to psychoanalysis follows Wittgenstein's 
observation that Freud is constantly claiming to be 
scientific, but what he gives is speculation - "something . 
prior even to the formation of a hypothesis."• In 
Wittgenstein's view, the only reason these "speculations" 
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have gained a certain popularity in the mind of the public 
is through their »appeal", or th~ir "charm" as explanations: 
"The picture of peop~e having unconscious thoughts has a 
charm. The idea of an underworld, a secret cellar. Something 
hidden, uncanny ... A lot of things one is ready to believe 
because they are uncanny." (Cited in Cioffi, 1969: 186) 9 
The same fundamental objection is embedded in 
Sebastiano Timpanaro's reference in The Freudian Slip (1976) 
to the "captious and sophistical method, resistant to any 
verification, quick to force interpretations to secure pre-
ordained proofs, employed by Freud and Freudians in their 
explanation of slips, dreams and neurotic symptoms." (1976: 
14) Timpanaro's aim in this study, which concerit~ates on 
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, is to "demystify a 
mode of reasoning which is also to be found in other of 
Freud's works - ~n particular, The Interpretation of Dreams 
and in general, all those writings which are dominated by 
the work of 'interpretation', which belongs to the anti-
scientific aspect of psychoanalysis". (1976: 12) Timpanaro 
uses the word "anti-scientific" because he regards it as the 
most appropriate to designate the "ensemble of diverse 
objections" which can be made against psychoanalysis -
objections which, as he points out, are interrelated, even 
if not identical. It is apparent that in both Fish's and 
Timpanaro's view, a method of investigation which admits the 
practice of interpretation cannot by nature be 
scientific. 10 
Traditionally, and prior to the work of the French 
women's liberation group Psychoanalyse et Politique, 
feminists have rooted their objections in similar ground. 
Historically, for many feminists, Freud has been, and indeed 
still is a prime target as a "male chauvinist" whose so-
called "scientific" propaganda has been responsible for 
damning a generation of emancipated women to the passivity 
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of the second sex. (cited in Mitchell, 1974: 303) In her 
survey of traditional feminist attacks on the Freudian 
notion of femininity (in Psychoanalysis and Feminism, 1974), 
Juliet Mitchell elicits the common claim on which their 
diverse arguments rest - namely, that Freud's theories are 
not based on what may justifiably be called scientific 
evidence. 11 Particularly pertinent here is the work of 
Sulamith Firestone who, taking her cue from Havelock Ellis' 
remark, in 1917, that Freud was a great artist but not a 
scientist, finds "poetic" rather than "scientific" genius in 
Freud's work: 
But was there any value in [Freud's] ideas? Let us re-
examine some of them once again, this time from a 
radical feminist view. I believe Freud was talking 
about something real, though perhaps his ide~s. taken 
literallyf lead to absurdity. In this regard, consider 
that Freud's genius was poetic rather than scientific; 
his ideas more valuable as metaphors than as literal 
truths. (cited in Mitchell, 1974: 346) 
In the same .way, Marcus attributes the fascination of 
the Dora history (as well as its ultimate failure) to 
Freud's genius as a story-teller, while for Fish, the 
"appeal" of Freudian propositions in general (and in the 
Wolf-Man's case history specifically) is directly 
attributable to the peculiar "discursive power" of which and 
by which they have been constructed. The true content of 
Freudian explanations, according to Fish, is the story of 
their making, the story of "persuasion ... practised on a 
massive scale", in which the reader only believes what he is 
told because he has "fallen totally under the control of the 
teller." 12 
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Underlying all these readings is the implicit 
requirement that, even if literature-knows that language is 
never n~ive, never "transparent" - that is, that it can 
never convey any "truth" which is extraneous to writing, 
which is not a truth having to do with the art of writing 
itself - the language of science, on the other hand, must 
remain "innocent": a neutral utensil, an instrument merely, 
to convey a "meaning" or a "truth" or a "fact" which is 
beyond it, foreign to it. All these readings, in other 
words, end by endorsing the privileged position assumed by 
scientific discourse as the referential code for all the 
"ex-centric" languages, which themselves are merely its sub-
codes. 
III 
It has been said that in the history of psychoanalysis, 
two competing myths about Freud have gradually developed. In 
a recently published reading of Freud's Three Essays on 
Sexuality, framed as a challenge to both, Arnold Davidson 
characterizes these myths as follows: 
The first myth, that of official psychoanalysis, 
depicts Freud as a lonely genius, isolated and 
ostracized by his colleagues, fashioning psychoanalysis 
single-handedly and in perpetual struggle with the 
world at large. The history of psychoanalysis under the 
sway of this myth has become the story of Freud as 
triumphant revolutionary. The second, opposing myth 
pictures Freud as getting all of his ideas from someone 
else - usually Wilhelm Fliess, although the .names of 
Jean Martin Charcot, Havelock Ellis, and Albert Moll, 
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among many others, are also mentioned frequently - and 
taking credit for what were in fact no more than minor 
modifications in previously developed theories. This is 
the myth of the career discontents, and the history of 
psychoanalysis dominated by it has become the story of 
Freud as demagogue, usurper, and megalomaniac. (1987: 
256) 
To these two myths we might now add a third, in which 
Freud emerges most strongly as a literary genius, whose 
imaginative and rhetorical powers occasionally enabled him 
to seduce his audience into mistakenly identifying his 
theoretical double-talk with scientific fact. This is the 
Wittgenstinian story of psychoanalysis as essentially 
duplicitous and dangerous, likely to do more harm than good: 
«Because although one may discover in the course of it 
various things about oneself, one must have a very strong 
and keen and persistent criticism in order to recognize and 
see through the mythology that is offered or imposed on one. 
There is an inducement to say, "Yes, of course, it must be 
like that· .. ,« (1972: 52) Under the sway of this myth, the 
history of psychoanalysis is itself the history of a 
"powerful mythology", the story of Freud as at worst 
hypocrite and dissembler, at best master illusionist~ 
While the perpetrators of this myth should be.given 
credit for their recognition of, and focus upon, what many 
of Freud's critics ignore, that is, the place of language in 
his work, it is their apparent underlying allegiance to the 
.notion of science as a form of neutral language, an 
instrument of thought - which, if it has a certain need of 
language, is nevertheless not, like literature, in language 
- that leads them inevitably to the conclusion that the so-
' 
called literary qualities of Freud's writing must 
necessarily disqualify it as science. Consequently, and 
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paradoxically, the very foc~s of these commentaries on the 
textuality of Freud's writing, far from encouraging the 
"mutation" in the consciousness of scientific discourse 
called for by Barthes, ends rather by confirming its present 
notion of itself as a superior referential code in relation 
to which all ~thers are mere embellishments. How could this 
be avoided? What would it mean to read Freud so as neither 
to elide the place of langu~ge in his work nor to 




It is in the response it offers to this question that 
Davidson's reading of the Three Essays seems to me to be 
particularly significant. In it, Davidson suggests that 
despite the enormous number of pages that has been written 
on these essays, it is very easy to underestima~e their 
density - "a density at once historical, rhetorical and 
conceptual". (1987: 252) This underestimation stems, 
Davidson suggests, from historiographical assumptions that 
quickly misdirect us away from the fundamental issues at 
stake in Freud's work. What distinguishes his own reading is 
his attachment, as he puts it, to a different 
epistemological and methodological orientation from that at 
work in previous material - "a different and particular way 
of doing the history of psychoanalysis". Central to this new 
epistemolqgical and methodological orientation is the 
archaeological perspective of Michel Foucault. Indeed, 
Davidson classifies his reading of Freud's Three Essays as 
following in the wake of some of his own earlier writings, 
in which he has tried to "adopt and adapt Foucault's 
archaeological perspective, using it to write a history of 
nineteenth-century psychiatric theories of sexuality". 
(1987: 254/255) 
Davidson's debt to Foucault is particularly apparent in 
his utilisation of Foucault's notion of the "discursive 
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practice" - a central constituent of which, in Davidson's 
interpretation, is "a set of concepts linked together by 
specifiable rules that determine what statements can and 
cannot be made with the concepts". To write a history of 
nineteenth-century psychiatry by way of this notion, 
according to Davidson, requires writing a history of the 
emergence of a new system of concepts and showing how these 
concepts are internally related by a set of rules to form 
what we might think of as a "determinate conceptual space". 
(1987: 255) How we characterise Freud's place in this 
history, Davidson goes on to say, will then depend not on 
who said what first, but on whether the structure of 
concepts associated with Freud's writings continues, 
extends, diverges from, or undermines the concept~al space 
of nineteenth-century psychiatry. 
What we need ... is a history of the concepts used in 
psychoanalysis, an account of their histori~al origins 
and transformations, their rules of combination, and 
their omployment in a mode of reasoning. This task 
presumes, first, that we can isolate the distinctive 
concepts,of nineteenth-century psychiatry, articulate 
their rules o1 combination, and thereby discern their 
limits of the possible. We must then undertake the very 
same enterprise for Freud's work, which, with 
sufficient detail, should enable us to see more clearly 
whether Freud's conceptual space continues or breaks 
with that of his predecessors. (1987: 257) 
It is this focus on ~he conceptual and historical 
dimensions of language - the conceptual as contingent on the 
historical - which distinguishes Davidson's reading of Freud 
from the tradition of textual analysis exemplified in the 
earlier mentioned essays by Marcus and Fish. What emerges in 
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Davidson's reading is a version of Freud's "genius" as 
neither an imaginative nor a rhetorical one so much as a 
conceptual one, grounded not so much in his ~anipulatory 
powers when dealing with the language of nineteenth-century 
psychiatry as in his ability, at the level of conceptual 
articulation above all, fundamentally to alter it: "Many 
writers before Freud possessed bits and pieces of his 
terminology and exhibited an inchdate, unself-possessed 
grappling with the problems brought to light by the Three 
Essays," writes Davidson. "But it was Freud who ascended to 
the level of concepts, who systematically and lucidly 
thought what had previously remained in a kind of 
precognitive blockage ... " (1987: 275) The true source of 
Freud's genius, in other words, lay not so much in his 
ability to work with language as in his power to proceed in 
spite of it. 
The particular concept on which Davidson focuses his 
attention in this essay is that of "sexual perversion". His 
analysis thus concentrates primarily on the first of Freud's 
Three Essays, "Sexual Aberrations". He begins with the 
observation that in order even to approximate to a 
comprehensive reading of this essay, it will be necessary to 
begin before Freud, with the prevailing concept of sexual 
aberration (or perversion) in the literature of nineteenth-
century psychiatry; it will be necessary to "demarcate the 
conceptual space of which perversion was an element that 
dominated European psychiatry at the ~ime Freud was writing 
the Three Essays". And he goes on to point out that the best 
way to begin to understand the nineteenth-century conceptual 
space encircling perversion will be to examine the notion of 
the ''sexual instinct": "for the conception of perversion 
underlying clinical thought was that of a functional disease 
of this instinct. That is to say, the class of diseases that 
affected the sexual instinct was precisely the sexual 
perversions". (1987: 258) 
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To be able to determine what phenomena are functional 
disturbances or diseases of the sexual instinct, Davidson 
proceeds, one must also specify in what the .normal, or 
natural .. function of this instinct consists: "Without 
knowing the normal function of the instinct, everything and 
nothing could count as a functional disturbance". (1987: 
260) Indeed, by the time Freud inherits the concept of the 
sexual instinct, as Davidson goes on to demonst~ate, there 
is virtually unargued unanimity not only on the fact that 
this instinct does have a natural function, but also on what 
that function is. Th~ view of Krafft-Ebing (in his Textbook 
of Insanity) is offered as representative: 
During the time of the maturation of physiological 
processes in the reproductive glands, desires arise in 
the consciousness of the individual, which have for 
their purpose the perpetuation of the species (sexual 
instinct) ... 
With opportunity for the natural satisfaction of the 
sexual instinct, every expression of it that does not 
correspond with the purpose of nature - i.e., 
propagation - must be regarded as perverse. (1987: 
260) 
The natural function of the sexual instinct then, is 
propagation, and the corresponding natural, psychological 
I 
satisfaction of this instinct must then consist in the 
satisfaction derived from heterosexual, genital intercourse. 
Sadism, masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality must all 
then be classified together as perversions since, as 
Davidson points out, "all exhibit the same kind of perverse 
expression of the sexual instinct, the same basic kind of 
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functional deviation, which manifests itself in the fact 
that psychological satisfaction is obtained primarily 
through activities disconnected from the natural function of 
the instinct". (1987: 262) 
This then is the prevailing conception of the sexual 
instinct and its perversions which Freud inherits and with 
which he is obliged to work in his Three Essays. To this 
popular conception of the sexual instinct Freud introduces 
two new technical terms: The sexual object is "the person 
from whom sexual attraction proceeds," while the sexual aim 
is "the act towards which the instinct tends" (1987: 263) As 
far as the "perversions" are concerned, these may now be 
classified in terms of (1) deviations with respect to the 
sexual object which, in relation to the prevalent conception 
of the natural function of the sexual instinct, must 
necessarily consist in deviations from the natural 
attraction exercised by one sex upon the other; and (2) 
deviations with respect to sexual aim, which must now 
necessarily consist in deviations from the natural goal of 
sexual union. These, as Davidson points out, are precisely 
the two conceptually basic kinds of deviations we should 
expect of those writers who subscribed to the popular 
conception of the sexual instinct. (1987: 263) 
It is important to recognize at this point that at the 
time Freud inherits it, shared opinion regarding this 
definition of the concept of the sexual instinct is 
unguestioned: in the nineteenth-century psychiatric theories 
that preceded Freud, both a specific object and a specific 
aim formed part and parcel of the instinct itself. The very 
nature of the sexual instinct manifested itself, according 
to these theories, in an attraction to members of the 




In his discussion of those "perversions" which manifest 
themselves as deviations in respect of the sexual object, 
Freud gives his fullest attention to inversion 
(homosexuality) - the deviation to which most nineteenth-
century psychiatrists had themselves devoted the most 
attention. And it is in the following passage, with which 
Freud concludes his discussion on deviations in respect of 
the sexual object, that, as Davidson will demonstrate, he 
deals his first "conceptually devastating blow to the entire 
structure of ni~eteenth-century theories of sexual 
psychopathology". (1987: 265) The passage is worth quoting 
in full: 
It has been brought to our notice that we have been in 
the habit of regarding the connection between the 
sexual instinct and the sexual object as more intimate 
than it in fact is. Experience of the cases that are 
con~idered abnormal has shown us that in them the 
sexual instinct and the sexual object are merely 
soldered together - a fact which we have been in danger 
of overlooking in consequence of the uniformity of the 
normal picture, where the object appears to form part 
·and parcel of the instinct. We are thus warned to 
loosen the bond that exists in our thought between 
instinct and object. It seems probable that the sexual 
instinct is in the first instance independent of its 
object; nor is its origin likely to be due to its 
object's attractions. (Freud, 1~05d: 147-48) 
In order to show that inversion was a real functional 
deviation and not· merely a statistical abnormality without 
genuine pathological significance, Davidson reasons, one had 
to conceive of the "normal" object of the instinct as part 
of the very content of the instinct itself: "If the object 
is not internal to the instinct, then there can be no 
intrinsic clinico-pathological meaning to the fact that the 
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instinct can become attached to an inverted object." (1987: 
265) It is through claiming, in effect, in the above 
passage, that there is no natural object of the sexual 
instinct, that the sexual object and the sexual instinct are 
merely "soldered together", that Freud proves himself worthy 
of the name of genius, in Davidson's eyes. Freud's 
conclusion, he writes, 
is expli~itly and directly opposed to any conclusion 
that could be drawn by using the (prevailing] concept 
of the sexual instinct. The relationship between the 
concepts of sexual instinct and sexual object found in 
nineteenth-century texts, a rule of combination 
partially constitutive of the concept of the ·sexual 
instinct, was completely undermined by Freud, and as a 
consequence of this cutting away of old foundations, 
inversion could not be thought of as an unnatural 
functional deviation of the sexual instinct. (1987: 
265-266) 
In much the same way, as Davidson demonstrates, Freud's 
argument, his "structure of concepts", leads to the parallel 
conclusion that the "normal" aim of the sexual instinct, 
genital intercourse, is not part of the content of the 
instinct; or, in other words, in the terms of Freud's· 
earlier conclusions about the sexual object, the sexual 
instinct and sexual aim are merely "soldered together". If 
the resulting overall structure of Freud's argument is to 
show that neither a specific aim nor a specific object has 
any constitutive bond with the sexual instinct, and if the 
previously shared concept of the sexual instinct is thus 
effectively dismantled, then, remarks Davidson, it is 
difficult to see how any conceptual foothold could remain 
for the concept of unnatural functional deviations of this 
instinct: 
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In the case of both sexual aim and sexual object, it is 
only the apparent uniformity of normal behaviour that 
directs us to think otherwise. But this apparently 
well-entrenched uniformity actually masks the 
operations of the sexual instinct, operations which, 
when conceptualized .by Freud, show us that the idea of 
the natural function of the instinct has no basis 
whatsoever. We ought to conclude from what Freud says 
here that there are no true perversions. The conceptual 
space within which the concept of perversion functions 
and has a stable role has been thoroughly displaced -
and displaced in a way that requires a new set of 
concepts for understanding sexuality and a new mode of 
reasoning about it. (1987: 270-71) 
Crucial to the difference between Davidson's reading 
and the tradition of literary analysis exemplified by Marcus 
and Fish et al, and in Mahony's project as a whole, is 
Davidson's recognition, not only of the rhetorical, but 
especially of the historical and conceptual density of 
Freud's texts .. By concentrating almost exclusively on the 
"literary" aspect oi Freud's work, which is defined in this 
case primarily as a function of its rhetorical power, these 
critics are led to underestimate or ignore both its 
historical and conceptual dimensions. In Davidson's reading 
of the Three Essay~, Freud's name itself - along with those 
of his predecessors, such as Bloch, Moll and others - are 
treated as, so to speak, "placeholders for certain sets of 
concepts and the way these concepts fit together to 
constitute a conceptual space". Only from this perspective 
can Davidson be appropriately placed to determine the way in 
which these essays provided the resources to "overturn" the 
conceptual space which made it possible for psychiatrists to 
make the statements about perversion that so dominated the 
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period - by fundamentally altering the rules of combination 
for concepts such as sexual instinct, sexual object, and 
sexual aim, with the consequence that these shared concepts, 
among others, were destroyed. 
That Freud himself was not always able to grasp the 
import of his own work; that he continued to use the idea of 
perversion as if his own conceptual innovations were not 
wholly accessible to him; that he often reintroduced, 
"b~hind his own back", in the Three Essays and elsewhere, 
identifications that he had shown to be untenable; that, in 
Davidson's terms, his "genius" was not always conscious of 
itself as such, is explained in Davidson's text by what he 
calls the "divergent temporality of the emergen6e of new 
concepts and the formation of new mentalities". (1987: 276) 
"Automatisms of attitude," writes Davidson, "have a 
durability, a slow temporality, which does not match the 
sometimes rapid change of conceptual mutation. Mental habits 
have a tendency towards inertia, and these habits resist 
change that, in retrospect seems conceptually required." 
(1987: 276) When this is taken into account, the hesitations 
and ambiguities of Freud's texts can no longer be seen as 
the result of some "deconstructive. indeterminacy or 
undecidability of the text", but are rather, as Davidson 
remarks, the "consequence of the dynamics of fundamental 
change": 
Mentality and concept are two different aspects ~f 
systems of thought, and we should not ex~ect them to be 
coherently connected all at once, as if forms of 
experience could be dissolved and reconstituted 
overnight. Sidney Morgenbesser is said to have asked 
the following question on an exam at Columbia 
University: 'Some people argue that Freud and Marx went 
too far. How far would you go?' Whether Freud went too 
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far or not far enough, this is exactly the right range 
of question. How far can you go? How far will you go? 
(1987: 277) 
IV 
Freud's critics have of~en suggested that his work 
would have been more successful had it embodied their 
notions of scientific discourse; but there is evidence to 
suggest that the enabling dynamic of Freud's thought was the 
result of a constant transgression of the boundaries of 
the~e notions as instituted by the scientific community 
during his lifetime. For all his de~ire that psychoanalysis 
be accorded the resonance and prestige of a true science 
along with all the others - "Psychoanalysis is a method of 
research, an impartial inst~ument, like the infinitesimal 
calculus ... " (Freud, 1930: 36) - Freud never failed to 
respond to his material with the full resources of a 
supremely creative imagination. Indeed, there are many 
examples of this creative tension scattered throughout his 
work. In the earliest case histories of the Studies on 
Hysteria (1893-1895) he writes, 
I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other 
neuro-pathologists, I was trained to employ local 
diagnoses and electro~prognosis, and it still strikes 
me myself as strange that the case histories I write 
should read like short stories and that, as one might 
say, they lack the serious stamp of science., .(1895d: 
160) 
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The problem, Freud believed - and in this he consoled 
himself - lay not in any preference of his own for the 
literary or fictional mode of writing so much as in·the 
nature of his subject itself: 
The fact is that local diagnosis and electrical 
reactions lead nowhere in the study of hysteria, 
whereas a detailed description of mental processes such 
as we are accustomed to find in the works of 
imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few 
psychological formulas, to obtain at least some kind of 
insight into the course of that affection. (1895d: 160-
161) 
In the Dora case history, which appeared in 1905, Freud 
was prepared to acknowledge that his narrative was such that 
many would find it possible, and would take it upon 
themselves, to read it as a roman a clef, "designed ·for 
their private delectation", rather than a serious 
contribution to the psycho-pathology of the neuroses. 
(1905e: 9) Indeed, as S~even Marcus has shown, Freud's 
prophecy was not to go unfulfilled. In his reading of the 
memoirs of Dr. Daniel Paul Schreber, published in 1911, 
Freud made a further confession of his convictions regarding 
the thin line dividing fact from fiction, truth from 
delusion: "It remains for the future to decide whether there 
is more delusion in my theory than I should like to admit, 
or whether there is more truth in Schreber's delusion than 
other people are as yet prepared to believe," he wrote. 
(1911c: 79) In a letter to Hermann Struck in 1914, Freud 
acknowledged his ~ssay on da Vinci to be "p~rtly fiction" 
(Freud, E., 1961: 312) and in the essay itself,-he admitted 
that as a piece of writing it might easily be classified as 
a "psycho-analytic novel": 
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In the preceding chapters I have shown what 
I 
justification can be found for giving this picture of 
Leonardo's course of development - for proposing these 
subdivisrons of his life and for explaining his 
vacillation between art and science in this way. If in 
making these statements I have provoked the criticism, 
even from friends of psycho-analysis and from those who 
are expert in it, that I have merely written a psycho-
analytic novel, I shall reply that I am far from over-
estimating the certainty of these results. Like others 
I have succumbed to the attraction of this great and 
mysterious man, in whose nature one seems to detect 
powerful instinctual passions which can nevertheless 
only express themselves in so remarkably subdued a 
manner. (1910c: 134) 
It is only fitting that the scientific investigator who 
chose for his objects of research the stuff of dreams, 
desires and fantasies - those very fictions by which we 
constitute ourselves as human subjects - should have been 
one of the first to refuse, however tentatively, the margins 
b.etween literature and the more important territory of 
"truth" traditionally set aside as the domain of science. It 
was Barthes who said that "what the human sciences are 
discovering today, in whatever field it may be, 
sociological, psychological, psychiatric, linguistic, &c., 
lit~rature has always known ... "; but it might just as well 
have been Freud. Pace his critics, Freud himself was well 
aware of the ambiguous textual status of much of his own 
writing, which hovered uneasily, he seemed to feel, on the 
borders between literature and sci~nce. Yet was it not 
precisely this uneasy position which enabled him to open up 
that "other place", that whole new dimension of intellectual 
37 
inquiry, the unconscious? "Only the real, rare, true 
scientific minds can endure doubt, which is attached to all 
knowledge," he once said to Marie Bonaparte. (cited Mahony, 
1987: 77) Freud's commitment finally was a commitment to 
scepticism - a scepticism which, in refusing the usual 
boundaries of science, made it possible to transcend them 
and explore a new continent of knowledge. 
NOTES 
1. This was Walter Schonau's doctoral thesis, Sigmund 
Freuds Prosa: Literarische Elemente seines Stils, 
published by JB Metzlersche Verlag (cited in Mahony, 
1987: 10) 
2. For reference to a number of schools of thought in 
modern linguistics that have yielded significant results 
for the study of literary texts, see J.M. Coetzee: 
"Lingtiistics and Literature", in Ryan, R. arid Van Zyl, 
S. (eds.) An Introduction to Contemporary Literary 
Theory (Johannesburg: AD Donker, 1982) In this essay, 
Coetzee concentrates on two schools: that of generative-
transformational grammar associated with the name of 
Noam Chomsky, and that of structuralism, particularly 
th& kind of structuralism defined in the writings of 
Roman Jakobson. 
3. For the full account, see Meltzer, 1987. 
4. Exemplary of one application of the recent French 
initiative which I shall not discuss here, and in which 
Lacan is the seminal figure, are the essays introduced 
by Jeffrey Mehlman in French Freud: Structural Studies 
in Psychoanalysis (Yale French Studies, 48) (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1972) In his editorial 
introductory essay, Mehlman notes that "to the ~xtent 
that the truth of Freud's theory is the fact of 
repression, the very resistance to that truth, the 
structure of its escape, constitutes an essential 
dimension of the discovery itself. So that 
psychoanalytic theory after Freud, in this view, should 
not be (primarily) a 'rectification' of Freud's theory 
on the basis of new data. Nor should it be an effort to 
purge Freud's writings of the elements (eg. the 'death 
instinct') with no apparent empirical basis. Analytic 
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theory, on the contrary, should be above all the theory 
of the contradictions in Freud's texts, of what we have 
referred to (all too succinctly) as the repression of 
the discovery of repression." (6) 
5. "PP" is the initial for the French expression for 
"pleasure principle" - a concept developed early in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and in Derrida's text. At 
the same time, the French pronunciation of these 
initials sounds like the equivalent of "granddaddy" 
(pep~). This homonymy links the authority of the 
pleasure principle and that of the grandfather or 
grandfathers evoked in the text. 
6. For a lucid summary of this aspect of Derrida's reading 
- of the way in which he not only "overdetermines the 
'scene of writing'" but actually "inserts the writer 
into it", ~ee Geoffrey Hartman, 1978: xiii. 
7. Marcus is here referring to the scene between Dora and 
Herr K. that took place when she was fourteen years old, 
and acted, Freud said, as a "sexual trauma". The scene 
is represented by Marcus as follows: "The r~ader will 
recall that on this occasion Herr K. contrived to get 
Dora alone ·at his place of business' in the town of 
B-------, and then without warning or preparation 
·suddenly clasped the girl to him and pressed a kiss 
~ 
upon her lips.· Freud then asserts that 'this was 
surely just the situation to call up a distinct feeling 
of sexual excitement in a girl of fourteen who had never 
before been approached. But Dora had at that moment a 
violent feeling of disgust, tore herself free from the 
man, and hurried past him to the staircase and from 
there to the street door'." (All italics are Marcus') 
40 
r 
8. Cyril Barrett (ed.) Wittgenstein: Lectures and 
Conversations (University of California Press, 1972) p. 
44. For further references to the "huge literature 
focusing on the issue of evidence and testability" see 
Fish's list in The Linguistics of Writing - Arguments 
between Language and Literature footnote 5, pp. 171-172. 
9. In the course of his essay, Cioffi will reveal 
repeatedly his own scepticism towards Freudian 
propositions - by likening the notion-of the unconscious 
to the "invisible companion phantasies" of o~r childhood 
(188); by proffering physiological explanations to 
replace Freud's psychological ones (189); by attributing 
Freud's attempts to illustrate the operation of 
unconscious agencies (in The Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life and elsewhere) to an unacknowledged and underhand 
"determination to describe familiar facts in a novel and 
congenial idiom". (191) Where Freud is most convincing, 
Cioffi will evoke not the probability of his assertions 
but his "grammatical genius", his "ingenuity in devising 
unconstruable idioms" (194), or his "ingenious 
exploitation ... of confusion ... in the interests of the 
theory". (195) He will suggest, alongside Wittgenstein, 
that_psychoanalytic explanations in general are akin to 
aesthetic ones: " .. ~aren't these [explanations] once 
again simply a matter of "giving a good simile", of 
'placing things side by side'?" Via the work of GE 
Moore (Mind, 1955), Cioffi will infer that "the world, 
conceived of psychoanalytically, is just the everyday 
world taken over again with an altered expression" . 
. . (209) In the end, he will conclude that "there are good 
grounds for assimilating [Freud's] achievement to that 
of the anonymous geniuses to whome it first occurred 
that Tuesday is lean and Wednesday fat, the low notes of 
the piano dark and the high notes light. Except that 
instead of words, notes and shades, we have scenes from 
human 1 if e" . ( 210 ) 
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10. Amongst those "div~rse objec~ions" put forward by 
Timpanaro are the Marxist claims that psychoanalysis is 
a ttbourgeois doctrine" incapable of seeing beyond an 
ideological horizon delimited precisely by the class 
interests of the bourgeoisie; arid that it is "anti-
materialistic" in that it eternalizes situations which 
are historically specific - for example, suggests 
Timpanaro, ttit abstracts what truth there is in the 
notion of 'hatred of the father· from an authoritarian 
structure of the family, which remains transient even if 
it is slow to pass away, and transforms it into a sort 
of eternal destiny of mankind". (13). 
11. While providing a comprehensive survey of, .and response 
to this tradition, the work of Mitchell's text is to 
defend psychoanalysis against it, and to show that 
because those feminists in opposition to Freud try to 
discuss his concept of femininity outside the framework 
of psychoanalysis, their objections, and even their 
tributes, cannot be made to stand up. She also reveals 
that their rejection of the scientific status of 
psychoanalysis would be more accurately described as a 
rejection of its two most crucial discoveries: the 
unconscious, and infantile sexuality. Amongst those 
feminist writers discussed by Mitchell are Simone de 
Beauvoir (The Second Sex, 1949), Betty Friedan (The 
Feminine Mystigue, 1963), Eva Figes (Patriarchal 
Attitudes, 1970) and Germaine Greer (The Female Eunuch, 
1971). 
12. For a development of, and response to Fish's arguments, 
see my "Power, Meaning and Persuasion in Freud's 'The 
Wolf-Man·: A Response to Stanley Fish", in the minnesota 
review, forthcoming 1990. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POWER,.llEANING AND PERSUASION IN FREUD'S "THE WOLF-MAN": 
A RESPONSE TO STANLEY FISH 
In July 1986, at the "Linguistics of Writing" 
colloquium held at the University of Strathclyde, Stanley 
Fish gave a paper in which questions of "power", "meaning" 
and "persuasion" were discussed in relation to a critical 
analysis of Freud's well-known "Wolf-Man" case history. An 
abbreviated version of the same paper appeared in the Times 
Literary Supplement of August 29, 1 prefaced by the following 
in~~oductory remarks: 
I have two epigraphs for this essay. The first is 
from James Strachey's preface to his translation 
of Freud's Introductory Lectures. Freud, he says, 
was "never rhetorical", and was entirely opposed 
to laying down his view in an authoritarian 
fashion. The second is a report by the Wolf-Man 
of what he thought to himself shortly after he met 
Freud for the first time: this man is a Jewish 
swindler, he wants to use me from behind, and shit 
on my head. This paper is dedicated to the 
proposition that the Wolf-Man got it right. (1986: 
935) 
My response to Stanley Fish was prompted by two 
striking features of his paper: First, by the confrontation 
it represents between one specialist trained in the art of 
literary interpretation, and another who was discovering a 
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methodology for the interpretation of dreams. To what 
extent do the two interpretative operations really coincide? 
Second, by a sense of deja-vu as I read his paper, as if 
everything he was saying had been said before, perhaps only 
in a different way. What is the fundamental objection 
underlying most attacks on Freud's work, how is it 
manifested in Fish's critique and, most significant of all, 
is it a valid one? 
This essay, then, is directed not only at Fish's paper, 
but at the critical tradition it both reflects and 
perpetuates. 
I 
Fish's "proposition" is based on the argument that 
Freud has used and manipulated the facts of the Wolf-Man's 
case to suit his own hypotheses, and, more specifically, to 
def end and justify the theoretical premisses upon which the 
discipline of psychoanalysis is built. In Fish's analysis, 
Freud's account of the Wolf-Man's case history proceeds not 
according to principles of rationality and objectivity, but 
is characterized by a rhetorical pattern in which repeated 
claims of "independence" - for the analysis itself, for the 
"materials" upon which it is built, and for the patient's 
share in its work - can be shown to be powerf~lly subverted 
by the narrative in which they are submerged: "The real 
story of the case," writes Fish, "is the story of 
persuasion, and w~ will be able to read it only when we tear 
our eyes away from the supposedly deeper story of the boy 
who had a dream." (1986: 937) 
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In the course of his critique, Fish will suggest that 
the greater part of the final interpretation of the dream 
which is the centre-piece of the analysis, is the product of 
"persuasion and force" on the part of Freud, the analyst, 
rather than the result of independent work on the part of 
the patient. Even where the patient does apparently speak 
·for himself in the interpretation of the dream, the 
independence of his words is compromised, according to Fish, 
by the method by which they have been "induced" by Freud. 
Fish is here referring in particular to the way in which 
Freud attempts to overcome the patient's persistently 
apathetic attitude to the analysis by fixing a particular 
date on which the treatment would have to end, "no matter 
how far it had advanced." 
In so doing, suggests Fish, "the coercion [on Freud's 
part] could not be more obvious ... " By imposing a fixed 
limit on the duration of the analysis, Freud was effectively 
assuring its advancement, and, what is more, assuring it "in 
a form he [would] approve." As further grist to his mill, 
Fish-goes on to point out that "Freud does not shrink from 
naming [this imposition] as an exercise of "inexorable 
pressure"; yet in the very same sentence he contrives to 
detach the pressure from the result it produces: "Under the 
inexorable pressure of the fixed limit the patient's 
resistance gave way, and now in a disproportionately short 
time, the analysis produced all the material which made it 
possible to clear up his inhibitions and remove his 
symptoms."" (1986: 935) In Fish's interpretation, the 
analysis is here cunningly, and indeed falsely, presented 
"as if it were independent of the constraints that father 
it, and at the end of the sentence the clearing up of 
inhibitions and the removal of symptoms appear as effects 
without a cause, natural phenomena that simply emerge in the 
course of their own time ... " (1986: 935) 
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It is in this "remarkable sequence ... repeated in a 
variety of ways in the paragraphs that follow" that Fish 
detects the "pattern" which he feels to be constitutive of 
the narrative structure.of the case history as a whole: 
"Always the pattern is the same:" writes Fish, "the claim of 
independence - for the analysis, for the patient's share, 
for the 'materials' - is made in the context of an account 
that powerfully subverts it, and then it is made again." 
(1986: 935) 
The argument against the "independence" of the analysis, 
which Fish constructs in this way in the first section of 
his paper, and elaborates in those which follow, is 
buttresseq by a critical tradition which attacks Freudian 
psychoanalysis on the grounds that it "acts by suggestion" -
or, in Fish's terms, "that what the analyst claims to 
uncover (in the archaeological sense of which Freud was so 
fond) he actually creates by verbal and rhetorical meansff 
(1986: 935). Within this tradition, the principle objection 
to psychoanalysis follows Wittgenstein's observation that 
"Freud is constantly claiming to be scientific, but what he 
gives is speculation - something prior even to the formation 
of a hypothesis." (cited in Barrett, 1972: 44) 2 
In Wittgenstein's view, the only reason these 
speculations have gained a certain popularity in the mind of 
the public is through their "appeal", or their "charm" as 
explanations: "The picture of people having unconscious 
thoughts has a charm. The idea of an underworld, a secret 
cellar. Something hidden, uncanny ... A lot of things one 
is ready to believe because they are uncanny." (cited in 
Cioffi, 1969: 186) Pursuing a similar line of thought, Fish 
attributes the "appeal" of Freudian propositions to the 
peculiar "discursive power" of which and by which· they have 
been constructed. The true content of Freudian 
explanations, according to Fish, is the story of their 
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making, the story of "persuasion ... practised on a massive 
' 
scale", in which the reader only believes what he is told 
because he has "fallen totally under the control of the 
teller." 3 
But what of Fish's own often formidable powers of 
persuasion? What of his o~n talent for verbal manipulation, 
his carefully cultivated discursive skills? Who n6w is the 
teller, and what, if subjected to closer scrµtiny, are the 
"true contents" of his tale? 
II 
We'll begin by examining Fish's investigation of the 
third paragraph of Chapter One of the Wolf-Man case history. 
In this paragraph, Freud weighs the virtues and defects of 
two possible methodologies in the analysis of infantile 
neuroses. The two possibilities, as Fish notes, are (1) 
analysing a childhood disorder when it first manifests 
itself in infancy, or (2) waiting until the patient is an 
"intellectually mature adult". 
"Since Freud is at this very moment engaged in the 
second practice," writes Fish, "it is not surprising that he 
decides in favour of it, but he must find a way to defend it 
against the objection (which he anticipates) that because of 
the passage of time what results will be the product of 
interpretation. He replies by asserting that interpretation 
will play an even greater part if the child is examined 
directly because "too many words and thoughts have to be 
lent" to him. In contrast, when one analyses an adult, 
these "limitations· do not obtain, although one must then 
"take into account the distortion and refurbishing to which 
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a patient's past is subjected when it is looked back upon"." 
(1986: 935) 
On examination, Fish finds this to be a "curious 
contrast" since, as he points out, "it is hard to tell the 
difference between "lending words" and "refurbishing"." The 
only reason the contrast works, in Fish's eyes, lies in the 
way that "the sentertce shifts the burden of "refurbishing" 
on to the patient." This Fish interprets as a "brilliant 
move" on Freud's part, which allows him to "admit 
interpretation into the scene while identifying it as the 
work of another, leaving himself the (honourable) work of 
undoing its effects. In only a few sentences," concludes 
the critic, "[Freud] has managed to twice distance himself 
from the charge of suggestion, first by pushing it off on to 
the-practitioners of a rival method, and second by making it 
into a property of the illness of which his now innocent 
labours are to be the cure." (1986: 935) 
Embedded in this sequence are a number of accusations 
directed-against the analyst: (1) that Freud's "defence" o~ 
his present methodology is based more on expedience than on 
an objective balancing of the pros and cons of both possible 
procedures (2) that underlying this supposed "defence" is an 
attempt to justify any element of interpretation which the 
analysis might entail, and to falsely identify it as the 
work of the patient whereas in fact it is the work of the 
analyst himself; and (3) that disguised beneath a surface 
discussion on questions of methodology is a concealed 
attempt, .on the part of the analyst, to "distance himself 
from .the charge of suggestion." 
Considering that the body of Fish's criticism is 
directed against the power 6f "suggestion" which he feels to 
be the greatest danger inherent in the practice of 
"interpretation" - one which must necessarily throw into 
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question the results of any psychoanalytic session - it is 
curious to find that his own criticisms are based 
exclusively on the very practice he cannot countenance in 
Freud: in this case, his own efforts to "interpret" the 
Freudian text in question. 4 Indeed, a return to the 
original paragraph under examination (which Fish 
significantly does not quote in full) reveals the critic's 
own penchant for "lending words" and "refurbishing", so that 
in the end, it is tempting to suggest that what is at stake 
is not Freud's attempt to defend himself against the charge 
of suggestion by identifying his own interpretations as "the 
work of another", but Fish's attempt to deflect the reader's 
critical gaze from his own tendency to "act by suggestion" 
by attributing this tendency instead to Freud. 
"Since Freud is at this very moment engaged in the 
second practice, it is not surprising that he decides in 
favour of it, but he must find a way to defend it against 
the objection that because of the passage of time what 
results will be the product of interpretation," writes Fish, 
suggesting, firstly, a firm rejection on Freud•s part of 
\ 
what Fish (rather than Freud) describes as the "rival 
method" in favour of that in which. he is presently engaged, 
and secondly, the need to justify his decision. 
In fact, no such rejection appears in the original 
text, which reads, in full, as follows: 
My description will therefore deal with an infantile 
neurdsis which was analysed not while it actually 
existed, but only fifteen years after its termination. 
This state of things has its advantages as well as its 
disadvantages in comparison with the alternative. An 
analysis which is conducted upon a· neurotic child 
itself must, as a matter of course, appear to be more 
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trustworthy, but it cannot be very rich in material; 
too many words and thoughts have to be lent to the 
child, and even so the deepest strata may turn out to 
be impenetrable to consciousness. An analysis of a 
childhood disorder through the medium of recollection 
in an intellectually mature adult is free from these 
limitations; but it necessitates our taking into 
account the distortion and refurbishing to which a 
person's own past is subjected when it is looked back 
upon from a later period. The first alternative 
perhaps gives the more convincing results: the second 
is by far the more instructive. (1918[1914]: 235) 
Rather than a-firm rejection of one method in favour of 
the alternative (which ~ish reads into the text to form the 
basis of his criticisms), what the text itself reveals is a 
careful balancing of the advantages and disadvantages of 
both. According to Freud, where the method he is not using 
is more "trustworthy" - a word Fish conveniently ignores -
that presently in use is "richer in material": where the 
alternative would "give the more convincing results", the 
method in use is "more instructive". 6 The earlier mentioned 
charge that Freud's "defence" of his technique is based on 
expedience begins to fall away when what is described by 
Fish as·a "defensive strategy" turns out to be little more 
than a (disinterested) account of alternative methodologies. 
The validity of Fish's critical assertions is further 
weakened if one stops to question not only the strength of 
his interpretation of Freud's text, but the very logic of 
his assumptions. It is difficult to imagine why Freud, as 
Fish suggests, should feel the need to "defend [his present 
practice] against the objection ... that because of the 
passage of time what results will be the product of 
interpretation", when the very "products" that 
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interpretation provides themselves constitute the material 
upon which the analyst frames his hypotheses as to the 
patient's infantile sexuality, and through which he is then 
led to the motive forces of the neurotic symptoms of later 
life. According to Fish, Freud's choice of procedure is 
defended by an alleged "assertion" that "interpretation will 
play an even greater part if the child is examined directly 
because 'too many words and thoughts have to be lent' to 
him." Once again, it is to Fish that the work of 
interpretation must be attributed. What Freud in fact 
asserts is that "an analysis which is conducted upon a 
neurotic child ... cannot be very rich in material; too many 
words and thoughts have to be lent to the child~ and even so 
the deepest strata may turn out to be impenetrable to 
consciousness." (my emphasis) What Freud objects to is not 
the par~ necessarily played by interpretation, but the very 
sparsity of material for interpretation that such an 
analysi~ must provide. 
It is also Fish's claim that underlying Freud's 
"defensive strategies" (the existence of which, as I have 
pointed out, is more a creation of Fish's than of Freud's) 
is an underhand attempt to "shift the burden of 
'refurbishing' on to the patient" (my emphasis) so as to 
"admit interpretation into the scene while identifying it as 
the work of another ... " Astonishingly, the very 
introduction of the "patient" into Freud's original text is 
the work of Fish, not of the author. The offending sentence 
- that which, according to Fish, "shifts the burden of 
refurbishing onto the patient ... " - reads as follows .in the 
original: "An analysis of a childhood disorder through the 
medium of recollection in an intellectually mature adult ... 
necessitates our taking into account the distortion and 
refurbishing to which a person's own past is subjected when 
it is looked back upon from a later period." In Fish's 
rendition of the same sentence, he takes it upon himself to 
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substitute the word "patient" for Freud's decidedly more 
neutral "person", thus introducing into Freud's original 
statement an element of specificity for which the author was 
never responsible, but which nicely supports Fish's central 
thesis. Indeed, the coercion could not be more obvious; but 
we soon begin to find that it is executed by Fish, not, as 
he would have us believe, by Freud. 
Finally, the isolation of the paragraph in question, 
and its subsequent emphasis in the reader's consciousness, 
is itself a coercive strategy employed by Fish to direct the 
reader's attention, in the interests of his own argument, 
away from what is actually at stake: namely, the "high 
theoretical interest" that any analysis of childhood 
neurosis, whatever the limitations of the methodology, must 
hold for psychoanalysis. As Freud makes clear in the 
paragraph immediately following the over-emphasized passage 
in question, "In any case it may be maintained that ·analysis 
of children's neuroses can claim to possess a specially high 
theoretical interest." (1918(1914]: 235; my emphasis) 
Later, in Chapter Two, Freud stresses that "analyses such as 
this are not published in order to produce conviction in the 
minds of th6se whose attitude has hitherto been recusant and 
sceptical. The intention is only to bring forward some new 
facts for investigators who have already been convinced by 
their own clinical experiences." (1918(1914]: 240) Far 
more important than the necessity for a means to confirm the 
accuracy of all interpretative details brought to light by 
the analysis, is the evidence the case history provides for 
the existence of infantile sexuality. This is the 
theoretical value of the case in Freud's view, and the 
reason for its publication, and it is this theoretical value 
that Fish evades by distracting the reader's attention to 
methodological questions of secondary significance. 
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III 
We have seen that Fish opens his paper by focusing on 
questions of methodology, while evading any serious 
confrontation with the theoretical issues underlying the 
Wolf-Man's case history. We have also seen the extent to 
which Fish relies on purely interpretive procedures to 
support his arguments, and that the, accuracy of his 
/ 
interpretations can be questioned on a number of .grounds if 
one returns to Freud's original t~xts. As such, Fish's 
paper both reflects and perpetuates the history of reduction 
and distortion which has characterized the development of 
psychoanalysis. 8 Further examination will reveal that in 
his-criticisms Fish is also guilty of what Juliet Mitchell 
describes as the "unconscious denial of the unconscious". 
Mitchell suggests that no understanding of Freud's work is 
possible without some grasp of two fundamental theories: 
firstly, the nature of unconscious mental life and the laws 
that govern its behaviour, and secondly, the meaning of 
sexuality in human life: 
It is ... a characteristic of most attacks on Freud's 
work that, though the criticism seems to be over 
specific issues, what is really being rejected is [the] 
whole intellectual framework of psychoanalysis ... There 
is formal obeisance to Freud's theories, yet behind 
most criticism of details there lies an unacknowledged 
~efusal of ~very major concept. Time and time again, 
one dissident after atiother has repudiated singly or 
wholesale all the main scientific tenets of 
psychoanalysis. (1974: 5) 
I 
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The first indication of his denial of the unconscious, 
amongst other major concepts of psychoanalysis, is Fish's 
evasion of them. At no stage, during the first section of 
his paper, does Fish attempt to confront or come to terms 
with any of the theoretical premisses upon which the 
analysis is based. This pattern continues well into Section 
II. at which point Fish gives his fullest attention to 
another passage of secondary significance, this time dealing 
with questions of narrative technique: "I am unable," writes 
Freud, "to give either a purely historical or a purely 
thematic account of my patient's story; I can write a 
history neither of the treatment nor of the illness, but I 
shall find myself obliged to combine the two methods of 
presentation." (1918(1914]: 240) 
"A "purely historical" account," responds Fish, "would 
be a narrative account tracing out relationships of cause 
and effect; and by declaring that he is unable to provide 
it, Freud releases himself from the requirement that in his 
explanations one thing be shown to follow another. A 
"purely thematic" account would be one in which the 
coherence of events and details was a matter of their 
relationship to a single master theme; and by declaring that 
he is unable to provide it, Freud releases himself from 
the requirement that his explanations go together to form a 
unified whole. In effect, he neutralizes criticism of his 
conclusions before they are offered and is in the enviable 
position of being at once the architect and judge of his own 
performance." (1986:" 936) 
Fish's response is revealing, for it provides us with 
evidence for what, in Fish's view, constitute narrative 
"requirements". First, there is the "requirement" (from 
which Freud has ostensibly "released himself") that "in [the 
author's] explanations one thing be shown to follow 
another.~ Second, there is the "requirement" (which Freud 
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has once again managed to "evade") that ''[the author's] 
explanations go together to form a unified whole." These, 
of course, are also the requirements of most forms of 
conscious perception, which tend to in~ist that it is in the 
nature of all "explanations" that they proceed according to 
clear relations of cause and effect. Fish is astute enough 
to realize that the explanation behind Freud's inability to 
meet those requirements lies precisely in "the nature of the 
unconscious, which, [Freud] tells us, is not a linear 
structure ruled by the law of contradiction, but a 
geological accumulation of forms that never completely 
disappear and live side by side in an uneasy and 
unpredictable vacillation." Fish is disturbed by this 
explanation for he fears the freedom it allows the narrator, 
the altogether too "favourable" rhetorical situation it 
seems to provide - one which, according to Fish, 
"neutralizes criticism" of Freud's conclusions "even before 
they are offered". But the real reason for Fish's 
discomfort is clearly his own underlying denial of the 
unconscious itself - a rejection which is barely disguised 
in.Fish's allegation some lines later that "the unconscious 
is not a concept but a rhetorical device, a place holder 
which can be given whatever shape the polemical moment 
requires." (1986: 936) Later still, we will find out that, 
for Fish, "a rhetorical object ... is entirely constructed 
and stands without external support; it is, we are 
accustomed to say, removed from reality ... " (1986: 938) If 
the unconscious is, in Fish's view, just such a "rhetorical" 
object, then in Fish's view, it can have nothing to do with 
"reality". Fish has recognized, as he tells us at the end 
of his paper, ihat "the thesis of psychoanal7sis is that one 
cannot.get to the side of the unconscious". Indeed, he is 
living proof of the fact - for he cannot get to the side of 
his own unconscious desire that all explanations proceed 
along the lines of conscious perception, or that "one thing 
be shown to follow another" in the formation of a coherent 
and "unified whole". 
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What Fish in fact requires is no less than a definitive 
understanding of all psychical processes from the point of 
view of consciousness, a requirement which, as Mitchell 
observes, is characteristic of most traditional opposition 
to Freud's theories: "It is no accident that, for all their 
differences, Reich's, Laing's and the feminists' theories 
come to resemble one another in so many ways. All these 
writers deny the unconscious - Reich by finding it to be 
nothing other than a pool of biological energy, Laing by 
treating its constructs as though they were identical to 
those of consciousness, the feminist critics by believing 
above all in social actuality and conscious choice." (1974: 
356) 
Ironically, Fish objects to Freud's interpretation 6f 
the Wolf-Man's dream on the grounds that it is too 
"authoritative", too "finished" and "enclosed" - the same 
grounds on which he objects to the narrative as a whole, and 
to Peter Brooks' reading of it (in Reading for the Plot; 
1984) as a "radically modernist" text, a "structure of 
indeterminacy" and "undecidability" which "perilously 
destabilizes belief in ... exhaustive accounts whose 
authority derives from the force of closure. "On the 
contrary," suggests Fish, '' ... we can note that Freud's own 
characterization of his narrative insists precisely on those 
qualities Brooks would deny to it: completeness, 
exhaustiveness, authority, and above all, closure." (1986: 
936) 
Freud's "own characterization" of his narrative, 
according to Fish, is to be found in a footnote as he begins 
to interpret the wolf dream: "it is always a strict law of 
dream-interpretation that an explanation must be found for 
every detail." (1918[1914]: 274) But Fish's objection is 
based on a misunderstanding of - or at least, on too 
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simplistic an approach to - what Freud means when he uses 
the word "explanation". Because he approaches all 
explanations from t~e point of view of consciousness, Fish, 
like Wittgenstein, sees all explanations as end-points in 
•the process of interpretation rather than starting-points. 
The importance, for Freud, of finding "explanations" for 
every detail of a dream lies not in the revelation of 
ultimate meanings they provide, in their "completeness", 
"exhaustiveness". or their "force of closure", but in the 
link they set up between the latent dream-thoughts and the 
manifest dream-content. The finding of this link is 
paramount in the operation of dream interpretation because 
it is only once this link has been brought to light that the 
process of interpretation can truly begin. 
The transformation of the latent dream-thoughts into 
the manifest dream-content deserves all our attention, 
since it is the first instance known to us of psychical 
material being changed over from one mode of expression 
which is immediately intelligible to us to another 
which we can only come to understand with the help of 
guidance and effort, though it too must be recognized 
as a function of our mental activity. (from The 
Interpretation of Dreams PLF 4, cited in Habermas, 
1968: 220) 
In relation to the above passage, Habermas suggests 
that "the technique of dream interpretation goes beyond the 
art of hermeneutics insofar as it must grasp not only the 
meaning o~ a possibly distorted text, but the meaning of the 
text distortion itself, that is the transformation of a 
latent dream thought into the manifest dream. In other 
words, it must reconstruct what Freud calls the 'dream-
work'. The interpretation of dreams leads to a process of 
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reflection that takes the same course as the genesis of the 
dream text, only in reverse. It is complementary to the 
dream-work. In this process the analyst can call on free 
association to individual elements of the dream as well as 
on subsequent spontaneous additions to the dream text as it 
was first communicated." (1968: 221) 
Far from leading to "completeness" and closure, the 
explanations which Freud refers to in his footnote may be 
seen to open up the dream text to a process whereby the 
uppermost dream layer, or the "dream facade" can be 
identified and removed. What follows is a complex 
interpretative operation obstructed by strong forces of 
resistance which may protract the process of interpretation 
over a number of years, and which may well prevent a point 
of -"closure" from ever being reached. 
This brings us to what is perhaps one of the most 
significant features of Fish's essay - its failure to 
distinguish between the operations of literary analysis and 
dream interpretation. In "Meaning and Dream 
Interpretation", Fredric Weiss tackl~s a number of questions 
relating to this distinction which are blatantly ignored by 
Fish: What type of meaning is Freud establishing for a 
dream-report? What are the relationships between a dream-
report, the subject's "associations", and the meaning 
assigned to the report? (Weiss, 1974: 55) Weiss suggests 
that Freud's dream interpretation has similarities to the 
interpretation of aesthetic objects, such as poems or films. 
But as soon as the view of dream interpretation as activity 
analogous to art interpretation is expanded, it begins to 
run into difficulties. For example, as Weiss points out, 
"Freud does not apply to ·associations· the criterion of 
consistency with context which is used to judge an 
interpretation of a poem as correct or incorrect. Moreover, 
he makes no attempt to measure a person's ·associations· 
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against any criterion, to judge them right or wrong, 
allowable or not al iowable. . . 'Right·, wrong·, 'allowable', 
'not allowable', 'plausible', 'far-fetched', 'relevant', 
\. 
'extraneous·, and any other such characterizations do not 
apply to ·associations·. If the subject's associations do 
lead to a meaning, that is the meaning which the 
psychoanalyst assigns to the dream-report: it cannot be 
rejected on any such ground as incompatibility with the 
dream-report, and the analyst makes no attempt to reject it 
on any ground." (Weiss, 1974: 57) 
In psychoanalysis, trains of associations are pursued 
not simply to discover, the meaning that may be inherent in a 
dream-report, but "for the sake of whatever they may be 
leading to, providing that what they are leading to is or 
reveals something about the subject ... There may be no 
attempt to assign everything to which the ·associations' 
lead, to the dream-report as its meaning. All reference to 
the dream-report may be dropped; the question of what 
meaning is to be assigned to it tends to fade out of 
consideration." (Weiss, 1974: 58) What Freud establishes 
during the interpretation of a dream, is what Weiss calls a 
"m~aning-for the subject": "It is a meaning-for him in the 
respect that he gives it: the meaning-for him of something 
is what it means to him, not what anyone else might or would 
have to make of it." (Weiss, 1974: 64) 
Fish~s earliest objection to the Wolf-Man's 
interpretation of his dream is to the "act of ~onstruction" 
which leads the patient to the "explanation" for one 
particularly significant detail: "Freud tells us that 
although the patient r•called the dream at a 'very early 
stage in the analysis', its 'interpretation was a task that 
dragged on over several years· without notable success. The 
breakthrough, as it is reported, came in an instant and 
apparently without preparation: 'One day the patient began 
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to continue with the interpretation of the dream. He thought 
that the part of the dream which said ... "suddenly the 
wiridow opened of its own accord" was not completel~ 
explained'. Immediately and without explanation, the 
explanation came forth: 'it must mean: "my eyes suddenly 
opened." I was asleep ... and suddenly woke up, and as I woke 
up I saw something: the tree with the wolves.' It is 
important to note that the patient does not say, 'Now I 
remember', but rather, 'It must mean.' His is not an act of 
recollection, but of construction ... " (1986: 935) 
Fish objects to this interpretation on two counts: (1) 
that is constructed rather than remembered, thereby leaving 
room to question its 6onsistency with the "true" meaning of 
the dream-report; and (2) that the patient is "compelled" to 
this particular interpretation (among all those he might 
have hit upon) not thr~ugh his own efforts, but through the 
persuasive techniques of the analyst. 
Freud's theory of dreams itself renders the first· 
objection invalid since the criterion of "consistency with 
context" which is used to judge the interpretation of a poem 
as correct or incorrect does not apply to the subject's 
associations in dream analysis. Indeed, such acts of 
"construction" may be essential if the process of 
interpretation is going to lead to the source of the 
neuroses underlying the dream itself. Further, they may 
issue either from the patient or from the physician, in the 
first stage towards, rather than as substitutes for, the 
patient's process of recollection. Thus the physici~n 
"reconstructs what has been forgotten from the faulty texts 
of the [patient], from his dreams, associations, and 
repetitions, while the [patient], animated by the 
constructions suggested by the physician as hypotheses, 
remembers ... " (Habermas, 1968: 230) Most significant of 
all, as Habermas makes clear, "only the patient's 
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recollection decides the accuracy of the construction." 
Fish fails to grasp either the hypothetical nature of these 
constructions, or their role in the ongoing rather than 
static process of recollection. 
As far as the second objection is concerned, Freud 
would hardly have stressed the method by which he "induced" 
the patient to speak had he considered it to be inconsistent 
with his theoretical aims. Neither can his reference to 
this exercise of "inexorable pressure" be shrugged off as an 
unfortunate but revealing verbal slip on the part of the 
author. On the contrary, Freud's r,ference to his 
analytical practice in this case would have beep included 
precisely to emphasize the necessity for strong forces of 
persuasion to counteract the patient's unconscious forces of 
resistance to the analysis. Certainly, Freud would have 
encouraged, perhaps even "compelled" or "persuaded", the 
patient to speak, for this was his task as an analyst - to 
help the patient 'overcome certain resistances - ... those 
which, earlier, made the material concerned into something 
repressed by rejecting it from the conscious." (1915a: 167) 
But it is an "act of construction" par excellence on the 
part of Fish to suggest that Freud's persuasive methods were 
extended, in this case, to elicit the content of the 
interpretation they produced. Nowhere in the Wolf-Man case 
history (or for that matter in Fish's response to it) is 
there any concrete evidence to suggest that the analogy 
between the window opening and the young boy awakening 
should have been attributed to the analyst rather than to 
the patient. 
We now see that at the same time that Fish rejects the 
hypothesis of the unconscious, he betrays his underlying 
scepticism with regard to another of psychoanalysis' major 
concepts: namely, that of resistance. For he is.apparently 
unable to accept that "persuasion" is a necessary counter-
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force to the patient's unconscious forces of resistance. 
Indeed, the experience of "resistance", suggests Habermas, 
is no less than the "starting point of psychoanalytic 
theory" (Habermas, 1968: 229) - a claim substantiated by 
Freud in a number of passages in which he draws attention to 
its theoretical importance, and to the way in which it 
determines and delineates the nature of the analyst's task: 
It is a long superceded idea, and one derived from 
superficial appearances, that the patient suffers from 
a sort of ignorance, and that if one removes this 
ignorance by giving him information (about the causal 
connection of his illness with his life, about his 
experiences in childhood, and so on) he is bound to 
recover. The pathological factor is not his ignorance 
in itself, but the root of this ignorance in his inner 
resistances; it was they that first called this 
ignorance into being, and they still maintain it now. 
The task of the treatment lies in combating these 
resistances. Informing the patient of what he does not 
know because he has repressed it is only one.of the 
necessary preliminaries to the treatment. If knowledge 
about the unconscious were as important for the patient 
as people inexperienced in psychoanalysis imagine, 
listening to lectures or reading books would be enough 
to cure him. Such measures, however, have as much 
influence on the symptoms of nervous illness as a 
distribution of menu-cards in a time of famine has upon 
hunger. The analogy goes even further than its 
immediate application; for informing the patient of his 
unconscious regularly results in an intensification of 
the conflict in him and an exacerbation of his 
troubles. (cited in Habermas, 1968: 230) 
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Naturally, Freud was acutely aware of the 
contradictions which his project - to discover and explain 
the mechanisms and effects of the unconscious - entailed. 
For he had to discover how to register unconscious mental 
proc~sses without this registration being distorted by the 
effects of consciousness. Time and again, throughout his 
professional career, Freud would return to the same 
fundamental problem with which he opens his paper on the 
unconscious in the "metapsychological papers" of 1915: "How 
are we to arrive at a knowledge of the unconscious? It is 
of course only as something conscious that we know it, after 
it has undergone transformation or translation into 
something conscious ... " (1915a: 167) And later, in "The Ego 
and the Id": "Now all our knowledge is invariably bound up 
' 
with consciousness. We can come to know even the Ucs. only 
by-making it conscious. But stop, how is that p~ssible? 
What does it mean when we say 'making something conscious'? 
How can that come about?" (1915b: 357) 
The fact of resistance is crucial in the answer to 
these questions, for it is only through the clarification 
and subsequent elimination of resistances that the effects 
of the unconscious can be brought to consciousness. Thus 
Freud goes on to say, in the earlier paper, that 
"psy'choanalytic work shows us every day that translation of 
this kind [ie. from unconscious to conscious] is possible. 
In order that this should come about, the person under 
analysis must overcome certain resistances - the same 
resistances as those which, earlier, made the material 
concerned into something repressed by rejecting it from the 
con-soious." (1915a: 167) In "The Ego and the Id", Freud 
elaborates on this statement by suggesting that "the reason 
why [unconscious] ideas cannot become conscious is that a 
certain force opposes them, that otherwise they could become 
conscious, and that it would then be apparent how little 
they differ from other elements which are admittedly 
66 
psychical. The fact that in the technique of psychoanalysis 
a means has been found by which the opposing force can be 
removed and the ideas in question made conscious renders 
this theory irrefutable. The state in which the ideas 
exis~ed before being made conscious is called repression, 
and we assert that the force which instituted the repression 
and maintains it is perceived as resistance during the work 
of analysis." (1915b: 357) 
Fish's criticisms reveal his ·own subjection to powerful 
forces of resistance - resistance to what Freud has 
described as the "first shibboleth of psychoanalysis": the 
fact that the "essence" of the psychical cannot be situated 
in consciousness. His consequent denial of the unconscious 
entails his denial of the concept of resistance, and so the 
cycle perpetuates itself as, scattered through the remaining 
pages of his paper, we come up against a string of further 
associated rejections: 
Of the theory of distortion in dreams, Fish goes one 
step further than the traditional complaint that it is too 
"arbitrary" to suggest that it constltutes yet another 
purposive strategy to sway the course of the analysis in 
whatever direction the analyst chooses: 
One critic has objected to [Freud's interpretation of 
the Wolf-Man's succession of dreams concerned with 
aggressive actions against his sister and governess] as 
one of Freud's "apparently arbitrary inversions", but 
it is far from arbitrary for it is in effect a precise 
and concise ·direction to both the patient and the 
reader, providing them with a method for dealing with 
the material they will soon meet, and telling them in 
advance what will result when the method is applied: 
"if you want to know what something - a dream, a piece 
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of neurotic behaviour - means, simply reverse its 
apparent significance, and what you will find is an 
attempt to preserve masculine self-esteem against the 
threat of passivity and femininity." The real 
I 
seduction in this chapter. is the seduction not of 
the patient by his sister, but of both the patient and 
the reader by Freud, who will now be able to produce 
interpretative conclusions in the confidence that they 
will be accepted as the conclusions of an inevitable 
and independent logic. ( 1986: 936) 
The content of Freud's alleged "precise and concise 
direction to the reader" is (as we are not altogether 
surprised to discover by this time) another of Fish's "acts 
of construction" - the result of his own work of 
interpretation neaily disguised as a quotation from Freud. 
What it constitutes is indeed a "precise and concise 
direction to the reader" - but to Fish's reader not Freud's 
- to attribute his own in~erpretive conclusions to Freud in 
the interests of strengthening the logic of his argument. 
Fish's next rejection concerns the existence of 
phantasies. Fish objects to the uncertainty surrounding the 
evocation of the "primal scene" - the picture of copulation 
between· the Wolf-Man's parents - since its status, as Freud 
himself admits,· is that of an "assumption". At another 
_point, Freud refers to the same "assumption" as an 
"unimpeachable fact", and it is at this point that Fish 
pounces, in the belief that he has uncovered yet another 
error of logic.with which to amplify his case against Freud: 
"Everything happens so fast in this sequence," complains 
Fish, "that we may not notice that the "unimpeachable fact" 
which anchors it is the assumption of the primal scene. In 
most arguments assumptions are what must be proved, but in 
this argument the assumption is offered as proof; and what 
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supports it is not any independent fact, but the polemical 
fact that without the assumption the story Freud has so 
laboriously constructed falls apart." (1986: 938) Whether 
the "primal scene"' ever actually took place, or was simply 
a phantasy on the part of the patient, is, as Freud 
stresses, of no significance. But it is significant for 
Fish, since his denial of the unconscious prevents him from 
acknowledging that central to the very concept of the 
phantasy, is the thesis that in the unconscious mind of the 
patient, it is indistinguishable from fact, and must 
therefore be treated as such in the analytic situation. 
Fish's final claim is that the thesis of psychoanalysis 
(that one cannot get to the side of the unconscious) is "one 
and th~ same"·with the thesis of his essay (that one cannot 
get to the side of rhetoric). In effect, this is a claim 
that repeats his analogy between the unconscious and 
"rhetorical objects", both of which are, in Fish's 
definition, constructs, removed from reality, and standing 
entirely without external support. It is a final and 
conclusive restatement of his denial of the unconscious, and 
in the end, we find that Mitchell's assertion - that "time 
and time again, one dissident after another has repudiated 
singly or who~esale all the main scientific tenets of 
psychoanalysis" - holds good for Fish as well. 
IV 
Of course, Fish is not a psychoanalyst. He is a 
literary critic - one who is so finely trained in the art of 
literary interpretation that he has been moved to declare 
that, where critical activity is concerned, "like it or not, 
interpretation is the only game in town". (1980: 355) By 
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this he means to _say that meanings are not embedded in 
texts, but depend entirely on the interpretive activities of 
the reader; that texts are "unstable entities" whose 
meanings are determined by, and "develop in a dynamic 
relationship with the reader's expectations, projections, 
conclusions, judgements and assumptions ... " (1980: 2) In 
this formulation, "the reader's response is not to the 
meaning, it is the meaning ... "; or, in other words, 
."linguistic and textual facts, rather than being the objects 
of interpretation, are its products." (1980: 3) 
According to Fish's theory, the reader's 
interpretations are shaped by the "interpretive community" 
of which he is a member. Members of the same "interpretive 
community" will, in Fish's view, share the same sets of 
assumptions, the same sets of "interpretive strategies" and, 
consequently, the same "ways of reading". "In other words, 
there is no single way of reading that is correct or 
natural, only 'ways of reading' that are extensions of 
community perspectives." It follows, for Fish, that "the 
business of criticism is not ... to determine a correct way 
of reading but to determine from which of a number of 
possible perspectives reading will proceed." (1980: 16) 
Nowhere in Fish's theory of reading does he account for 
the possibility that amongst those "possible perspectives" 
from which reading may proceed, there will be some which are 
appropriate to the text in question and some which are not. 
This weakness in his theoretical position shows up in 
practice in his reading of the Wolf-Man case history, for he 
reads it from a perspective of consciousness which is 
totally inappropriate to it. 
Fish argues for a model of critical activity which he 
describes as a model of "persuasion", in which "prejudicial 
or perspectival perception is all there is, and the question 
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is [simply] from which of a number of equally interested 
perspectives will the text be constituted." (1980: 366) 
The "whole of critical activity", argues Fish, "is an 
attempt on the part of one party to alter the beliefs of 
another so that the evidence cited by the first will be seen 
as evidence by the second." The model of critical activity 
which Fish o~poses in this argument is, as he points out, 
one in which the procedure is exactly the reverse: "evidence 
available apart from any particular belief is brought in to 
judge between competing beliefs, or, as we call them in 
literary studies, interpretations. This is a model derived 
from an analogy to the procedures of logic and scientific 
inquiry, and basically it is a model of demonstration in 
which interpretations are either confirmed or disconfirmed 
by the facts that are independently specified." (1980: 365) 
The business of this essay is not to point out the 
serious limitations of Fish's idea of what constitutes 
"criticism" in the field of literary studies. For the 
moment, the theoretical argument drawn up by Fish interests 
me only to the extent that his enthusiasm for the activity 
of interpretation and for its associated model of 
"persuasion" over that of "demonstration" has led him to 
superimpose the former model on the texts of Sigmund Freud, 
and to see the whole of psychoanalysis, quite 
unproblematically, as "just another form of interpretation". 
It is Habermas who makes the pertinent observation that 
although psychoanalysis gives the appearance of a special 
form of "interpretation", it is in fact something more: 
Initially, psychoanalysis appears only as a special 
' 
form of interpretation. It provides theoretical 
persp~ctives and technical rules for the interpretation 
of symbolic structures. Freud always patterned the 
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interpretation of dreams after the hermeneutic model of 
philological research. Occasionally he compares it to 
the translation of a foreign author: of a text by Livy, 
for example. But the interpretive effort of the analyst 
distinguishes itself from that of the philologist not 
only through the crystallization of a special object 
domain. It requires a specifically expanded 
hermeneutics, one that, in contrast to the usual method 
of interpretation in the cultural sciences, takes into 
account a new dimension. 
What ultimately shapes this "new dimension" in the 
interpretive efforts of the analyst is the unconscious 
itself. Indeed, it must ultimately shape all interpretive 
operations for as soon as it is perceived not as a "second 
consciousness" but as a particular "psychical locality" with 
its own contents, its own mechanisms and specific "energy", 
which is eternally present, and of which consciousness is 
simply an added "quality", then even the interpretive 
possibilities of the very language we speak must be expanded 
to take it into account. Thus Freud has remarked, "In our 
science as in the others the problem is the same: Behind the 
attributes (qualities) of the object under examination which 
are presented directly to our perception, we have to 
discover something else which is more independent of the 
particular receptive capacity of our sense organs and which 
approximates.more closely to what may be supposed to be the 
real state of affairs." (cited in Nagel, 1974: 12) 
Stanley Fish would do well to take this "new dimension" into 
account in any further hermeneutic forays he may be 
contempl~ting into the work of Sigmund Freud. 
NOTES 
1. A collection of papers presented at the colloquium has 
since. been published under the title The Linguistics of 
Writing - Arguments between Language and Literature, 
.edited by Nigel Fabb, Derek Attridge, Alan Durant and 
Colin MacCabe (Manchester University Press, 1987). As 
this essay was written before,the appearance of the 
book, however, all page references to Fish's article 
will be to the TLS version. 
2. For further references to the "huge literature focusing 
on the issues of evidence and testability", see Fish's 
list in The Linguistics of Writing - Arguments between 
Language and Literature (Manchester UP, 1987) footnote 
5, pp. 171-172. 
3. The same fundamental objection is embedded in Sebastiano 
Timpanaro's reference to the "captious and sophistical 
method, resistant to any verification, quick to force 
interpretations to secure pre-ordained proofs, employed 
by Freud and Freudians in their explanation of slips, 
dreams and neurotic symptoms." (The Freudian Slip, New 
Left Books, 1976, p. 14) Traditionally, and prior_ to 
the work of the French women's liberation group 
Psychoanalyse et Politique, feminists have rooted their 
objections in similar ground. For a comprehensive survey 
of, and response to this tradition, see Mitchell, 1974. 
The work of Mitchell's text is to defend psychoanalysis 
against this claim, and to show that because those 
feminists in opposition to Freud try to discuss his 
concept of femininity outside the framework of 
psychoanalysis, their objections, and even their 
tributes, cannot be made to stand up. She also reveals 
that their rejection of the scientific status of 
psychoanalysis would be more accurately described as a 
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rejection of its two most crucial discoveries: the 
unconscious, and infantile sexuality. 
4. I am not persuaded by Fish's attempts to dissolve this 
contradiction, in the final section of his paper, by 
declaring that no-one can get to the side of rhetoric, 
that "being persuasive, assuming the stance of ~ 
rhetorician, is not something you can chaos~ to avoid" -
a statement which, in the end, neither renders his 
interpretive efforts more coQvincing, nor vindicates his 
arguments. The rest of this paper will b~ dedicated to 
demonstrating why. 
5. For further discussion of methodological approaches to 
the analysis of infantile neuroses, see Freud, 1909: 
169. 
t 
6. For an elaboration on this point, see Althusser, 1984. 
Althusser suggests that one of the difficulties facing 
anyone attempting to understand and assess Freud's work 
today is to cross the "vast space of ideological 
prejudice" that divides us from Freud through the 
reduction of his "revolutionary discovery" of the 
unconscious to disciplines essentially foreign to it -
including that of psychology itself: "Western reason 
... will only agree to conclude a pact of peaceful 
existence with psychoanalysis after years of non-
recognition, contempt and insults ... on condition of 
annexing it to its own sciences and myths ... " (1984: 
186) This history of mythologization has had far-
reaching effects on the reception of Freud's ideas: 
First, it has resulted in a displacement of the object 
of psychoanalysis from what analytical technique deals 
with in the analytical practice of the cure (the 
unconscious) to analytical practice, or the "cure" 
itself. Second, it has prevented the successful 
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transferral from a form of .critical attention which is 
itself dominated by a problematic of consciousness to 
one which starts from a recognition of the primary role 
played by the unconscious. Hence a form of criticism 
has arisen whose critical focus is misdirected, and 
which is based on preconceptions inimical to an adequate 
response to Freud's ideas. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DORA: MOMENTS OF MODERNISM 
The subject of this essay is Freud's first great case 
history, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, 
better known as the case of "Dora" - Freud's pseudonym fo;r a 
young woman who began treatment with him in the autumn of 
1900. From her early childhood, Dora had suffered 
intermittent hysterical symptoms - both mental and physical 
- and was finally presented to Freud for therapy at the age 
of eighteen after her father's discovery of a note in which 
she threatened suicide because "as she said, she could no 
longer endure her life." Dora herself had been unwilling to 
undergo treatment from the start: "It was only her father's 
authority," Freud tells us, "that induced her to come to me 
at all." Freud never completed the treatment, which was 
called off by Dora herself after only three months. 
Since its publication in 1905, Freud's account of his 
treatment of Dora has been widely discussed, not only by 
analysts, but - particularly over the last several years -
by literary critics as well. A rich and varied selection of 
essays on the case, many of them by literary critics, was 
recently published by Columbia University Press in a volume 
called In Dora's Case. In this essay, I propose once again 
to re-open the case, but first, by way of introduction, I 
want. to focus in some detail on a tecent article by Toril 
Moi, entitled Patriarchal Thought and the Desire for 
Knowledge. My reasons for doing so should become clear as 
the essay proceeds. 
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I 
Focusing on psychoanalytic theories of knowledge, 
sexuality, and sexual identity, Toril Moi suggests that at 
one level, Freudian psychoanalysis can be characterized as 
an effort to open up and extend the field of rational 
knowledge: "Perhaps the analytic situation may be seen a~ a 
different model of structuring knowledge," she writes, "one 
that forces us steadily to reflect on the points of 
exclusion, repression, and blockage, in our own discursive 
constructions ... " (1989: 196) 
Moi is here referring particularly to what she calls 
the very specific "dialogic" situation created by 
psychoanalytic practice as it is known today, and as it 
evolved from the first analytical sessions between Freud and 
his hysterical patients. These sessions between analyst and 
mental patient were crucially different from any that had 
gone before. As Moi points out: "Unlike Charcot, who chose 
to exhibit his hysterical patients in a gesture of 
dominance, Freud decided to listen to them: psychoanalysis 
is born in the encounter between the hysterical woman and 
the positivist man of science." (1989: 196) It is in this 
revers~l of the traditional roles of subject and object, of 
speaker and listener, Moi suggests, that Freud more or less 
unwittingly opens the way for a new under'standing of human 
knowledge. 
Moi has arrived at this point in her essay (to which I 
will return later) after a brief survey of some recent 
attempts amongst feminists to criticize, and propose 
alternatives to, certain forms of structured thought which 
have beeh variously labelled "male science", "male theory", 
or "male rationality". These traditional modes of 
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·knowledge, they have argued, are inextricably linked with 
traditional sexualized - and sexist - categories of 
dominance and oppression. Their claim (as represented by 
Moi) is that (male) science, philosophy, rationality - call 
it what you will - constantly re-enacts the Cartesian 
mind/body divide, in which, the argument goes, 
... always and everywhere the rational, active, 
masculine intellect operates on the passive, 
objectified, feminized body. To be intellectual - to 
think? - under patriarchy ... is willy-nilly to take up 
a position marked as masculine. If one doesn't, one has 
no option but to embrace the other side of the tedious 
series of homologous patriarchal oppositions, where 
irrationality and thoughtlessness is equated with 
femininity, the body, object-being, emotionality, and 
so on. (1989: 189) 
According to Moi, the most influential arguments 
against the so-called "male science" have been put forward 
by Evelyn Fox Keller, whose main enemy is the concept of 
"objectivity", which she sees as the ruling ideological 
paradigm of the natural sciences. In Keller's critique, 
scientific ideology divides the world into "two parts - the 
knower (mind) and the knowable (nature)", and insists that 
the relation between "knower and known is one of distance 
and s~paration ... that between a subject and object 
radically divided". Having divided the world, patriarchal 
ideology genders the two halves. Nature, objectified and 
oppressed, is female, whereas knowledge is characterized as 
male: "The characterization of both the scientific mind and 
its modes of access to knowledge as masculine is indeed 
significant. Masculine here connotes, as it so often does, 
autonomy, separation and distance. It connotes a radical 
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rejection of any commingling of subject and object, which 
are, it now appears, quite consistently identified as male 
and female." (1989: 189-190) Feminists, Keller argues, 
should refuse to accept this male vision of the 
subject/object division; instead she proposes a 
"commingling'' of the two, or an empathetic "feel~ng" for the 
object, where it is no longer reified but respected in its 
integrity. 
Moi is sceptical both about the decision to label 
traditional science "male" (Why not "patriarchal"? she 
suggests; just as all women are not feminist, not all males 
are patriarchal) and to call the new mode of knowledge 
"female". Why imply, she asks, that this new mode somehow 
is less suitable for males? She is also sceptical about the 
usefulness of seeing all forms of intel~ectual mastery 
simply as aggressive control and domination. To be 
consistent, Moi points out, the denunciation of all possible 
forms of mastery would logically have to include the 
rejection, not only of "rapacious exploitation of natural 
resources, nuclear weapons, and dictatorship, but of 
agriculture, house-building, and bicycling as well". (1989: 
193) 
Also, while Moi finds Keller's critique of dominant 
forms of what she calls Cartesian rationalism "inspiring"; 
her denunciation of the logic of domination and 
objectification at work in the ideology of science "timely"; 
while she warms particularly to the idea put forward by 
Keller of undoing the split between reason and emotion - of 
finding a place for feeling within science - on the whole, 
she finds Keller's analysis of knowledge and feminism 
"somewhat disappointing". This is because, as she argues 
convincingly, Keller's analysis never quite manages ~o break 
free of what Moi calls the "straitjacket of patriarchal 
binary thought", in the end remaining trapped by the very 
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categories of the scientific ideology it sets out to read. 
"There is no attempt here to question the logic that 
underpins patriarchal metaphysics, or to contest the very 
meaning of terms such as masculine/feminine, reason/emotion, 
and so on ... " (1989: 193) 
In preference, Moi turns to the "deconstructive 
onslaughts" on these very sets of (patriarchal) oppositions 
which have come from thinkers such as Helene Cixous, and 
which, she says, contrast sharply with the curious 
"timidity" of the critiques offered by Keller and her 
followers: 
By focusing on the inevitable struggle, the warring 
relationship between such hierarchical oppositions [as 
for example, activity/passivity; culture/nature; 
head/heart; man/woman ... ] Cixous at once signals that 
the battle between the sexes insinuates itself in the 
very structure of the sign, and that in the case of 
such binary oppositions the sexual struggle is bound up 
with the effort to deconstruct phallogocentric logic ... 
The deconstructive move is not to abolish oppdsitions, 
or to deny that such signifiers exist, but rather to 
trace the way in which each signifier contaminates and 
subverts the meanings of the others. Such an approach 
opens the sign up, insists that its meaning is always 
deferred, never fully present to itself. In its 
questioning of the metaphysics of presence and 
identity, deconstruction offers a more radical ~olution 
to the problem of subject and object rai§ed by Keller 
and Bordo. (1989: 194) 
It is from this point, via a brief look at French 
feminist philosopher Michele Le Doeuff 's account of 
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knowledge and patriarchal ideologization, that Moi turns 
towards the Freudian psychoanalytic dialogue. For Moi, the 
analytical situation radically undermines the split between 
active subject and passive object denou~ced by Keller - not 
only because the doctor here turns listener, but also 
because the analytical session engages both analyst and 
patient in transference and countertransference. 
Transference in analysis is roughly defined by Moi as "the 
process whereby the patient transfers earlier traumas and 
reactitins, whether real or imaginary, on to the analyst", 
while countertransference is characterized as "the analyst's 
more or less unconscious reactions to the discourse of the 
patient". (1989: 197) For Moi (as for Lacan) the Freudian 
dialogue, caught as it is in a web of transference and 
countertransference, ~unset~les and undoes any clear-cut 
oppositions between subject and object, self and other". 
(1989: 198) Moi turns to Shoshana Felman to draw out the 
implications of this point: 
By shifting and undercutting the clear-cut polarities 
between subject and object, self and other, inside and 
outside, analyst and analysand, consciousness and 
unconscious, the new Freudian reflexivity substitutes 
for all binary, symmetrical conceptual oppositions -
that is, substitutes for the very foundations of 
Western metaphysics - a new mode of interfering 
heterogeneity. The new reflexive mode - instituted by 
Freud's way of listening to the discourse of the 
hysteric and which Lacan will call the "inmixture of 
the subjects" (Ecrits, p. 415) - divides the subjects 
differently, in such a way that they are neither 
entirely distinguished, separate from each other, nor, 
correlatively, entirely totalizable but, rather, 
interfering from within and in one another. (1989: 
198) 
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There is then in the psychoanalytic situation 
(concludes Moi) a model of knowledge which offers no firmly 
established binary opposites, which cannot therefore be 
gendered either as masculine or feminine, and whi~h thereby 
offers us a chance to escape the "patriarchal· tyranny of 
thought by sexual analogy": "As feminists in search of new 
ways to think about objectivity, knowledge, and modes of 
intellectual activity," Moi writes, "we can ill afford to 
neglect the model offered by psychoanalysis." (1989: 198) 
However - and here's the catch - Moi also points out 
that if Freud's .(and Breuer's) act of listening represents 
an effort to include the "irrational discourse of 
felifinini ty" in the realm of science, it also embodies their 
hope of extending their own rational understanding of 
psychic phe~omena: "Grasping the logic of the unconscious, 
they want to make it accessible to reason." (1989: 197) In 
other words, if on the one hand Freud's and Breuer's "act of 
listening" can be said to constitute a "revolutionary effort 
to let female madness speak to male science", what lurks 
behind it at the same time is a "colonizing, rational 
impulse" which constantly threatens to undermine it, to 
"obliterate" the language of the irrational and the 
unconscious, and to repress the challenging presence of the 
feminine in the process. (1989: 197) 
Having once drawn our attention to it, however, Moi 
dismisses this contradiction at the heart of the 
psychoanalytic project •ith a surprising rapidity; but not 
without first alluding, even if only in passing, to its 
significance in the case of Dora. In Dora's case, she 
suggests, Freud allows the "colonizing impulse" to gain the 
upper hand; here, according to Moi, what she now calls the 
"imperialist tendency" running right through Freud's 
writings, surfaces conspicuously. 
I 
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Indeed, the observation is not an original one. It has 
been made before, in one form or another, by almost everyone 
who has written on Dora in recent years, and in almost every 
one of the essays published in In Dora's Case. To illustrate 
the point, here are just a few examples: 
For Maria Ramas (Freud's Dora, Dora's Hysteria) such is 
the obliterating force Qf Freud's bl~ndness in his treatment 
of Dora that in the end her hysteria - her "repudiation of 
sexuality" - is not explained by Freud but, rather, 
"explained away"; in the course of the analysis, according 
to Ramas, Freud literally "abandons" his initial concern -
the elucidation of (Dora's) hysteria - to present us instead 
with a series of "ideological constructs" manufactured 
purely as a defence for his own "patriarchal fantasies of 
femininity and female sexuality". (1985(1980]: 151) 
Particularly striking to Neil Hertz (Dora's Secrets, 
Freud's Techniques) are Freud's moments of "exuberant 
intellectual narcissism" in the case; his moments of 
"investment" in the "beautiful totality" of his own 
imaginative products; the "vigor" with which he 
"differentiates" himself fro~ Dora, his own "mode of 
knowing" from hers. For He~tz, while Freud's "overflowing 
fondness" for his subject in the Dora case is noteworthy, it 
can hardly be said to include Dora herself: "if anything, 
she is diminished by it, seen thoroughly through". 
(985[1983]: 233-34) 
In Steven Marcus' v~ew (Freud and Dora) the 
distinguishing characteristic of Freud's technique in this 
case is the aggressive manner in which he "forces 
interpretations on Dora before she is ready for them or can 
accept them". (1985(1974]: 88) According to Marcus, 
throughout this "extraordinary work" both Dora and Freud 
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insist with "implacable will" upon the primacy of their own 
versions of "the truth", or "reality", which they then use 
as "wea_pons" against one another. 
remarks, 
It must be emphasized, he 
that the "reality" Freud insists upon is very different 
from the "reality" that Dora is claiming and clinging 
to. And it has to be admitted that not only does Freud 
overlo~k for the most part this critical difference; he 
also adopts no measures for dealing with it. The demon 
of interpretation has taken hold of him, and it is this 
power that presides over the case of Dora ... In fact, 
as the case history advances it becomes increasingly 
clear to the careful reader that Freud and not Dora has 
become the central character in the action ... Instead 
of letting Dora appropriate her own story, Freud 
becomes the appropriator of it. (1985(1974]: 85) 
The Freud we meet with in Marcus' reading is indeed a 
"demonic" figure, "pushing on no matter what" - the same 
"relentless investigator" in fact that we encounter in Toril 
Moi's 1981 reading of the case, in Representation of 
Patriarchy: Sexuality and Epistemology _in Freud's Dora. 
Here, M6i had developed to the full her allusion, in the 
later essay, to Freud's "imperialist tendencies" in Dora's 
case, while suggesting that his account of the analysis of 
Dora be scanned "with the utmost suspicion". In the Dora 
case, she writes, Freud's attempts to posit himself as the 
neutral, scientific observer who is merely noting down his 
observations and reflections can no longer be accepted: "The 
archeologist must be suspected of having mutilated the 
relics he finds." (1985(1981]: 189) As for Dora herself, 
her condition as a victim of male dominance becomes starkly 
visible in Freud's account, according to Moi: "She is not 
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only a pawn in the game between Herr K. ~nd her father; her 
doctor joins in the male team and untir~ngly tries to 
ascribe to her desires she does not have and to ignore the 
ones she does have". (1985[1981]: 191) If the "emancipatory 
project" of psychoanalysis .fails in the case of Dora, 
conclµdes Moi, without mincing her words, 
it is because Freud the liberator happens also to be, 
objectively, on the side of oppression. He is a male in 
patriarchal society, and moreover not just any male but 
an educated bourgeois male, incarnating malgre lui 
patriarchal values. His own emancipatory project 
profoundly conflicts with his political and social role 
as an oppressor of women. (1985[1981]: 193) 
But if it can be held that, in Dora's case, Fr~ud 
failed in the potentially "revolutionary" project to let the 
madwoman speak, to inscribe the madwoman's discourse into 
science; that, in Dora's case, the discourse of the hysteric 
was allowed only the slightest inroad into the "smooth 
positivist logic" of the man of science, becoming if 
anything submerged by it instead; if it can be held that in 
Dora's case, it is Freud's story that is being writt~n and 
not hers that is being retold, can it not equally be held 
that in the storm of critical protest that has arisen in its 
wake, Dora's story has become no more her own, still less 
Freud's, but largely, and perhaps even overwhelmingly, that 
of his critics? Freud's story of Dora's hysteria has become 
the critics' story of Freud's failure to come to ter~s with 
it. It is to salvage what has been lost in the telling of 
this tale that I would now like to turn once again to the 




Why did Freud publish Dora's case at all? If the 
analysis failed so dismally, and if (as his critics have 
often conceded) Freud was the first to admit it, what could 
h~ have hoped to gain from setting down on record this 
ignominious personal and professional defeat? The reasons 
Freud himself offers in the Prefatory Remarks, and comes 
back to sporadically in The Clinical Picture, are reiterated 
as follows in the Postscript: 
[I]n publishing this paper, incomplete though it is, I 
had two objects in view. In the first place, I wished 
to supplement my book on the interpretation of dreams 
by showing how an art, which would otherwise be 
µseless, can be turned to account for the discovery of 
the hidden and repressed parts of mental life ... In the 
second place, I wished to stimulate interest in a whole 
group of phenomena of which science is still in 
complete ignorance today because they can only be 
brought to light by the use of this particular method. 
No one, I believe, can have had any true conception of 
the complexity of the psychological events in a case of 
hysteria - the juxtaposition of the most dissimilar 
tendencies, the mutual dependence of contrary ideas, 
the repressions and displacements and so on ... 
Some lines later, he moves on to the question of 
sexuality: 
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I was further anxious to show that sexuality does not 
simply intervene, like a deus ex machina, on one single 
occasion, at some point in the working of the processes 
which characterize hysteria, but that it provides the 
motive power for every single symptom, and for every 
single manifestation of a symptom ... I can only repeat 
over and over again - for I never find it otherwise -
that sexuality is the key to the problem of the 
psychoneuroses and of the neuroses in general. 
(1905[1901: 155 and 156) 
The usual response to Freud's own characterisations of 
his labours is to dismiss them with the same scepticism he 
was in the habit of directing at his patients. Thus for 
Steven Marcus the above remarks have at most a "fractional 
validity". The real reason behind its publication, he 
claims, was clearly Freud's own "unsettled and ambiguous 
role" in the case; his need to write it out, in some 
measure, as "an effort of self-understanding". (1985(1974: 
67) This - in some measure - may well be so; but the 
critical energy which has been so forcefully directed in 
recent years, by Freud's feminist critics in particular, at 
his own "unsettled role" in the case has ended, I would 
suggest, by obscuring the substantial contribution it 
represents in the history of the development of Freud's 
theory as a whole; its crucial place in the building of the 
very psychoanalytic model of knowledge which, for Moi, holds 
such promise for feminists in search of new modes of 
intellectual activity. 
It is by now widely known that although the first 
version of Dora, originally entitled "Dreams and Hysteria", 
was written in 1901, the year after the appearance of The 
Interpretation of Dreams, Freud delayed publication until 
1905, the year of the Three Essays on Sexuality. Amongst 
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much speculation over the reasons for this, Jacqueline Ro~e 
has suggested tha~ Freudis hesitancy in publishing the case 
was a measure of his theoretical uncertainty during this 
p•riod: the period between the first formulations of the 
theory of the unconscious in The Interpretation of Dreams, 
and the theory of sexuality in the Three Essays. In this 
sense, the history of the case, its "hesitancy", she writes, 
"speaks for itself": 
for [Dora's case] is caught quite literally between 
those two aspects of F~eud's work, the theory of the 
unconscious and the theory of sexuality, whose relation 
or distance is what still conce~ns us today, as if the 
case of Dora could only appear finally at the point 
where the implications of its failure had already been 
displaced onto a theory of sexuality, by no means 
complete and still highly problematic, but at least 
acknowledged as such. (1985(1978]: 130) 
This marks the beginning of what is probably one of the 
most constructive analyses to date of the reasons for the 
case's failure, one in which its transitional theoretical 
status - falling (or ''failing") as it does between Freud's 
theory of the unconscious and that of sexuality - is for 
once recognized and taken into account. This, unlike many, 
is an analysis whose theoretical density takes it beyond any 
fixation on Freud the man, and his narcissistic "fantasies 
of omni~cience"; while also, in its author's view, going 
beyond the call for an alternative reading, whose content 
would then be "the feminine", to recognize the problem of 
Dora precisely as the problem of the feminine within 
psychoanalysis "in its urgency for us now". 
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The history of the case - its original title; the date 
of its conception and the date of its eventual publication; 
the space between the two, punctuated, as Rose observes, by 
Freud's own comments on his hesitancy regarding a case that 
had promised so much, but had turned out "poorer than [he] 
could have wished" - would tend to bear out the double 
theoretical and methodological purpose stated above: to 
supplement The Interpretation of Dreams, and to demonstrate 
the importance of sexuality in the aetiology of hysteria. 
What then of the second objective - "to stimulate interest 
in a whole group of phenomena of which science is still in 
complete ignorance today ... "; and to give some conception of 
the complexity of the psychological events in a case of 
hysteria - "the juxtaposition of the most dissimilar 
tendencies, the mutual dependence of contrary ideas, the 
repressions and displacements and so on ... "? 
This of course, marks the beginnings of precisely that 
"effort" Moi discerns in Freudian psychoanal~sis to "open up 
and extend the field of rational knowledge" - an effort 
consisting in its theorisation of the properties of the 
unconscious - and it is clear that the significanc• of the 
case history for Freud lies not least in the introduction it 
provides to this new terrain. Indeed, at a number of points 
in the narrative, Freud makes it evident that he feels 
himself.to be on the edge of a new region of knowledge - one 
which it will nevertheless be impossible to chart completely 
in the space of a single case history. 
The first contours of this new territory are outlined 
in the opening.pages of the first chapter of the case 
history proper, The Clinical Picture, in Fr~ud's description 
of his patients' inability, in the early stages of 
treatment, to provide a coherent narrative of the history of 
their lives and illnesses. The first account, he tells us, 
is invariably fragmented and incomplete; comparable, in 
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fact, to "an unnavigable river whose stream is at one moment 
choked by masses of rock and at another divided and lost 
among shallows and sandbanks". (1905(1901]: 45) This 
inability to give an ordered and consistent history, Freud 
stresses, is not merely characteristic of the neuroses; it 
also possesses great theoretical significance with regard to 
both the conscious and unconscious motivations of the 
patient; 
In the first place, he writes, part of what the patient 
omits from the story will have been kept back consciously 
and intentionally, for reasons of shame, timidity or 
discretion: "this is the share taken by conscious 
disingenuousness". In the second place, what is left out of 
the story may have been normally available to consciousness, 
but may have disappeared from memory in the telling; despite 
the patient's having made no deliberate reservations: "the 
share taken by unconscious disingenuousness". In the third 
place, there may by true "amnesias" - "gaps in the memory 
into which not only old recollections but even quite recent 
on~s have fallen" - and "paramnesias" which are formed 
secondarily to fill in the gaps and conceal the presence of 
the amnesias. In addition, even when the events themselves 
.have been kept in mind, the purpose underlying the amnesias 
may be fulfilled by altering their chronological order, 
thereby destroying the connections between them. (Freud, 
1905[1901]: 46-47) 
From a theoretical point of view, the presence of such 
"amnesias" is fundamental, and a necessary correlate of the 
symptoms. Ideally (as the theory has it in this early stage 
of its development) in the further course of the treatment, 
the patient will supply the facts which had been withheld, 
or had not come to mind. The paramnesias will prove 
untenable and the gaps in the patient's memory will be 
filled in, until finally, all going well, the patient will 
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come into possession of his or her own full and unbroken 
history: 
Whereas the practical aim of the treatment is to remove 
all possible symptoms and to replace them by conscious 
thoughts, we may regard it as a second and theoretical 
aim to repair all the damages to the patient's memory. 
These two aims are coincident. When one is reached, so 
is the other; and the same path leads to them both. 
(Freud, 1905[1901]: 47) 
Dora's case then, opens by focusing our attention on 
those very "points of exclusion, repression and blockage 
in ... discursive constructions" whose emphasis in the 
analytic dialogue Toril Moi invokes as the distinguishing 
characteristic of psychoanalytic practice, and because of 
which she advances it as a new - and, for feminists, more 
promising - model of structuring knowledge. In fact, this 
early discussion on amnesia marks one of the formative 
moments in what will later become the Freudian theory of 
repression; and a continuation of what Freud had first 
described in the Studies on Hysteria as a "psychical force" 
(or an "aversion on the part of the ego") in his patients 
which was opposed to pathogenic ideas becoming conscious or 
being remembered; a form of "not knowing", which was in fact 
a "not wanting to know ~ a not wanting which might be to a 
greater or lesser extent conscious." (1893-1895: 353) In 
1914, Freud declared the theory of repression to be the 
"corner-stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis 
rests", and in the following year, he published his most 
elaborate formulation of the theory in the metapsychological 
paper entitled "Repression" and in Section IV of the paper 
on "Tbe Unconscious". (see Freud, 1915a and b) 
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If repression is the "corner-stone" on which the 
structure of psychoanalysis rests, it also holds potential 
theoretical value in Moi's search for new ways to think 
about knowledge and modes of intell~ctual activity. Loosely 
speaking, repression may be defined as a psychical mechanism 
activated when the satisfaction of a drive (or instinct, as 
Strachey's translation has it), though likely to be 
pleasurable in itself, would be "irreconcilable with other 
claims and intentions", and would therefore "cause pleasure 
in one place and unpleasure in another." If the motive 
force of unpleasure acquires more strength than the pleasure 
likely to be obtained from satisfaction, the instinctual 
impulse may pass into a state of "repression". In the 
''first phase" of repression, the psychical representative of 
the instinct is denied entrance into the conscious.. In the 
seci~nd phase, "mental derivatives" of the repressed 
representative - or trains of thought which, while 
originating elsewhere, have since come into associative 
connection with it - undergo the same fate as what was 
primally repressed. (Freud, 1915a: 146) 
The most striking feature of Freud's theory as 
formulated in the paper devoted to repression in 1915 (and 
the most promising, I would suggest, for the move away from 
"patriarchal systems of knowledge") is the continuing active 
force he ascribes to an instinct's psychical (or 
"ideational") representative even after it has undergone 
repression. Freud insists that "it is a mistake to 
emphasize only the repulsion which operates from the 
direction of the conscious upon what is to be repressed; 
quit~ as important is the attraction exercised by what was 
primally repressed upon everything with which it can 
establish a connection." In other words, it is es~ential to 
realise that repression does not hinder the instinctual 
representative from continuing to exist in the unconscious; 
from "organizing itself further, putting out derivatives, 
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and establishing connections." Indeed, Freud goes on to 
say, the instinctual representative develops with less 
interference and more profusely if it is withdrawn by 
repression from conscious influence: 
It proliferates in the dark, as it were, and takes on 
extreme forms of expression, which when they are 
translated and presented to the neurotic are not only 
bound to seem alien to him, but frighten him by giving 
him the picture of an extraordinary and dangerous 
strength ... (1915a: 148) 
We are now coming very close to another of Moi's 
preferred models for knowledge - that suggested by the 
French feminist philosopher, Michele Le Doeuff. Le Doeuff 's 
analysis marks the transition, in Moi's paper, from the 
"somewhat disappointing" critiques of so-called "male 
science" offered by Keller and her followers, to the more 
promising one suggested by psychoanalytic practice: 
Focusing [Moi writes] on the double problem of the 
empirical exclusion of women and the theoretical 
repression of femininity in western philosophy, Le 
Doeuff argues that traditional western philosophy 
exhibits a striking contradiction at its centre. On 
the one hand, philosophy is an activity based on the 
recognition of lack: philosophy, in other words, exists 
because there is something that remains to be thought. 
On the other hand, philosophy also works from the 
imaginary assumption that the knowledge produced by 
philosophy creates completion, that its aim is to 
construct a flawless structure without lack. The 
paradoxical truth is that, for this school of thought, 
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perfect philosophy would simply cease to be phi~osophy 
at all. (1989: 194) 
The problem for feminists is that invariably, western 
philosophy posits woman as the symbol of lack and 
negativity, thereby, the argument goes, turning her into the 
gr~und of its own existence: "by her ve~y inferiority she 
guarantees the superiority of philosophy." (Moi, 1989: 195) 
Moi supports Le Do~uff 's call for an alternative philosophy 
which would be conscious of its own lack, which, "aware of 
its own open and unfinished nature can hope to avoid being 
caught in the sterile dichotomy between reason and unreason, 
masculinity ahd femininity." (1989: 196) For Moi, the 
advantage of Le Doeuff 's account (over that of Keller, Bordo 
et al.) is that it "allows us to analyse and deconstruct the 
opposition between inside and outside which structures 
knowledge itself. In this respect, Le Doeuff 's 
deconstruction of the boundaries between knowledge and non-
knowledge is not only reminiscent of Derrida, but of the 
very specific· dialogic situation created by psychoanalytic 
practice." (1989: 195) 
The same might be said of Freud's theory of repression: 
In its emphasis on the "deceptive (psychical) strength" of 
the subject's repressed instinct - or "amnesia" - normally 
considered as a form of loss of knowledge, but which is now 
shown to be more powerful in its influence over the subject 
than what he or she knows, or has available to 
consciousness, Freud's theory of repression - in its first 
evolutionary stages in Dora's case, and central to 
psychoanalytic practice in general - provides just such a 
"deconstruction of the boundaries between knowledge and non-
knowledge", perhaps in fact the first radical questioning of 
the metaphysics of presence and identity which must be the 
starting point of all deconstructive logic, and, ultimately, 
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all movements away from those systems of knowledge trapped 
in Mai's "straitjacket of patriarchal binary thought". 
In Dora's case, there seems to be little dispute over 
the basic theory underlying it that hysterical symptoms are 
"compromise formations" that express repressed sexual 
wishes; nor over the fact that, since Dora does indeed 
display such hysterical symptoms, she must have a "secret" -
an unconscious desire. The controversy, and most of the 
opposition from feminists, arises not in relation to the 
existence of Dora's "amnesias", but to the anamnesis through 
which we are conducted in the psychoanalytic narrative which 
tells of her treatment, during the course of which, it is 
held, Dora's story becomes Freud's. For Moi, this 
anamnesis is coincident with the point at which Freud's 
"imperialist tendency" surfaces in the case, thereby all but 
obliterating the discourse of his patient. 
Since the "language of the irrational and the 
unconscious", or the "discourse of the madwoman", as Moi has 
it, is by definition unavailable to consciousness, then it 
must be in the process of "translating" it into conscious 
thought-language, that this "obliteration" takes place. And 
if repression is the process through which the patients' 
"intimate" and "secret" wishes are made unavailable to. 
consciousness in the first place - through which they are 
converted into the symptoms of hysteria - then the dream, 
according to Freud, is one of the roads along which 
consciousness can be reached by the psychical material which 
has been cut off from it, and become pathogenic; it is one 
of the "detours by which repression can be evaded ... " 
(1905(1901]: 44). Freud's interpretations of Dora's dreams 
have been much discussed, while frequently held as evidence 
of his tendency in Dora's case to substitute his own version 
of reality for hers. In the following section, I would like 
tQ put Moi's charge against Freud to the test, this time by 
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tracing his "translation into conscious thought-language" 
. ... 
not of her dreams but ·.of another of her "indirect" psychical 
representations - of what he calls her "supervalent" train 
of thought regarding her father's relations-with Frau K. 
III 
In his 1915 paper on "repression", Freud emphasizes 
that it would be incorrect to imagine that all the 
derivatives of what was primally repressed are withheld from 
the conscious by the mechanism of repression. If these 
derivatives become sufficiently far removed from the 
repressed representative, he suggests - "whether owing to 
the adoption of distortions or by reason of the number of 
intermediate links inserted" - they have free access to the 
conscious. (1915a: 149) This is significant since the 
appearance of such "derivatives", produced by the patient 
during analysis in the form of "associations", may lead the 
analyst to the content of ~he repressed material. 
Freud writes, 
Thus 
"In carrying out the technique of psychoanalysis, we 
continually require the patient to produce such 
derivatives of the repressed as, in consequence either 
of their remoteness or of their distortion, can pass 
the censorship of the conscious. Indeed, the 
associations which we require him to give without being 
influenced by any conscious purposive idea and without 
any criticism, and from which we reconstitute a 
conscious trarislation of the repressed representative -
these associations are nothing else than remote and 
distorted derivatives of this kind. (1915a: 149) 
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If the condition for such derivatives gaining access to 
consciousness is a function of their remoteness (through 
distortion) from the repressed representative, then their 
initial formation is a function of th~ existence of a 
"continuous pressure" exercised by the repressed itself in 
the direction of the conscious, so that if the repression is 
to be kept from breaking through to consciousness, this 
pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure: 
"Thus the maintenance of a repression involves an 
uninterrupted expenditure of force, while its removal 
results in a saving from an economic point of view." 
(1915a: 151') 
In Chapter IV of his 1915 paper on "The Unconscious" 
Freud describes this process - the process whereby the 
repression is not only established but continued and 
maintained - as an anticathexis "by means of which the 
system Pcs·. protects itself from the pressure upon it of the 
unconscious idea." It is this which represents the 
permanent expenditure of energy of a primal repression; and 
which also guarantees the permanence of that repression: 
"Anticathexis is the sole mechanism of primal repression; in 
the case of repression proper ('after-pressure') there is in 
addition withdrawal of the Pcs. cathexis. It is very 
possible that it is precisely the cathexis which is 
withdrawn from the idea that is used for anticathexis." 
(1915b: 184) 
"The notion of "anticathexis" is prefigured in Freud's 
analysis of the unconscious force underlying Dora's reaction 
to her father's affair with Frau K. According to Freud, 
Dora herself complained that she could not account for its 
apparently disproportionate strength: 
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'I can think of nothing else', she complained again and 
again. 'I know my brother says we children have no 
right to criticize this behaviour of Father's. He 
declares that we ought not to trouble ourselves about 
it, and ought even to be glad, perhaps, that he has 
found a woman he can love, since Mother understands him 
so little. I can quite see that, and I should like to 
think the same as my brother, but I can't. I can't 
forgive him for it.' (1905[1901]: 88-89) 
Dora's inability in the face of her own repeated 
attempts to dissipate or remove this particular train of 
thought leads Freud to suspect the presence of a 
pathological component: "A train of thought such as this," 
he writes, "may be described as excessively intense, or 
better reinforced, or 'supervalent' ... It shows its 
pathological character in spite of its apparently reasonable 
content, by the single peculiarity that no amount of 
conscious and voluntary effort of thought on the patient's 
part is able to dissipate or remove it. A normal train of 
thought, however intense it may be, can eventually be 
disposed of." (1905[1901]: 88) Freud concludes that such a 
thought must owe its reinforcement to the unconscious: "It 
cannot be resolved by any effort of thought, either because 
it itself reaches with its root down into unconscious, 
repressed material, or because another unconscious thought 
lies concealed behind it." (1905[1901]: 89). 
In the latter case, Freud goes on, the concealed 
thought is usually the direct contrary of the supervalent 
one: "Contrary thoughts are always closely connected with 
each other and are of ten paired off in such a way that the 
one thought is exc~ssively intensely conscidus while its 
counterpart is repressed and unconscious." This relation 
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between the two thoughts is proffered as an effect of the 
process of repression, in which repression is in fact 
achieved by means oi the excessive reinforcement of the 
thought contrary to the one to be repressed. The "reactive 
thought" keeps the objectionable one under repression by 
means of a certain "surplus of intensity"; at the same time 
it itself becomes "damped" and proof against conscious 
effort of thought. In this scenario, conscious thought 
itself becomes a symptom of the repressed, and the task of 
the analyst to strip the supervalent thought of its 
excessive intensity by bringing its repressed contrary into 
consciousness. 
Freud's response to this particular point of 
"exclusion" or "blockage" in Dora's discourse is given in 
two essentially contradictory narratives, each of which 
(following the above formulation) serves as an attempt to 
identify and give substance to the "repressed contrary" to 
which the sUpervalent thought owes its existence, and the 
second of which significantly displaces the first. 
Following what most critics have identified as the 
general scheme of Freud's interpretation of the case as a 
whole, the first scenario is based on what Rose describes as 
a "simple identification of the oedipal triangle". The 
starting point for this is Dora's protest at her place in 
the relationship between Frau K. and her father; that is, 
her objection to being "proferred as a pawn" to Herr K. Her 
repudiation of Herr K. is then the inevitable consequence of 
an outrage that takes Herr K. as its immediate object, and 
yet behind which is the figure of the father, who is the 
object of real reproach. (see Rose, 1985(1978]: 132) 
Specifically, at this point in the narrative, the 
obsessive character of Dora's preoccupation with her 
father's relations to Frau K. - along with her "ultimatum" 
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to him ("either her or me ... "), her "scenes", her suicidal 
intentions - is taken to constitute a form of behaviour 
which, exceeding filial concern, would be more appropriate 
in a "jealous wife" and must therefore signify her newly 
revived (unconscious) sexual attraction to her father, now 
manifested in an (unconscious) identification with "both the 
woman her father had once loved and the woman he loved now". 
This, in turn, is diagnosed as a "reactive symptom'' to cover 
the suppression of her love for Herr K: 
I could not avoid the assumption that she was still in 
love with him, but that, for unknown reasons, since the 
scene by the lake her love had aroused in her violent 
feelings of opposition, and that the girl had brought 
forward and reinforced her old affection for her father 
in order to avoid any further necessity for paying 
attention to the love which she had felt in the first 
years of her girlhood and which had now become 
distressing to her. In this way I gained an insight 
into a conflict which was well calculated to unhinge 
the girl's mind. On the one hand she was filled with 
regret at having rejected the man's proposal, and with 
longing for his company and all the little signs of his 
affection; while on the other these feelings of 
tenderness and longing wer combated by powerful forces, 
amongst which her pride was one of the most obvious. 
Thus she had succeeded in.persuading herself that she 
had done with Herr K. - that was the advantage she 
derived from this typical process of repression; and 
yet she was obliged to summon up her infantile 
affection for her father and to exaggerate it, in order 
to protect herself against the feelings of love which 
were constantly pressing forward into consciousness. 
(1905(1901]: 93) 
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As in Freud's analysis of Dora's second dream (see 
Rose, 1985[1978]: 132) Dora's infantile love for her father 
is here summoned up secondarily, as a defense against her 
continuing love for Herr K. In this scenario, then - and in 
Freud's general intepretation of the case as a whole -
Dora's rejection of Herr K. is defined as simultaneously 
oedipal and hysterical (repudiation of her own desire); and 
her desire itself as unproblematic - heterosexual and 
genital. 
But if this is the point at which Freud's 
interpretation can be seen to endorse a patriarchal 
definition of Dora's desire, it is also the point at which 
the narrative which contains it strains most insistently 
against such an endorsement. For if the above scenario 
provides a motivation for the revival of Dora's infantile 
affection for her father, it nevertheless fails (as Freud 
himself implies) to account for the fact that she was almost 
incessantly a prey to "~he most embittered jealousy". 
(1905(1901]: 93) Neither does it explain Dora's earlier 
prolonged period of complicity in the affair between her 
father and Frau K., nor her persistent loyalty to the woman 
who had ostensibly replaced her in her father's affections. 
Furthermore, it cannot account for Dora's "unmistakable 
identification with her father", revealed in the symptom of 
the cough, nor her further "masculine identifications" at 
various points in the case history. (see Rose, 1985[1978]: 
13~) 
Most crucial of all, however, the first scenario cannot 
explain the "obstinacy" with which Dora retained the 
particular amnesia concerning ~he sources of her "forbidden" 
knowledge - the .knowledge whose main source, as Freud 
realizes only too late, "could have been no one but Frau 
K.", and which Frau K. will later use to betray her. And it 
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is Freud's refusal to let go of this most "remarkable" of 
Dora~s blockages and repre~sions - ("her knowing all about 
such things and, at the same time, her always pretending not 
to know where her knowledge came from ... ") - which prompts 
him finally to resist the temptation to settle for less when 
he offers in the concluding pages of The Clinical Picture to 
"obscure and efface" what he now revealingly refers to as 
the "fine poetic conflict'' it has thus far been possible to 
ascribe to Dora. The second scenario which Freud now puts 
forward in its place - and which he describes as a 
"complication" of the first, but which in fact crucially 
displaces it - reveals Frau K rather than her husband as the 
real object of Dora's desire and obsessive jealousy, and the 
reason for her exaggerated reproaches against her father. 
Although what Freud now perceives as the "strong homosexual 
cu~rent" in Dora's mental life becomes submerged again in 
his analysis of Dora's dreams, the deep significance he 
attached to its discovery - however belated - is stressed in 
a lengthy footnote to his closing remarks on the case. 
Thus the anamnesis through which we are conducted in 
this sequence - the product of Freud's attempt to "fill the 
gaps" in Dora's memory - ~ppears in two contradictory 
narratives, each with its own central character. In the 
first, the protagonist, and the object of Dora's repressed 
desire, is Herr K.; in the second, it 'is his wife. It is 
the persistence with which Freud clings to the first of 
these two narratives, while marginalising the second, that 
has attracted most hostility, particularly from feminists. 
What is emphasized in the response is first, that the 
"r~~~ity" Freud insists upon here is very different from the 
"reality" Dora is claiming and clinging to; and second, that 
not only has Freud assigned Herr K. a far more favourable 
position than he deserved in Do~a's mental life, in doing so 
he has at the same time - in his identification with Herr 
K., and in his failure to recognize the counter-transference 
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(the place of his own desire in the narrative) - made 
himself rather than Dora the central character in the 
action. 
There is no denying that Freud underplays, or is 
perhaps simply blind to the extent to which his second tale 
- the tale of Dora's homosexual desire for Frau K. -
contradicts and undermines the first; his only offer to deal 
with this problem appearing in what Rose perceives as a 
"mandatory appeal'' to the properties of the unconscious 
itself ("in the unconscious contradictory thoughts live very 
comfortably side by side" (1905(1901]: 96)). Rose notes the 
tenacity with which Freud hangs on to a notion of a genital 
heterosexuality throughout the case - so much so that in 
consequence, he is led to pursue a number of blatantly false 
trails in his interpretation of both her dreams: 
Note for the moment that Freud is so keen to hang on to 
a notion of genital heterosexuality that it leads him, 
first, to identify the fantasy of childbirth that 
analysis revealed behind the second dream as an 
"obscure maternal longing", outdoing in advance Karen 
Horney's appeals to such a longing as natural, 
biological and pregiven, in her attacks on Freud's 
later work on femininity, and second, to classify 
Dora's masculine identification and desire for Frau K. 
as "gynaecophilic" and to make it "typical of the 
unconscious erotic life of hysterical girls", that is, 
to use as an explanation of hysteria the very factor 
that needs to be explained. (1985[1978]: 134) 
Yet Freud's apparent failure to grasp the full 
significance of his move should not be allowed to undermine 
it, nor to efface the brief but telling comparison inscribed 
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within it between his vision of himself as "man of letters" 
in the first tale while "medical man" in the second; creator 
of a "fine poetic conflict" in the first scenario and a 
"world of reality" in the second. Nor finally, should the 
theoretical distance be underestimated, and thus the radical 
break it represents, between the notion of a problematic, 
differential and component sexuality suggested, however 
tentatively, by Freud's second narrative - and elaborated in 
his Three Essays on Sexuality - and the nineteenth-century 
medical conceptualization of the sexual instinct from within 
which it was produced. 
For Rose, Freud's unconvincing attempt to resolve the 
contradictions he himself has created reveals a theory of 
interpretation functioning as "resistance'' to the pressing 
need to develop a theory of sexuality - whose "complexity" 
and "difficulty", as she points out, manifests itself time 
and again in the case. But what is not mentioned here is 
the already existent, and indeed powerfully 
institutionalised, theory of sexuality from within which 
Freud was working at the time. Freud's "resistance", 
according to Rose, appears most strongly in relation to Frau 
K. 's status as an object of desire for Dora: "Thus this 
aspect of the case surfaces only symptomatically in the 
text, at the end of the clinical picture that it closes, and 
in a series of footnotes and additions to the interpretation 
of the second dream and in the postscript." (1985[1978]: 
134) Read against the conceptual and historical background 
of nineteenth century psychiatry, however, the marginal 
status of this aspect of the case becomes symptomatic, I 
would suggest, not so much of Freud's resistance as that o~ 
the psychiatry of the day; of the absence of any conceptual 
backing for an analysis of Dora's homosexuality which could 
assign it a central position in the narrative without 
converting the story of her hysteria into a tale of 
perversion ipstead ... 
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Following Arnold Davidion's account (1987) of the 
historical background ~gainst which Freud wrote his Three 
Essays on Sexuality (and thus Dora's case history too), we 
learn that in nineteenth century psychiatiric circles there 
is virtually unargued unanimity both on the fact that the 
"sexual instinct" has ~ natural function and on what that 
function is. Krafft-Ebing's view is given as 
representative: 
During the time of the maturation of physiological 
processes in the reproductive glands, desires arise in 
the consciousness of the individual, which have for 
their purpose the perpetuation of the species (sexual 
instinct) ... 
With opportunity for the natural satisfaction of the 
sexual instinct, every expression of it that does not 
correspond with the purpose of nature - ie., 
propagation - must be regarded as perverse. 
260) 
(1987: 
Should anyone doubt the representativeness of Krafft-
Ebing' s conception, Davidson cite~ a long passage from 
Moll's Perversions of the Sex Instinct (1891) (since Moll 
is considered to be a direct anticipator of Freud) which 
demonstrates that Moll's conception of the nature of the 
sexual instinct and Krafft-Ebing's are quite literally 
interchangeable. "Nineteenth-century psychiatry silently 
adopted this conception of the function of the sexual 
instinct. It was often taken as so natural as not to need 
explicit statement ... " writes Davidson. (1987: 261) "In 
fact," he adds later, "many writers before Freud used the 
terms 'sexual instinct' and 'genital instinct' 
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interchangeably, as if the latter were simply a more p'reci se 
name for the former. This identification was not in the 
least bit arbitrary, since the sexual instinct was conceived 
of as psychically expressing itself in an attraction for 
members of the opposite sex, with genital inte~course as the 
ultimate aim of this attraction." (1987: 273) Since the 
natural function of the sexual instinct was thus taken to be 
propagation, and the corresponding natural, psychological 
satisfaction of this instinct to consist in the satisfaction 
derived from heterosexual, genital intercourse, then any 
deviation from this function, including homosexuality, was 
taken to be a perversion. 
Juliet Mitchell has warned against the dangers of 
extrapolating Freud's ideas about femininity from their 
context within the larger theories of psychoanalysis - a 
practice which, she suggests, can be held responsible for 
.much of the hostility his work has p~ovoked amongst 
feminists. For, as Mitchell points out, it is only this 
context which prevents such notorious concepts as for 
example, "penis-envy", from becoming either laughable or 
ideologically dangerous: "In the briefest possible terms, we 
could say that psychoanalysis is about the material reality 
of ideas both within, and of, man's history; thus in 'penis-
envy we are talking not about an anatomical organ, but 
about the ideas of it that people hold and live by within 
the general culture, the order of human society." (1974: 
xvi) The same hostility must naturally result from any 
attempt to read Freud without constantly bearing in mind 
both the conceptual framework in which he was working, and 
the ideological and social order in which he lived. 
Further, while it is one thing to pay lip-service to 
the question of history, it is another to integrate it into 
the practice of interpretation itself. There are, of 
course, many patriarchal judgements to be found within 
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Freud's work, and the opportunity to point them out is 
seldom passed by - particularly, and no doubt 
' understandably, where his feminist critics are concerned. 
Not infrequently, the link between these judgements and the 
prejudices of Victorian society is also both recognized and 
made explicit. Yet, more often than not, if the question of 
history is not being raised purely as a way of rejecting 
psychoanalysis as the "culture-bound product of a small-
minded 'Victorian' patriarch", it is raised only to accuse 
Freud of having had a part in it at all - as if his 
complicity with the ideology of his day were something he 
might easily have avoided - while what is ignored is the 
explanatory potential of history with respect to the 
processes of intellectual production, both for Freud and in 
general. Thus we can now turn again to Mai, in her essay on 
Dora: 
Now if the hysterical woman is gagged and chained, 
Freud posits himself as her liberator. And if the 
emancipatory project of psychoanalysis fails in the 
case of Dora, it is because Freud the liberator happens 
also to be, objectively, on the side of oppression. He 
is a male in patriarchal society, and moreover not just 
any male but an educated bourgeois male, incarnating 
malgre lui patriarchal values. His own emancipatory 
project profoundly conflicts with his political and 
social role as an oppressor of women. (1985(1981]: 
193) 
This is elo~uently put, but it is insensitive - as, I 
would suggest, is the essay as a whole - to the complexity 
of the charge it lays. For if the "conflict" th~t it rais~s 
is essentially an historical one, and if behind it, in the 
final analysis, lies the reason for the case's failure, then 
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why is this the single occasion in the space of Moi's 
discussion that the category of history is allowed to 
surface at all? Also, if Freud is an "incarnation" (malgre 
lui) of patriarchal values, then what, in this equation, we 
can only wonder, is the content, for Moi, of lui? Important 
though it is to distinguish and bring to light the moments 
at which, bourgeois patriarchal male that he was, Freud 
reproduced the values of his bourgeois patriarchal society, 
these should not be allowed to obscure those other moments 
when, malgre lui, he moved decisively, irreversibly, beyond 
them. 
IV 
What has been lost in most recent commentary on Freud's 
Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria is any abiding 
sense or acknowledgement of its ground-breaking significance 
in the history of psychoanalytic thought. Read in 
conjunction with the Studies on Hyst•ria, The Interpretation 
of Dreams and the Three Essays on Sexuality (as Freud 
explicitly intended it to be) Dora's case can be seen to 
straddle three of the founding moments of Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory. How then can the case at the same 
time be said to represent its failure? Would it not be more 
accurate to suggest that Dora's case, rather than 
representing the failure of psychoanalytic theory - "in its 
inability to account for the feminine" - represents the 
point at which that theory begins; the first significant 
attempt, in fact, to "write the history of femininity, to 
understand female subjectivity, or simply to imagine woman 
as mythical and social subject." (De Lauretis, 1984: 131) 
Rather than the moment at which Freud's "colonizing 
impulse ... gains the upper hand", Dora's case represents the 
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moment at which that "colonizing impulse" is first relaxed, 
however tentatively ~r incompletely; the moment at which the 
"langua~e of the irrational and the unconscious" makes its 
first, tremulous appearance in the discourse of science. 
It is ironic that the very "drive for knowledge" 
(Freud's own theory, in fact, of epistomephilia) which Moi 
holds responsible for Freud's failure in the Dora case (see 
Moi, 1985[1981]) is also the theory she invokes in her 
later essay as most promising for feminism in the directions 
it offers for a departure from the "dualisms" of patriarchal 
thought. In particular, Moi claims, since the Freudian 
drive for knowledge, or the capacity for intellectual 
speculation, takes the human body as its point of departure, 
the theory of epistemophjlia can be seen to provide us with 
a first outline of a theory of knowledge which undoes and 
displaces the reason/emotion (or head/heart; mind/body) 
dualism which is invariably read through the male/female 
paradigm. (For elaboration, see Moi, 1989: 198-203) The 
theory is further valuable, in Moi's view, for its 
demonstration of the imagina~y nature of (male) philosophy's 
"dream of self-contained plenitude": 
Self-defeating, always frustrated by the limitations of 
the body, the Freudian drive for knowledge is 
structurally incapable of achieving total insight or 
perfect mastery: the philosopher's dream of self-
contained plenitude is here unmasked as the imaginary 
fantasy it is. Freudian theory posits tha drive for 
knowledge (epistemophilia) as crucially bound to the 
body and sexuality. If reason is always already shot 
through with the energy of the drives, the body, and 
desire, to be inteliectual can no longer be theorized 
simply as the "opposite" of being emotional or 
passionate ... (1989: 203) 
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Thus Moi invokes,the theory of epistemophilia as the 
rationale behind her own conviction that a new feminist 
philosophy of science has much to gain from Freud and Lacan. 
Curiously, however, her own criticism of Freud would seem to 
demand bf him the very achievement of "complete 
elucidation", "total insight" or "perfect mastery" whose 
impossibility she would now seek to endorse. The same might 
be said of much recent criticism of Freud's account of the 
Dora case. Yet it is only if we take an interpretive stance 
which insists on seeing the whole of psychoanalytic theory 
as present in one piece of writing - in effect ignoring the 
historicity of intellectual production in general - that we 
can easily make such demands. 
In this essay, I have tried to do two things: First, 
to restore some sense of the theoretical moment represented 
by the Dora case, particularly in its anticipation of later 
formulations of the crucially significant theory of 
repression, and in its movement - however halting - towards 
a new theory of a problematic, differential and component 
.sexuality. Second, I have tried to re-introduce the 
question of history into what has become the critics' story 
of Freud's .failure to get to the bottom of Dora's case. In 
doing so, I hope to have suggested a way be~ond the 
contradiction in which Freud is persistently invoked, in 
feminist criticism, as both liberator and oppressor, hero 
and villain. ·The distinction drawn by Mitchell between 
Freud's theory itself, and the ideological uses to which it 
is put ( 1974: xxii) seems especially pertinent here. As 
Mitchell points out, psychoanalysis, like any other system 
-· 
of thought, was formed and developed within a particular 
time and place: "but that does not invalidate its claim to 
universal laws, it only means that these laws have to be 
extracted from their specific problematic - the particular 
material conditions of their formation. In this connection 
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we need to know of the historical circumstances of their 
development mainly in order not to limit them thereto." 
(1974: xx) 
The difference between ignoring the historical 
circumstances of the production of Dora's case history, and 
incorporating them in the process of its interpretation, I 
would suggest, amounts to the difference between reading it 
as the moment at which the "emancipatory project" of 
psychoanalysis fails, and the moment at which it in tact 
begins. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MOLL FLANDERS AND THE IMPOTENCE OF CRITICISM 
Throughout history people have knocked their heads 
against the riddle of the nature of femininity ... Nor 
will you have escaped worrying over this problem -
those of you who are men; to those of you who are women 
this will not apply - you are yourselves the problem. 
Sigmund Freud, 1933 
Still one of the most memorable instances of Freud's 
life-long battle to solve the "riddle of femininity'' is his 
Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905) - his 
account of the case of "Dora", a young woman more or less 
forced into analysis with him by her father. The case has 
become most famous not for its successes but for its 
failures. By now, most contemporary readers, especially 
those familiar with Dora's subsequent history, have agreed 
that Freud failed either to get to the bottom of her 
hysteria - leaving many questions posed by the case 
unanswered - or to bring about any lasting alleviation of 
her symptoms, whether mental or physical. In recent years, 
critics have concentrated on analyzing this failure in.terms 
of Freud's personal part in it. Had he been more aware of 
such psychoanalytic phenomena as the transference or 
counter-transference, 1 they argue, Freud might have had more 
success with the treatment as a whole, and Dora might not 
have "walked out on it" prematurely as she did, only three 
months after it had begun. 
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The case has been especially interesting to Freud's 
feminist critics, both those generally hostile to his work 
and those in favour of it. For many feminists, Freud's 
"technical" and "theoretical" failures in the case are 
overlaid by what they see as the imposition of his own 
patriarchal values and prejudices in his int~rpretations of 
Dora's symptoms. Freud is "authoritarian", they claim - a 
"willing participant in the male power game" between Dora's 
father and his mistress' husband - and at no time does he 
turn to consider Dora's own experience of the events: "That 
Freud's analysis fails because of its inherent sexism is the 
common feminist conclusion," wri~es Toril Mai. 
(1985(1981]: 182) One or two critics, most notably 
Jacqueline Rose, have begun to displace the question of 
Freud's failure in the case to a more complex consideration 
of the construction of the "riddle of the nature of 
femininity" itself. (see Rose, 1985(1978]) From within 
what already existing inscriptions of "the feminine" was the 
riddle constructed in the first place? they ask. Who posed 
it anyway? Today, nearly a century after the publication of 
Dora's case, the controversy in psychoanalytic circles over 
the question of femininity continues - so much so that 
commentat.or David Macey has been prompted to declare a 
stalemate, and to pronounce the "obscure object" of 
psychoanalysis a myth of i'ts own making: 
Freud wishes to see into femininity, to penetrate it. 
Yet 'lynx-eyed Freud' remains blind to the fact that 
his phallic-optical metaphors construct and reproduce 
femininity as dark, impenetrable and unknowable. 
Psychoanalysis posits femininity as being in excess of 
its rationalist discourse, and then complains and 
exclaims that it cannot explain it. It is as though 
the obscure object had to remain impenetrable for the 
desire to penetrate to be sustained. Freud's attempts 
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to explain femininity might be described as an 
interminable exercise in epistemological foreplay; the 
final penetrating explanation or insight never comes, 
precisely because he defines its object as impenetrably 
obscure. (1988: 179) 
In this essay, I want to examine a different 
permutation of the age-old quest to solve the riddle of 
femininity. The relation I will be concerned with here, 
however, is not that between analyst and analysand, but 
between the institution of English literary criticism and 
one of fiction's most controversial female protagonist~: 
Daniel Defoe's notoriously "contradictory", "immoral", 
"shallow", "hypocritical", "heartless", "bad", yet 
"marvellous" Moll Flanders. The characterization is Arnold 
Kettle's, from his 1964 essay, In Defence of Moll Flanders 
(see Kettle, 1973(1964]), and its concentration on the 
confused morality of Defoe's heroine has been a 
representative feature of most readings of Moll Flanders 
from the moment of its troubled incorporation into the 
canon. Indeed, literary critics' attempts to "explain" Moll 
could be said to mirror the "interminable exercise in 
epistemological foreplay" which has characterized Freud's 
attempt to "expl~in" femininity - the "final penetratirig 
explanation or insight" never coming in either case. For 
many critics, Moll's "contradictions" are part and parcel of 
her identity as a woman; in Kettle's characterization, in 
fact, Moll emerges as no less th~n the embodiment of "pure 
womanhood": 
The underlying tension which gives Moll Flanders its 
vitality as a work of art can be expressed by a 
contradiction which is at once simple and complicated. 
Moll is immoral, shallow, hypocritical, heartless, a 
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bad woman: yet Moll is marvellous. Defoe might almost 
(though he wouldn't have dreamed of it) have subtitled 
his book 'A Pure Woman·: (1973(1964]: 391) 
Th~se sentiments are echoed by the publishers' comment 
on the back cover of the Penguin edition of the novel 
according to which so successfully does Moll represent her 
sex in Defoe's story, that the "irresistible femininity" of 
the heroine "rises ~lomst tangibly off the pages". For Ian 
Watt on the other hand, as a woman, Moll barely makes the 
grade: Moll has many "feminine traits", he concedes - she 
has "a keen eye for fine clothes and clean linen", and shows 
a "wifely concern" for the creature comforts of her males -
but these are relatively external and minor matters, Watt 
continues, and the essence of her character and actions is 
"essentially masculine". (1987: 113) 
While no-one would wish to claim that Defoe intended 
Moll Flanders as a contribution to debates on femininity, 
there is nevertheless no getting away from the fact that 
most commentary on the novel has, at some stage or another, 
gravitated irresistably towards the figure of its female 
protagonist. That is, much of the critical debate around 
the novel has focused insistently on the problematic 
subjectivity of the heroine herself. Yet Moll remains 
elusive, the riddle of her fictional identity intact. 
According to" James Joyca, the character of Moll Flanders has 
literally brought contemporary criticism to its knees: Along 
with Christian Davies and Roxana, two of Defoe's other 
heroines, he writes, Moll forms the "trio of female 
characters" which has reduced contemporary criticism to 
"stupefied impotence". (1973(1964): 345) 
This essay will be dedicated to examining some of the 
problems Defoe's novel has posed to a tradition of 
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patriarchal literary criticism. 2 These problems, I shall 
argue, are inseparable from questions of representation, 
female identity and the notion of "femininity" itself - the 
same questions in fact which proved so intrusive in Freud's 
narrative.of the case of.Dora. In the final section of the 
essay, I shall propose a new perspective through the work of 
British feminist Denise Riley. In her re~ent book, Am I 
that Name?, Riley suggests that the discursive category 
"women" is neither straightforward nor natural, but is 
characterized by an "inherent shakiness": 
To put it schematically: women is historically, 
discursively constructed, and always relatively to 
other categories which themselves change; women is a 
volatile collectivity in which female persons can be 
very differently positioned, so that the apparent 
continuity of the subject of 'women' isn't to be relied 
on; 'women' is both synchronically and diachronically 
erratic as a collectivity, while for the individual, 
'being a woman'is also inconstant, and can't provide an 
ontological foundation. (Riley, 1988: 1-2) 
It is this "shakiness", I shall argue, exemplified in 
Defoe's-novel in the character of Moll Flanders, which has 
so successfully resisted the classifications of traditional 
literary criticism. 
I 
Although today Defoe is the single writer usually taken 
as the originator of the novel in England, in his own day he 
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was thought of as a polemicist and controversialist: "a 
scribbler with more talent than most, perhaps - as Pope 
allowed - but essentially not different in kind from the 
other pamphleteers and hacks of his time." (Rogers, 1972: 4) 
According to Pat Rog~rs' account of Defoe's critical 
heritage, it was only towards the end of the eighteenth 
century that he gradually came to be accepted as a major 
literary figure, and only in the nineteenth that he was 
regarded a "great novelist". 
For long the best known single account of Defoe, and 
one whose influence is still apparent today, according to 
Rogers, was the somewhat negative assessment by the 
Victorian man of letters Leslie Stephen, in 1868. It is 
interesting to see how Stephen's negative judgement is 
simply repeated and endorsed in F.R. Leavis' seminal work on 
the novel, The G~eat Tradition. Here, in a notorious 
footnote, Leavis effectively refuses Defoe entry into the 
canonical history of the novel. Defoe, he writes, 
was a remarkable writer, but all that need be said 
about him as a novelist was. said by Leslie Stephen in 
Hours in a Library ... He made no pretension to 
practising the novelists' art, and matters little as an 
influence. In fact, the only influence that need be 
noted is that represented by the use made of him in the 
nineteen-twenties by the practitioners of the fantastic 
conte (or pseudo-moral fable) with its empty pretence 
of significance (1948: 10) 
Stephen's disappointment in Defoe arises essentially 
because in two significant ways, Defoe's novels fail to live 
up to his idea of what constitutes good fiction. The first 
ha~ to do largely with formal questions, with Defoe as 
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"craftsman". As far as Stephen is concerned, the novel as a 
form has to lie somewhere on the border-line between poetry 
and prose. "Novels," he writes, "should be prose saturated 
with poetry"; and Defoe, in Stephen's view, was simply not 
enough of a poet to be a good novelist: "[Defoe] was simply 
telling a true story and leaving his readers to feel what 
they pleased ... He was simply a narrator of plain 
facts ... The poetical element would have been as much out of 
place as it would have been in a merchant's ledger." (cited 
in Rogers, 1972: 175) 
Stephen's second complaint - and the most interesting 
for us here - has to do with Defoe's depiction of character. 
For Stephen, it is essential that the characters in novels 
display some "psychological depth" if the novel is to 
qualify as successful. As far as Stephen is concerned, in 
Defoe's novels, we are invariably supplied with too many 
facts and details in connection with the story, while we are 
not given enough insight into the emotions of the 
characters. Defoe, he writes, "is generally too anxious to 
set everything before us in broad daylight; there is too 
little of the thoughts and emotions which inhabit the 
twilight of the mind; of those dim half-seen forms which 
exercise the strongest influence upon the imagination, and 
are the most tempting subjects for the poet's art." (cited 
in Rogers, 1972: 171) 
To illustrate the point, Stephen turns to the character 
of Robinson Crusoe, whom he finds particula.rly 
disappointing. Although, in one sense, the story of Crusoe 
is "marvellously like truth", writes Stephen, it is 
"singularly wanting" as a psychological ~tudy. We are not 
given enough indication, he complains, of the internal 
struggles that someone in Crusoe's position must nece~sarily 
have gone through. Crusoe himself is "all bµt impossible". 
Any man living fifteen years by hi~self on an island would 
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either hav~ gone mad in real life, or would have sunk into 
the semi-savage state; but this does not happen to Crusoe. 
Stephen, then, is troubled by the "significant difference" 
between what he finds in the fiction and what he believes 
would have been the reality. Defoe, he claims, gives a 
"very inadequate picture of the mental torments to which his 
hero is exposed." He remarks on Defoe's "want of power in 
describing emotion" as compared with his "amazing power'' in 
describing facts. (see Rogers, 1972: 172-175) 
Nearly a century after the first appearance of 
Stephen's essay, Ian Watt, in The Rise of the Novel, has 
some very similar things to say about Defoe. The longest 
chapter in the book is devoted to Moll Flanders, and in it· 
we find a repetition of Stephen's anxieties about Defoe's 
"want of power in describing emotion" - his inability to 
depict psychological depth in his portrayal of character. 
At the same time, Stephen's preoccupatio~ with "poetic 
value" - or the lack of it - in Defoe's work persists in 
Watt's evaluations, only now becoming more pronounced, more 
clearly defined. 
According to Watt, Defoe is incapable of writing in a 
manner which is "emotionally evocative". Watt is bothered 
by the sparsity in Defoe's work of what he calls "powerful 
passages focused on human feeling"; there is too much of 
something-else he calls "uninspired filling-in" - and this 
is one reason why he believes that Defoe's stature as a 
novelist has been overestimated. All Watt's criticisms of 
Moll Flanders come down to what he sees as its "central 
defect", and that is "a lack of serious order or design" - a 
lack manifested not only structurally (in the development of 
the story) but also in the "psychological" and "moral" 
aspects of the work. Thus Stephen's objections to Defoe's 
poor craftsmanship, and to the psychological superficiality 
of his characters, are repeat~d in Watt's assessment, while 
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at the same time amplified by a new critical dimension, now 
focused on the moral aspect of the works, and in this case, 
specifically, of Moll ~landers. 
According to Watt, the moral claim for Moll Flanders 
amounts to the assertion that it teaches a "somewhat narrow 
kind of ethical lesson - vice must be paid for and crime 
does not pay." Narrow as it is, this "moral claim" is not 
even substantiated by the narrative itself, Watt suggests, 
for the plot "flatly contradicts" Defoe's proposed moral 
theme. Despite Defoe's promise in the preface that "there 
is not a wicked action in any part of [Moll Flanders], but 
is first or last rendered unhappy", in the story itself, far 
from suffering appropriately for her wickedness, Moll 
actually appears to pro~per as a result of it. In Watt's 
judgement, this is a contradiction Defoe would have done 
well to avoid, since the moral which now emerges in 
consequence is that "honesty may not be the best policy, and 
~ 
that if you want to live in a genteel style, prudent and 
enterprising crime may prove more effective than plying your 
needle; you can always settle your spiritual account when 
the one at the bank has beeri taken care of." (1987(1957]: 
161) 
When he moves on to discuss Defoe's portrayal of Moll 
herself, Watt (as I mentioned earlier) finds that she is not 
"feminine" enough to be convincing as a character. Further, 
she lacks psychological depth, in Watt's assessment, not 
least because we see her not through the eyes of any other 
characters in the book, but only as she sees herself. 
"Defoe keeps us informed," writes Watt, "as no other 
novelist does, of his heroine's holdings in cash and 
personal effects: he does not bother to make cl•ar her 
emotional development, or to take stock of her real 
character." (1987[1957]: 162) And later, "there is no 
developing personality in Moll to be observed, no moral or 
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psychological pattern to the loosely strung out network of 
personal relations." (1987[1957]: 163) Watt is also 
disappointed that Defoe does not give more serious 
consideration to the nature of Moll's relationships: We have 
little insight, he complains, into most of her lovers or 
children, or whether she loved them, or which she preferred. 
Finally, her character as a wife, suggests Watt, is 
inconsistent with her portrayal as a mother, which is itself 
contradictory. 
Watt's essay is seen as the initiator of a long-
standing critical debate over the book's structural 
coherence - or lack of it - on the one hand, and its alleged 
"moral inconsistencies" on the other. These "moral 
inconsistencies" are generally attributed to the character 
of Moll herself, the problem arising in what John Richetti 
has described as the "contradiction beween the sordid facts 
of her story and the attractive vitality of her 
personality." (1975: 94) Most attempts to explain this 
contradiction have been focused on the question of Defoe's 
irony, on whether to take Moll's inconsistencies as a 
reflection of Defoe's own unresolved and unconscious moral 
conflicts, or whether to attribute them instead to his use 
of a consciously ironic mode. 3 One influential critic has 
tried to account for the problem by attempting to 
demonstrate the way in which what he calls the "novelistic 
process" of Moll Flanders continually distracts the reader 
from the "moral implications" of Moll's various act~: "We 
may recoil momentarily from [Moll's] heartlessness," he 
writes, "but so does she, with disarming humanity: once 
~gain, in a martner typical of the entire book, Defoe 
portrays Moll as both reprehensible and sympathetic." 
(Starr, 1971: 164) 
For Ian Watt and Leslie Stephen, ·on the other hand, the 
problem of Moll's inconsistencies is more a problem of 
124 
Defoe's technical deficiencies as a novelist - his inability 
to portray psychological or emotional depth. But however we 
define the parameters of the debate, and however earnest the 
criti.cs' attempts to conclude with respect to Moll herself -
for one she is "guilty of all sorts of shocking actions", 
while essentially a good woman because "neither a hypocrite 
or a fool" (Forster, 1973[1927]: 343); for another she i~ 
"the embodiment of thrift, good management, and industry" 
while also "the perverse and savagely acquisitive outlaw, 
the once dedicated servant of the Lord turned to the false 
worship of wealth, power, success" (Price, 1973[1964]: 377); 
for one "essentially masculine" (Watt, 1987(1957]: 113); 
while for another (by association at least) "a pure woman" 
(Kettle, 1973[1964]: 191) - whatever the permutations put 
forward to account for Moll's contradictions, there is no 
doubting that her fictional identity has in some way posed a 
challenge to, or resisted, the usual categories of 
traditional literary criticism. The question that remains 
now is why. 
II 
For some critics, Moll's contradictions have rendered 
her if anything more rather than less convincing as a 
character. - a judgement which necessarily goes hand in hand 
with a departure from the Leavisite view of Defoe as 
technically incompetent as a novelist lacking the 
qualification even to be worthy of consideration. One of 
the first to give full acknowledgement to Defoe's technical 
expertise was Leslie Stephen's daughter, Virginia Woolf, in 
1919. Expressing her regret, in an essay on the bi-
centenary of Robinson Crusoe, that Defoe~s other ~orks, 
including Roxana, Captain Singleton and Colonel Jack, were 
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so little known, Woolf. comes out with an assessment of 
Defoe's work in general as "indisputably great": 
We may agree with Mr Wright, the biographer of Defoe, 
that these "are not works for the drawing-room table." 
But unless we consent to make that useful piece of 
furniture the final arbiter of taste, we must deplore 
the fact that their superficial coarseness, or the 
universal celebrity of Robinsons Crusoe, has led'them 
to be far less widely famed than they deserve ... They 
stand among the few English novels which we can call 
indisputably great. (1973(1919]: 338) 
Many critics have looked back on Virginia Woolf's essay 
as a peculiarly important moment in the history of Defoe's 
critical reception, mainly, I think, because of her 
wholehearted acceptance of Defoe as a serious novelist. In 
Rogers' assessment, Woolf's essay was "probably the single 
most influential item" in the entire critical heritage. 
With it came the recognition that Defoe "repaid adult and 
sensitive reading": "[Mrs. Woolf] had opened the way to 
criticism of a more inward and more self-conscious kind than 
that which had prevailed hitherto." , (1972: 26) Also 
significant, however, was the influence of Woolf's feminism 
- the new and unprecedented emphasis she gave to the novel's 
attention to the position of women in eighteenth century 
Britain. Thus one feminist critic has referred to Woolf's 
"groundbreaking" observation that Defoe used his heroines to 
bring to light the "peculiar hardships of women" in 
eighteenth century Britain - an aspect of the novel which 
had gone altogether unacknowledged by previous critics, 
including Woolf's father, Leslie Stephen. 
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As far as the character of Moll is concerned, Woolf was 
the first to stress that Moll's "rule of thumb morality" - a 
code of behaviour which she had "forged in her own head" -
was a result not of moral weakness or even confusion, but of 
necessity, of the fact that from her birth, Moll had been a 
victim of "that worst of devils, poverty"; that she was 
driven from place to place throughout her life, forced to 
shift for herself from an early age, and to earn her living 
as soon as she could sew; that she had little time to waste, 
as Woolf put it, "upon the refinements of personal 
affection." (1973[191]: 339) 
So Woolf emerged with an interpretation that began, for 
the first time, to draw attention away from "essentialist" 
debates over Moll's innate or inherent moral and 
psychological make-up to the environment of social 
inequality in which it was forged, the fictional struggle 
for survival of which it was an inevitable consequence. Of 
course any shift in critical focus away from questions of 
individual morality towards questions of the social ~ 
towards a view of subjectivity as socially and culturally 
contingent rather than given - is a progressive one for 
feminism, 4 and it is therefore to Defoe's feminist critics 
that Woolf speaks.most strongly. 
Woolf's tentative steps towards emphasizing Defoe's 
social criticism in defence of Mol~'s so-called "rule of 
thumb morality" are more fully developed in Lois Chaber's 
paper on women and capital in Moll Flanders (1982). Chaber 
writes in opposition to traditional critics such as Terence 
Martin whose interpretation~ focus on Moll's psychological 
characteristics, usually at her expense. Thus where Martin 
reads Moll's escape through London streets after her first 
theft - a breathless flight through a maze of backstreets -
as an objective correlative for Moll's "confused 
psychology", Chaber is quick to point out that these 
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literally tortuous streets exemplify what Raymond Williams 
calls (in The Country and the City) the "forced labyrinths 
and alleys of the poor." As an emblem for the whole novel, 
then, suggests Chaber, they more appropriately evoke the 
"twisted course laid for Moll in an unjust society." 
212) 
(1982: 
Similarly, where Moll's constant hiding of money from 
husbands or lovers has been attributed (by traditional 
patriarchal critics) to her "innate criminality", or at best 
her "middle-class pettiness", Chaber reads it as Moll's only 
available while ironically fragile means of defence a~ainst 
·the legalized theft of women's property rights. (1982: 216) 
At another point, where Moll's expressed admiration, in the 
early pages of the novel, for the woman who apparently makes 
a living mending lace but in fact works as a prostitute, has 
been interpreted as an ironic revelation of Moll's "real". 
aspirations, Chaber reads it, somewhat sardonically, as a 
bit of black humour attacking a society in which sex is the 
only self-supporting profession for women. (1982: 220) 
In Chaber's view, Martin typifies what she scathingly 
r•fers to as "those well-meaning participants in the great 
debate over irony in Moll Flanders who seek to elevate the 
quality of Defoe's novel by deflating the moral status of 
its heroine." (In other words, if Moll can be shown 
conclusively to be inherently immoral, then Defoe can no 
longer be ac6used of inconsistency with regard to the moral 
claims he makes for the novel) While she is sympathetic to 
their respect for Defoe's art, Chaber takes issue with their 
designation of his satirical target. His social criticism, 
she suggests, has ~een converted too often into 
psychological comedy: Far from being the constituents of 
comedy, however, Chaber suggests that "[t]he heroine's 
allegedly indelicate, immoral and illegal activities are [in 
fact] emanations and illuminations of a burgeoning 
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patriarchal capitalist community - or anticommunity - the 
novel's main object of concern." (1982: 212) 
So while Martin reads Moll Flanders as psychological 
comedy, Chaber, from her Marxist/feminist perspective, reads 
the novel as social criticism. And the consequences, in 
their different interpretations of the psyche of the 
fictional Moll, are significant: Chaber looks at Moll as a 
social being; following in the footsteps of the great 
Marxist critic Georg Lukacs, she ~oncentrates her attention 
on what Lukacs described as the "organic, indissoluble 
connection between [woman] as a private individual and 
[woman] as a social being, as a member of a community." 
According to Chaber, Moll is to be read as a "meeting-point 
of the forces of change": "The social setting of Moll 
Flanders," she writes, "is a classic instance of one of 
Marx's 'periods of transformation', in which the 'material 
forms of production in society come in conflict with the 
existing property relations of production', and the heroine, 
with her bourgeois enterprise on the one hand and her desire 
for a genteel spouse on the other, embodies historically 
conflicting classes." (1982: 212),6 
Other Marxist critics have also attempted, like Chaber, 
to shift judgement from Moll's "soul" - from her inherent 
morality or immorality - to the environment in which she 
struggles to survive. (see, for example, Kettle, 1973(1964]) 
But in Chaber's view, though they concede the significance 
of Moll's gender in Defoe's social commentary, they do not 
go far enough in analyzing his choice of a woman to reflect 
the bourgeois landscape. For Chaber, Defoe's critique of 
capitalism is inseparable from his critique of sexism: 
"Defoe uses Moll's roles as criminal and woman - both 
outsiders - to criticize emergent capitalism, but in so 
doing he also reveals the more long-standing evils of 
sexism ... He exposes the worst evils of capitalist society 
through the activities of women ... " (1982: 213) 
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The contradictions in the novel, then, which to Ian 
Watt are a product of Defoe's techni6al incompetence, are 
attributed a more positive value, in Chaber's analysis, as 
representations of "the contradictions in the condition of 
women under capitalism." (1982: 213) Chaber's emphasis on 
these contradictions removes the burden of guilt from Moll 
' 
herself - where, she feels, many traditional critics 
including Ian Watt, have placed it - and focuses instead on 
the extent to which Moll is forced into crime by the laws of 
an unjust society. "The novel," writes Chaber, ''reveals a 
chain of criminality in which Moll is merely one 
link ... [since] Moll is surrounded by persons as 
manipulative, mercenary •nd deceptive as she is ... " (1982: 
213) But the criminal redundancy of Moll's world is a 
consequence not only of the collection of rogues with whom 
she keeps company, but more importantly of a "cancer 
multiplying throughout the social body." The work of 
Chaber's analysis is to diagnose the forms of this "cancer" 
in vindication of the novel's heroine. 
The distinction between Ian Watt's reading of Moll 
Flanders, and Lois Chaber's, would seem then to underwrite a 
distinction between two different ways of viewing identity, 
which have produced two different interpretations of the 
novel. Where Chaber sees the character of Moll as the 
medium through •hich Defoe reveals to us the "concrete 
social and legal conditions throttling woman's potential", 
Ian Watt sees her as a somewhat clumsy or ill-conceived 
embodiment of what should amount to the innate and abstract 
qualities of women themselves. Because, as he puts it, Moll 
"accepts none of the disabilities of her sex," Watt 
considers that the essence of her fictional character and 
·actions is "masculine". In this formulation, Watt is 
measuring Defoe's success in his portrayal of the character 
of Moll Flanders ·against his own notion of what constitutes 
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femininity, and this he believes is something which should 
be common to all women. One's identity then, according to 
Watt's view is innate, inherent, ''natural"; and women are 
innately, inherently different from men. The view of 
identity implicit in Chaber's article, on the other hand, 
takes identity to be socially and culturally contingent, 
largely a consequence of the social environment in which it 
is forged, a "product of the historical process". 
Watt is prepared to concede that his own prognosis on 
Moll's "essential masculinity" is a "personal impression" 
which would be difficult, if not impossible to establish. 
But it is at least certain, he goes on, "that Moll accepts 
none of the disabilities of her sex, and indeed one cannot 
but feel that Virginia Woolf's admiration for her was 
largely due to admiration of a heroine who so fully realised 
one of the ideals of feminism: freedom from any involuntary 
involvement in the feminine role." (1987[1957]: 113) The 
crucial point here is how exactly to define "the feminine 
role". Moll's failure to fulfill it is attributed by Watt 
to Defoe's shortcomings as a novelist, to his inability to 
portray his protagonists in a truly "lifelike" manner - an 
attitude which, I would suggest, could in turn be attributed 
to the limitations in his critical views as to what 
constitutes a good novel, to what J. Paul Hunter (1988) 
might have called his "anxieties about realism" 7 ; an 
attitude which is now compounded with some further 
"anxieties", this time about the question of "femininity", 
along with a somewhat narrow view of what ~onstitute the 
"ideals of feminism". Rather than aspiring to free 
themselves from "involuntary involvement in the feminine 
role", what many feminists would wish to underline, once and 
for all, is the fact that the mythological "feminine role" 
is itself the problem, that the "feminine role", such as it 
is, has no natural existence, and is itself an ideological 
construct. 
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In my vi~w. Moll's evasion, as a fictional construct, 
of any readily available sexed definition, her uneasy 
vacillation between the so-called masculine and feminine 
roles, and even more important, her vacillations within the 
various available assignations of "the feminine" -
alternately and at once wife, mistress, mother, whore -
constitute neither a structural weakness in the novel, nor 
are they to be read as an index of Moll's "confused 
psychology". Rather, her vacillations are best read as 
evasions, resistances, refusals of the fixing of identity 
and all that it entails. In support of this idea, I would 
now like to turn to Denise Riley. 
III 
In her recent essay Am I that Name?, Riley traces the 
trajectory of the categorisation of women - of social and 
discursive constructions of female identity - from medieval 
times to the present. Her thesis is that the unmet needs 
and sufferings of women spring both from a concrete social 
reality of oppression, as well as from the ways in which 
women are positioned or defined, often harshly or stupidly, 
as "women". Thus from Renaissance theological definitions of 
woman as the "inferior of the male by nature, his equaL by 
grace"; through Rousseauesque invocations of the "sex" of a 
woman as a generally suffusing characteristic ("The male is 
only .a male now and again, the female is always a female, or 
at least all her youth; everything reminds her of her sex"), 
to the Hegelian conception of woman as intelligible only 
within her various immersions in the familyi Riley maps the 
increasing saturation, across the centuries, of women with 
their sex. 
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"The troubles of "women"," she writes, tt .. aren't 
unique." But they are arguably peculiar in that women - half 
the human population - have suffered from a peculiar "weight 
of characterization". This represents one part of the double 
bind with which feminism, in Riley's view, now has to deal. 
On the one hand it is clear that the actions and needs of 
women have to be fished out of obscurity, to be made more 
visible. At the same time, it is also evident that, ~s Riley 
insists, ''there are-always too many invocations of "women", 
too much visibility, too many attempts to categorise women 
which would be better dissolved again." (4) 
Riley -is totally opposed to all notions of an innate 
female identity, an identity which is natural to all women, 
and which renders them ideal for certain roles, certain 
occupations, while not for others. In her view, one's 
identity is never fixed, never stable, and it is only 
sometimes dependent on one's sex. Identity then, is a 
perpetually fluctuating state. Her study is aimed at 
exposing the essentially artificial nature of all the 
numerous definitions and categorisations over the centuries 
of feminine identity, and of the supposedly pre-ordained 
"feminine role" in society. Riley's thesis is that in the 
end, what these definitions describe has nothing to do with 
the innate characteristics of women, only with the way they 
have been positioned in patriarchal society. 
According to Riley, the legacy of the eighteenth 
century was an intensification of the notion of a 
"n~turalised femininity'' placed firmly within the domestic 
realm, within the family. Indeed, Defoe could be said to 
have made his own contribution to this legacy in the form of 
his "conduct manuals", The Family Instructor (1715,1718) 
Religious Courtship (1722) and Conjugal Lewdness (1727). In 
these manuals, Defoe provides us with a particularly obvious 
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case of the ''positioning" of women in patriarchal social 
systems, their "subjettion" in language. Part of the 
project of these manuals is of course precisely to define 
''the feminine role", to delimit a fixed position, indeed a 
fixed identity, for women. 
In a recent reading of the conduct manuals, Carol 
Houlihan Flynn (see Flynn, 1987) concludes that in Defoe's 
ideal domestic economy, the wife would nec~ssarily 
volunt~rily surr~nder her will, fi~st of all to God's and 
then to that of the husband. It is no doubt true - and 
Flynn concedes the fact - that Defoe, who insisted that 
there be "justice" between husband and wife - could be 
called an. "early champion of feminist ideals". But Flynn 
suggests that in the manuals, he speaks for a system which 
is ''at war with its own imperatives": While they do grant 
certain freedoms to women, 'the manuals simultaneously 
advocate that women maintain a submissive role and that they 
remain fixed within the domestic realm. 
Also, although Defoe outlaws any form of physical 
coercion by the husband, he nevertheless demands an 
"affectionate compliance" fr6m the wife. Like the "subject" 
in Althusserian theory, the woman must freely choose her 
subjection; while no woman should be forced to obey her 
husband~ every woman should freely choose her subjection to 
the husband's will: "The woman," writes Defoe, "not only 
must submit to family instruction, but also must submit 
consciously, even joyously." (cited in Flynn, 1987: 80)' In 
this way, her subjection can be made to appear both 
"necessary" and "natural" - "a voluntary submission to the 
good." "I don't take the state of Matrimony to be designed 
as that of apprentices who are bound to the Family, and that 
the Wife is to be us'd only as the Uppe~ Servant in the 
House," claims Defoe in Conjugal Lewdness (cited in Flyrin, 
1987: 81) But when all is said and done, the patriarchal 
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dispensation advanced in the manuals insists absolutely upon 
submission to the law of the father. 
In the novels, many of the contradictions implicit in 
the writings of the conduct manuals are thrown strongly into 
relief. This, as Flynn points out, is because of the 
"terrible instability" revealed in his novelistic domestic 
economies but absent in the conduct manuals: 
When Defoe, the author of conduct manuals, demands 
self-control and moral management, he presupposes a 
domestic life of stability and substance safe from 
arbitrary intrusions from invisible hands. His 
citizens and their wives worry over mutual 
subordination and family worship, but .they are always 
certain that they possess a parlour to pray in. His 
novelistic domestic economies, however, reveal a 
terrible instability. (1987: 84) 
In the novels - not least in Moll Flanders - "the moral 
imperatives of the conduct manuals become what Moll calls 
'by the way·, irrelevant incidentals in a world of tragic-
comic accidents where your husband turns out to be your 
brother and your serving-maid is actually your daughter. 
Family structures turn perverse, while the 'natural' self 
ap~arently regulated in-the conduct manuals strains against 
material circumstances that make nuclear domesticity not 
only 'imaginary·, but unimaginable." (1987: 85) What 
emerges in the novels, in other words, is no less than the 
impossibility of the feminine ideal represented in the 
manuals, since only in an atmosphere of total domestic and 
economic stability - virtually impossible to sustain in 
reality - could such an ideal be met. 
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In Moll Flanders, I would suggest, Defoe's presentation 
\ 
of "the fortunes and misfortunes" of his famoµs heroine goes 
one step further, to reveal not only the impossibility of 
the conduct book exemplar, but the artificiality of many of 
those patriarchal organisations of the female sex into 
specific positions in society. From the moment of her 
birth, and throughout her eventful life, Moll will shift 
uneasily between the various positions available to her as a 
woman in a patriarchal and capitalist society, thus exposing 
the artificial nature of those positions. (As we learn from 
the title page itself, she will be ... "12 year a whore, 5 
times a wife (whereof once to her own brother) 12 year a 
thief, 8 year a transported felon in Virginia, at last grew 
rich, lived honest and died a penitent".)• Often this 
instability takes the form of a disparity between Moll's 
designation in the eyes of the l~w (her official 
designation, or position) and the role she is forced into by 
the reality of her social situation (her actual position): 
For example, her first legal marriage to her lover's 
brother - the younger son of the family who takes her in on 
the death of her "Mistress-N~rse" - finds Mcill "wife" in the 
eyes of the law to a man she perceives more as a "brother-
in-law", while legally "sister-in-law" to the one to whom 
for some time she has been "Mistress", and to whom in 
reality she feels it her right to call herself "wife": In 
Moll's words, "he should never be able to say that I who he 
had persuaded to call myself his Wife, and who had given him 
the Liberty to use me as a Wife, was n~t as Faithful to him 
as a Wife ought to be, what ever he might be to me." (MF, 
39) To her lover, on the other hand, Moll may be defined in 
whatever way appears most convenient to him at the time, 
while whatever else she is 'or has been can remain "wrapt up 
in an eternal Silence": 
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But here my Dear, says he, you may come into a safe 
,_, 
Station, and appear with Honour and with splendor at 
once, and the Remembrance of what we have done may be 
wrapt up in an eternal Silence, as if it had never 
happen'd; you shall always have my respect, and my 
sincere Affection, only then it shall be Honest, and 
perfectly ~ust to my Brother; you shall be my Dear 
Sister, as now you are my Dear -------- and there he 
stop'd. 
Your Dear whore, says I, you would have said, if 
you had gone on, and you might as well have said 
it ... However, I desire you to remember ... that I was 
your Wife intentionally, tho' not in the Eye of the 
World, and that it was as effectual a Marriage that had 
pass'd between us as if we had been publickly Wedded by 
the Parson of the Parish ... " (MF, 59) 
Not only is she ''Wife" at heart to one roan, while to 
another "in the Eye of the World", Moll's predicament also 
makes her an adultress, in spirit even if not in the eye of 
the law. The rift between one's public persona - the name 
one assumes in the Eye of the World - and that which one 
assumes in private is often, as Moll's commentary after her 
husband's death suggests, formidable: 
I confess I was not suitably affected with the loss of 
my Husband ... for he was a tender, kind, good humour'd 
Man as any Woman could desire; but his Brother being so 
·always in my sight, at least, while we were in the 
Country, was a continual Snare to me; and I never was 
in Bed with my Husband, but I wish'd my self in the 
Arms of his Brother; and tho' his Brother never offer'd 
me the least Kindness that way, after our Marriage, but 
carried it just as a Brother ought to do; yet, it was 
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impossible for me to do so to him: In short, I 
committed Adultery and Incest with him every Day in my 
Desires, which without doubt, was as effectually 
criminal in the Nature of the Guilt, as if I had 
actually done it. (MF, 76) 
Later, Moll will find herself legally still married to 
her "gentleman-trader" husband, the draper (and therefore, 
as she put~ it, ''limitted" from marrying ~gain) while in 
reality single, and forced again to put herself on the 
marriage "market". Having been abandoned to fend for 
herself by the draper, who escapes to France after landing 
them both in debt, Moll nevertheless remains his wife in the 
eye of the law. In actuality, as she wryly remarks, she is 
more of a widow since she expects never to see her husband 
again. The social position Moll finds herself in as a 
result could hardly be more awkward: 
However with all this ... I found upon casting things 
up, my Case was very much alter'd, and my Fortune much 
lessen'd ... and my Condition was very odd, for tho' I 
had no Child, (I had one by my Gentleman Draper, but it 
was buried,) yet I was a Widow bewitched, I had a 
Husband, and no Husband, and I could not pretend to 
Marry again, tho' I knew well enough my Husband would 
never see England any more, if he liv'd fifty Years: 
Thus I say, I was limitted from Marriage, what Offer 
soever might be made me: and I had not one Friend to 
advise with, in the Condition I was in, at least not 
one I durst Trust the Secret of my Circumstances to, 
for if the Commissioners were to have been inform'd 
where I was, I should have been fetch'd up and examin'd 
upon Oath, and all I had sav'd be taken away from me. 
(MF, 80) 
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Later still, in Virginia, Moll will find herself 
legally married to a man who actually turns out to be her 
half-brother, making her both wife and sister to the same 
man, while simultaneously,mother and aunt to their two 
children. The moment of Moll's discovery of her actual 
plight is one of the many moments in the novel when the 
constitutive power of language - its power to position and 
place the human subject - is brought sharply into relief. 
For some time, Moll has lived prosperously, thinking herself 
''the happiest Creature alive" when, in a moment, an "odd and 
surprising Event" renders her condition ''the most 
uncomfortable, if not the most miserable, in the World." 
(MF, 68) The "Event'' Moll here refers to is effectively an 
event of language, the "Story" in which her mother reveals 
her true name - one which leaves Moll "the most unhappy of 
all Women in the World": "O had the Story never been told 
me," laments Moll, "all had been well; it had been no Cr~me 
to have lain with my Husband, since as to his being my 
Relation, I had known nothing of it." (MF, 70) It is only 
once her condition is named - placed within the "prison-
ho~se" of language - that it takes on any real significance 
Moll. 
Moll's precarious and contradictory identity, generated 
in a succession of fictional situations such as the above, 
in which she simultaneously assumes conflicting social 
positions, reads as a form of "resistance" to the roles that 
the narrative prepares for her - a refusal of the positions 
offered her in"a patriarchal and capitalist society, a 
refusal to submit to the forms of organization of sexuality 
which result in the p~oduction of those sexual categories, 
"male" and "female", on which sexual discrimination is 
·based. Moll "resists" all fixed social positions, even as 
they are thrust upon her, and in the process lays bare what 
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Riley might call their "inherent shakiness". None of these 
positions, any more than the meaning of the words in which 
they are inscribed, are "natural", s~crosanct or inviolate. 
Another symptom of that "shakiness", appears in the 
ambiguity surrounding the term ""gentlewoman". What would 
it mean to fall under the designation "gentlewoman"? To the 
linguistically untutored Moll, the genteel world represents 
the possibility of evading the role she is destined for 
through birth - that of a servant. An emblem of her desire 
for independence, the gentlewoman, as she tells the 
mayoress, would be anyone "that did not go to service, to do 
House-Work". Moll is yet too naive to appreciate the social 
meaning of the word, its public significance ("for [my good 
old nurse, Mrs. Mayoress, and all the rest of them] meant 
one Sort of thing, by the Word Gentlewoman, and I meant 
quite another") and later she will confuse the term with 
that of "prosititute", or as her Nurse puts it, "Person of 
ill Fame". In its official sense, as recorded in the OED, 
the designation "gentlewoman" (''a woman of good birth or 
breeding, a lady") is forever denied to those not born to 
it; it is inherent. As an orphan, then, Moll's pretensions 
to the genteel life threaten the ''natural" social order, the 
social status quo; hence the reactions of outrage and 
amusement Moll's aspirations provoke in her nurse (" ... why, 
what? said she, is the Girl mad?") and in the mayoress. 
But in the fiction, on more than one occasion during her 
life as a thief, Moll's very success. in this vocation will 
depend on her ability to adopt a gentlewoman's guise, to 
pass herself off as a lady. (see, for example, MF, 165 ff.) 
In the resulting conflation of two apparently disparate 
roles, two ostensibly opposing identities - that of thief 
and lady - Moll reveals the artificial nature of both. One 
is neither inherently a gentlewoman, nor is one inherently a 
thief. Inherently - to adopt Riley's model - one is only a 
fluctuating identity, publicly fixed and privately re-
defined. 
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The continual tension between Moll's public and private 
persona, her predicament as a woman who leans away 9 from the 
positions prepared for her by her culture, who exceeds the 
limits of her expected narrative role, forces Moll into a 
secretive existence, a life of masks and masquerades, as she 
strains to accomodate the forms of her desires and 
aspirations to the restricting forms of her subjection to 
the law. 10 Thus on the brink of her first sexual affair, 
Moll will leave the house to meet her lover hooded and .. 
concealed behind a face mask. (MF, 23} After the desertion 
to France of her second husband, the draper, Moll is forced 
by circumstance to lodge herself where she is totally 
unknown, to dress in the habit of a widow and to assume the 
pseudonym Mrs. Flanders. (MF, 51) The success of her 
elaborate seduction of her next husband, undertaken with the 
help of her intimate friend, the Captain's Lady, is 
contingent on her masquerading as a "widow of fortune". 
(MF, 61 ff} Outside the moral order through most of the 
novel, both as a woman who will not be contained by the 
sexual definitions of her culture, and as a criminal, Moll's 
only defence is her virtual anonymity, even amongst her 
partners in crime: 
Here again my old Caution stood me in good stead; 
Namely, that tho' I often robb'd with these People, yet 
I never let them know who I was, or where I Lodg'd. 
my Name was publick among them indeed; but how to find 
me out they knew not ... and this wariness was my safety 
upon all these Occasions. (MF, 173} 
Indeed, her entire narrative is written under an 
assumed name - that of Moll Flanders - as a form of 
protection from the law, since her true name, as she writes, 
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is still so well known in the records of two significant 
representatives of the law in eighteenth century England -
Newgate Prison, and the criminal court adjoining it, the Old 
Bailey. 
Ultimately, Moll's anonymity - her refusal to be 
publicly named, officially placed in the eye of the law -
reads as yet another refusal of her subjection to the 
patriarchal and capitalistic forms of organization of her 
fictional world. And it is here, as I have already 
suggested, that the novel makes its most important statement 
for feminism. Further testimony to the strength of the 
novel's resistance to patriarchal structures lies in its 
heroine's disruption of the classifications and 
preconceptions of traditional literary criticism. All 
at~empts, on the part of critics such as Ian Watt to define 
Moll, to categorise her, to label her, to "put her in her 
place" as a character, as representation of "woman", have 
thus far proved inconclusive. Critics continue to compete 
amongst themselves for the final word, and Moll contiriues to 
refuse to let them have it. 
What the continuing critical debates over the character 
of Moll represent is the critics' desire for "complete 
elucidation" 11 of her, total knowledge of her; and if 
possession of knowledge means possession of power, then so 
far in this struggle for knowledge, for possession of power, 
it is Moll who has emerged victorious. Perhaps this is what 
Joyce had in mind when he said that Christian Davies, 
together with the ''adventuress Roxana" and the 
"unforgettable harl~t Moll Flanders", forms the trio of 
female characters which has reduced contemporary criticism 
to stupefied impotence. 
NOTES 
All page references to Moll Flanders will be to the Norton 
Critical Edition (1973. Kelly, Edward (ed.) New York: W.W. 
Norton and Co.), and will be included in the text, 
abbreviated as MF. 
1. The concepts of transference and countertransference are 
notoriously difficult to define, the reason for this, 
according to Laplanche and Pontalis, being that "for 
many authors the notion has taken ~n a very broad 
extension, even coming to connote all the phenomena 
which constitute the patient's relationship with the 
psychoanalyst." (Laplanche: 456) For our purposes, 
Toril Moi's rough definition in Patriarchal Thought and 
the Drive for Knowledge will do: "If Transference in 
analysis can be roughly defined as the process whereby 
the patient transfers earlier traumas and reactions, 
whether real or imaginary, on to the analyst, 
countertransf erence may be characterized as the 
analyst's more or less unconscious reactions to the 
discourse of the patient, or rather to the transference 
of the patient. Transference and countertransference 
engage analyst and analysand in 'a c~mplex, differential 
set of interactions, which may literally 'make or break' 
the analysis. The truth of the analysis, its power to 
cure, is the discursive construction of this 
transferential network ... " (1989: 197) 
2. For the most part, the collection of essays in Defoe: 
The Critical Heritage (see Rogers, 1972) along with 
those in the Norton Critical Edition (1973) are 
representative of this tradition. Apart from one or two 
exceptions, my analysis of the tradition will 
concentrate on articles reproduced in these two critical 
anthologies. 
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3. In his chapter on Moll Flanders in Defoe's Narratives: 
Situations and Structures (1975), Richetti describes the 
nov_el as the "centre" of the critical debate surrounding 
Defoe's irony: "In that argument," he writes, "Ian 
Watt's distinction between a consciously ironic work 
with a coherent ironic structure and a work like Moll 
Flanders which is primarily ironic in our perception of 
it as such strikes me as conclusive. Watt admits that 
there are occasional ironic situations, but he argues 
persuasively that the ~eep moral incpnsistencies in the 
book derive not from Defoe's moral plan but from related 
formal and ideological problems ... " (1975: 94) Some 
replies to Watt's argument have rested on Defoe's 
journalism, which makes it clear that he used irony more 
clearly (and more effectively) elsewhere and therefore 
must be employing it in Moll Flanders. In Richetti's 
view, Watt himself provides a fair compromise between 
the two positions in his survey of the controversy in 
"The Recent Critical Fortunes of Moll Flanders", in 
Eighteenth Century Studies, 1 (1967): The point to 
begin with in any discussion of Moll Flanders, notes 
Richetti, is, as Watt put it, that "Defoe's genius as an 
observer, together with a narrative technique that did 
not force him to prejudge his material, may well have 
produced a ~asterpiece which is, unintentionally but 
enduringly, a compre·hensi ve image of the ambiguous and 
dehumanizing conflicts into which modern civilization 
plunges its unhappy natives." (Richetti, 1975: 95) All 
these arguments are based on a (pre-Freudian) notion of 
a unified expressive subject, whose intentions are pure 
and whose mastery of language is (or should be) complete 
a view of the subject disrupted by Defoe's writing, 
and particularly by Moll Flanders. Traditional 
criticism then attempts to explain this disruption by 
locating it as a problem of irony. My own approach will 
.\ 
see'.k to explain the problem differently by locating it 
/ 
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precisely as a problem of the inadequacy of pre-Freudian 
notions of the subject, identity and intention in 
language as founding assumptions for the analysis of 
literary texts. 
4. The tendency to hold the morality of women as by nature 
questionable goes back at least to the Renaissance, 
during which time it was generally believed that woman's 
assignation to the cold and moist humours - her chemical 
make-up - undermined her emotional control and her 
reasoning powers - since the latter were associated with 
warmth and dryness. Only in the next life, after death, 
would woman be free of her inferiority to m.en. (see 
Riley, 1988: 18-35) In The Renaissance Notion.of Woman, 
Ian Maclean points out that most writers in the 
Renaissance suggest that woman is less well endowed than 
man with moral apparatus, and continue the practice of 
praising saintly women for their "paradoxical" virtue. 
But, like woman's subordination to her husband and her 
disqualification from full participation in the 
spiritual life, this inequality is attached to this life 
only, and all commentators stress that she will share 
equally in the joys of paradise: "In theologi~al terms, 
woman is, therefore, the inferior of the male by nature, 
his equal by grace." (Riley, 1988: 25) Equally 
damaging is the more modern opposing myth which, as Lois 
Chaber puts it, reserves for women the "humanity" 
atrophied in men competing in a vicious capitalistic 
society: "Excluded from production by capitalistic 
society, women were left to gain their identity from the 
inner world of psychological~emotion~l life, and they 
were endowed with a moral superiority to compensate for 
their economic diminution." (Chaber, 1982: 223) In 
fact, this is mor~ likely to be the myth subscribed to -
whether consciously or unconsciously - by modern 
patriarchal critics, such as Watt. It is from 
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expectations rooted in this, sexist myth, suggests 
Chaber, that reactions of disbelief ~nd moral outrage at 
Moll's beha~iour are derived. 
5. For Defoe's own analysis of the evolving displacement of 
the aristocracy by the middle class, see his Conjugal 
Lewdness, or Matrimonial Whoredom - A Treatise on the 
Use and Abuse of the Marriage Bed, pp 256-57. See also 
Juliet Mitchell's social historical analysis in her 
introduction to the Penguin Clas~ics edition of the 
novel: "In essence, the novel is a vivid dramatization 
of the conflicts and confusions over values that took 
place in -0ne of the most interesting periods of English 
history - a period of turmoil during the establishment 
of the moral and legal basis of modern capitalist 
society ... The changes had to be worked through a~ all 
levels of society. The old values not only had to be 
overthrown but also had to be replaced. In a very real 
way the ground rules of everday life and 'common sense· 
terms and notions had to be re-defined. Thus the period 
is one of profound value confusion and of unusual 
social, ~conomib and moral mobility - the like of which 
has not been seen sine~ in England." (1978: 5, 10) 
6. One of the quarrels Marxist feminists have with classic 
Marxism is its failure to invesitigate the historical 
effects on patriarchal relations of changes in modes of 
production. See, for example, Annette Kuhn and AnnMarie 
Wolpe, "Feminism and Materialism", and Roison McDonough, 
~Patriarchy and Relations of Production", in Kuhn and 
Wolpe (eds.) Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes 
of Production (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) 
7. In a recent article called "Novels and 'the Novel': The 
Poetics of Embarrassment" (Hunter, 1988), J. Paul 
Hunter brings into focus a number of those features in 
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the eighteenth century novel which, he says, "embarrass" 
readers who bring to the novel "rigid formal 
expectations" because these features do not "fit" the 
readers' conceptions of what the eighteenth century 
novel is, or ought to be. One of the main problems with 
the way i~ which many readers approach the novel, 
according to Hunter, stems from what he calls their 
"anxieties about ;realism'." Hunter points out that in 
discussions of the novel, the term has tended to become 
normative, so that novels tend to be judged 
qualitatively on the degree or amount of realism to be 
found in each, as if more is better. He suggests that 
modern criticism of all kinds, criticism of fiction in 
particular, but also criticism of drama, poetry and 
autobiography, tends to be realism-centred, with 
individual works achieving a place on the scale directly 
proportional to the amount of "reality" that can be 
certified and tallied up in each: "Traditional 
novelistic theory, based as it is on analogies with more 
traditional and more conservati~e literary forms and the 
structures that support them, does not like to hear the 
multiple voices in novels or recognize the presence of 
competing modes within individual works. Recent 
narrative theory has been more willing to accept odd, 
lumpy, and unexpected features, but criticism concerned 
primarily with novels ... remain(s] intolerant of 
features that do not meet preconceived standards. 
Definitions remain high-minded, novels recalcitrant." 
(480) These ideas seem particularly pertinent in the 
case of Ian Watt: Influenced as he is by his own 
anxieties about realism, Watt's final verdict on Defoe 
conceded that "history" may have lent his "artless 
veracity" an."adventitious charm", but that this should 
not deceive us as to his real worth: "We rejoice to see 
a writer so innocently unaware of how novels are 
supposed to be written, and we are tempted to find irony 
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and moral sophistication because we cannot credit that 
so remarkable a writer and so amazing a man could have 
produced so many contradictions in a spirit of genuine 
naivety. That, at least, is the main problem his novels 
pose for readers today." 
8. My account of the fluctuating nature of female identity 
can be contrasted with Richetti's suggestion (see 
Richetti, 1975) that: "The imaginative centre of Moll 
Flanders lies in its ratification of the possibility of 
private survival and even autonomy." (1975: 140) For 
Richetti, the problem of Moll's fluctuation is resolved 
by the following hypothesis: "Moll responds to events 
and dominates them, but she cannot be said to initiate 
them. What she must have of a primary and assertive 
nature is a residual self we have already observed in 
the process of being frustrated and submerged because of 
the nature of the social world." (1975: 101) 
Richetti's account would seem to be influenced by an 
American style "ego-p~ychology" in which the self can 
always emerge triumphant: " ... the real movement of 
Defoe's novels is not simply towards the determinants of 
character but rather towards the depiction of a 
dialectic between self and other which has as its end a 
covert but triumphant assertion of the self." (1975: 
as) My own account stresses a different Freudian theme: 
that of the instability of identity, and particularly 
female identity, its constant failing rather than its 
"triumphant assertion". 
9. The reference is to "Woman, leaning away", by South 
African poet Ingrid de Kok, from her recent anthology 
Familiar Ground (Ravan Press, 1988). One of the themes 
explored in de Kok's poetry is the complex of identities 
and positions demanded of women in South African society 
today. 
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10. It is interesting to note the connection between the 
"mask of womanliness" adopted by analyst Joan Riviere's 
patient (see Riviere, 1986(1929]) and the series of 
fals~ identities Moll is forced to assume in order to 
survive in her fictional social environment. The case 
from which Riviere.develops her argument involves a 
successful intellectual woman who sought reassurance 
from men after her public engagements by ~dopting "a 
mask of womanliness" as a defence - "to avert anxiety 
and the retribution feared from men." (1986(1919]: 35) 
What emerges from the case is a notion of femininity as 
itself a masquerade - 'the woman' as male fiction, 
construction, condition (Heath, 1986: 49) Although none 
of the masquerades adopted by Moll involve the 
assumption specifically of Riviere's patient's "mask of 
womanliness", in both cases the need to assume a false 
identity springs from the impossibilty of the positions 
assigned to women by patriarchal systems of 
organization. 
11. The reference is to Freud's .expression of his own desire 
for "complete elucidation" in the case of Dora: "I 
should have been very well satisfied if the 
circumstances had allowed me to give a complete 
elucidation of this case of petite hysterie. And my 
experience with other patients leaves me in no doubt 
that my analytic method would have enabled me to do 
so ... " (Freud, 1905(1901]: 54) 
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